BlackFive

Grim,

I've inserted some comments in your reply below. Also, I have the following caveats regarding my experience and perspectives:

I haven't served at theater/global level (meaning I haven't been above division level or been a drone in the Pentagon), except for a 15 month stint in Pakistan (including 4 months at the US Embassy for President Clinton's visit). There are a lot of things happening behind the scenes that I don't have access to, both in foreign countries and between departments (although I did get to peek behind the 'green curtain' while I was in Pakistan ).

To frame my previous response a little better, I read the slides from a framework of 'see yourself, see the enemy, see the terrain'. I perceive the 'terrain' to include neutral, or non-aligned, indigenous population and their governments (unless they are actively hostile to us), the 'enemy' to include active combatants (and their state sponsors), and 'yourself' to include all instruments of our national power.

My concern with the slides is that I perceive that the 'terrain' and 'yourself' are being underrepresented. Consistent with the '28 Articles', a purely military solution is not generally possible in COIN. Changing the conditions that support, or generate, the situation requires a long term commitment from the 'terrain' and all instruments of national power. I am glad that our senior leaders not only parrot President Bush's assessment that this is a long war, but that our senior leaders are codifying this.

While I was in Pakistan , I had many semi-political discussions with Pakistani officers, and with the few NGO workers I met. I postulated that the 'will of the people' is an inevitability, one that the 'information age' will only accelerate. To me, this is the foundation of the inevitability of democracy spreading (but it must coincide with a means of protecting minority rights, or you don't get democracy, you get mob rule). My subsequent service overseas has reinforced this postulate (or I've got blinders on). The problem is that the people's 'will' might not be something ready for democracy. To whit, if a culture is still trapped in a tribal or feudal mentality (which I perceived to be true in rural Pakistan ), then the people are not ready to make choices on their own, nor are they ready to tolerate dissenting opinion (peacefully). Their 'will' is to look for someone to tell them what to think (at some level). Also, the instruments of government are not ready to protect this fledgling democracy. Elected officials revert to the 'tribal chieftain' role on a national level and corrupt the branches of government (starting with the judiciary). This happened in the 10 years of Pakistan 's 'sham democracy' as GEN Musharef said after his coup.

For nations struggling with the 'will of the people', I believe there are two general routes: the French Revolution and the British Magna Carta. Both eventually led to some form of stable democracy, but by extremely different means (this is a gross oversimplification, but it has proven useful as a discussion tool). I characterize the French route as an effort to solve all of the nation's ills overnight. This solution doesn't work, as it tries to provide a quick (and bloody) fix to problems that take generations to overcome. The British route, while also occasionally bloody, took much longer, and required increasing internal investment and trust in government institutions from the monarchy. Eventually, the British monarchy faded out of direct governance and remains a cherished symbol in Britain . Contrast that to the French monarchy.

I think many of the smaller Arab states see this dichotomy as well. States like Qatar , UAE, Dubai , even Kuwait are investing in their institutions. I believe that these rulers see the writing on the wall and are trying to prevent a local version of the French 'madness' from trying to solve all of their perceived problems overnight, while at the same time setting themselves (the current rulers) up to gradually fade away like the British monarchy. I believe, purely as speculative, that we are quietly helping these states, and are setting them, and ourselves, up for long term success. That this goes relatively unnoticed in the MSM is a touchy subject. I suspect that the MSM would focus on short range and generally negative aspects (i.e. 'they're not changing fast enough'). I believe that Presidents Musharef and Karzai also are trying to implement a 'British' solution, and I sincerely hope that they succeed. The people of Pakistan and Afghanistan deserve responsible and stable democracy.

But…I also believe that most people aren't ready for it. These tribal cultures don't understand, and don't always want to understand, the responsibilities that come with democracy. I think this is especially true of the tribal chieftains…they don't want to give up absolute power for a system of checks and balances, at any level.

My concern is that our (American) experience is vastly different. We did not break away from a tribal/feudal mentality (at least nothing that compares to feudal Britain or what I've seen overseas). Therefore, we discount the immense cultural 'inertia' inherent in other societies. We all too easily overlook the influence of tribalism while looking for a 'quickie' solution.

Regarding 'yourself', I would like to relate an anecdote experience from earlier this year. I was serving in 2ID in Korea when the last NSS came out. Our planners held a 4 hour, voluntary discussion open to anyone interested. The planning team was there (all Majors and Captains), and I participated. Of interest, one of the planners brought up that the State Department, from a briefing he received, does not have a very robust staff, at least not compared to DoD. We have staffs all the way from global/strategic down to battalion level, whereas the State Dept does not have an equivalent. This gives DoD tremendous flexibility to manage chaotic situations, within the constraints of available expertise. By contrast, the State Dept lacks this flexibility, even at the regional level. My own experience in Pakistan confirms this. Even thought the mission there was one of the larger ones, the State Dept had limited ability to coordinate the planning and operations of the many Departments and Bureaus represented there.

