I haven't had an opportunity to read it all in detail (you can find it here) but one of the areas that most interested me was how MAJ Hasan had managed to avoid being considered a threat prior to Ft. Hood, given his activities, and some sort of action taken earlier on.
In a very telling section, the panel that reviewed the incident made some revealing findings and had what I'd consider some damning words for Hasan's former chain of command:
I found it interesting that they called it a failure of "officership", i.e. the fact that whether you are a doctor or some other specialty, you are still a military officer and expected to do your duty as a member of the military profession. That duty means evaluating the whole officer, not just his or her academics and certainly not ignoring warning signs as obvious as Hasan's.
We conclude that although the policies we reviewed were generally adequate, several officers failed to comply with those policies when taking action regarding the alleged perpetrator. We recommend you refer matters of accountability for those failures to the Secretary of the Army for appropriate action.
We also recommend you direct further action on two key concerns identified during our review. We believe that some medical officers failed to apply appropriate judgment and standards of officership with respect to the alleged perpetrator. These individuals failed to demonstrate that officership is the essence of being a member of the military profession regardless of the officer’s specialty. We also found that some medical officers failed to include the alleged perpetrator’s overall performance as an officer,rather than his solely academic performance, in his formal performance evaluations. An individual’s total performance, academic and non-academic, in a school environment must be a partof the formal performance evaluation process to preclude decisions on that individual’s career from being flawed because of incomplete information.
Both types of failures, in our view, were significant and warrant immediate attention.
It appears, given this short blurb that some - and I want to stress that, this isn't some type of blanket indictment of all in the medical corps - in his chain of command ignored that which wasn't strictly academic and thus gave an incomplete picture of this officer which apparently hid those warning signs.
I can tell you from personal experience, no one likes to write an adverse performance evaluation. When you do, you do it with the understanding that you're at best limiting the officer's career and at worst, probably ending it. It is not an easy thing to do. But your duty to the military profession is to honestly and completely evaluate those that work for you to the best of your professional ability even if it might mean ending a career. In the profession of arms, failure to do so can end up getting people killed on a battlefield, or, in the case of MAJ Hasan, at Ft. Hood.
According to these findings that duty apparently wasn't fulfilled by some in Hasan's chain of command, and that's a failure of leadership. Given that, I certainly agree with the recommendation of the panel that those who didn't do their duty be referred to the Secreatary of the Army for "appropriate" action.