To me, this indicates a need for other instruments of national power to develop more thorough staffing HQs. Given resource constraints, I wonder if there is room to integrate these activities at the MACOM (or RCC or whatever we're calling them these days) level.

From my limited direct experience with the State Department (and other Depts/Bureaus), I assess that we have a significant problem with unity of effort. The causes could be many: lack of staffing, or integration of existing staffing; internal friction (as you indicate); lack of focused leadership; institutional inertia; etc.

As for the Cold War scenario, I will have to brush up on my Gaddis. As I recall (according to Gaddis), we set the conditions for victory in the late 50s when we achieved (real or perceived) military parity with the USSR and the Marshall Plan really kicked in. This changed the paradigm of the Cold War from military confrontation to economic competition. Underlying assumptions of the military parity were:

Neither state could avoid a catastrophic second strike Neither state wanted to see their populations incinerated Don't mess around in each other's countries…too inflammatory (hence war by proxy) To support these assumptions, both the US and USSR implemented and tolerated both overt and covert means of verification of each other's nuclear weapons status. Will Iran play by those rules? From what I've seen in open sources, it doesn't look promising.

v/r

MAJ Wegner

From Grim:

[Some personal remarks redacted, here and at the end.]

"Consistent with the '28 Articles', a purely military solution is not generally possible in COIN. Changing the conditions that support, or generate, the situation requires a long term commitment from the 'terrain' and all instruments of national power."

Agree. The bad news, as we've addressed, is that there is a major breakdown in several of the Republic's institutions. (It isn't limited to these matters, I have to say: the Federal government is cracking on several fault lines, the most severe being the judiciary's relationship to the rest of the government -- this week's FISA case is explosive, though it may take a while for people to realize just what the judge said).

The good news is that a lot of these national powers are separately replicated at DOD, which seems to be more-or-less functional at this time. CIA functions are largely, though not entirely, replicated at DIA (as we saw in the Soviet/Afghan conflict; Stansfield Turner's CIA was largely emasculated, but DIA was still able to run operations). USAID functions can be replicated in emergencies by the combatant commander -- PACOM's handling of the Christmas Tsunami remains the best example. State's diplomatic function is also replicable at the combatant commander level, in my experience.

That means we can move forward here, even though some of the basic systems of the Republic are... well, they are broken. It's not just that the wrong people are in charge. It is that the systems themselves no longer work -- State is tied to the UN, so is USAID, and CIA has adopted a risk-averse culture which is totally inappropriate for what is meant to be a cowboy service. The latter is the only of the problems which is being addressed; and, as mentioned, there are some major conflicts in the basic Constitutional mechanisms that are coming to the fore under the stresses of the moment.

"I postulated that the 'will of the people' is an inevitability, one that the 'information age' will only accelerate. To me, this is the foundation of the inevitability of democracy spreading (but it must coincide with a means of protecting minority rights, or you don't get democracy, you get mob rule)."

Agree on first point: democracy is coming.

As to the second point: I agree that you are correct to note that a means to protect minority rights is needful. I don't, however, see any obvious mechanism for doing so evolving.

Indeed, I think the mechanisms for doing this are withering even in America . Federalism was the chief such mechanism, so that Minnesota can have different laws from Georgia . The judiciary problem mentioned above, coupled with the 14th Amendment, means that we are losing that: increasingly, problems are required to have one single solution by Federal courts. That multiplies political tensions that, elsewhere, would result in strengthened insurgent movements -- and, indeed, may result in them here as well, someday.

What, then, is the model we have to propose to nations like Pakistan (or the Philippines , which you rightly mention as important)? It has to be internal autonomy -- as Federalism failed as a model, we are talking about genuinely independent spheres of influence. In other words, the wave of the future isn't a US "state/Federal" model -- it's our relationship with our own internal Native American Tribe Nations.

"The problem is that the people's 'will' might not be something ready for democracy. To whit, if a culture is still trapped in a tribal or feudal mentality (which I perceived to be true in rural Pakistan ), then the people are not ready to make choices on their own, nor are they ready to tolerate dissenting opinion (peacefully). Their 'will' is to look for someone to tell them what to think (at some level)."

I wrote a piece about that, long ago now.  If this is a line of thinking that you refer to often, I'll be so bold as to suggest you might want to read the piece, which is entitled, "The Black Mail."

"My concern is that our (American) experience is vastly different. We did not break away from a tribal/feudal mentality (at least nothing that compares to feudal Britain or what I've seen overseas). Therefore, we discount the immense cultural 'inertia' inherent in other societies. We all too easily overlook the influence of tribalism while looking for a 'quickie' solution."

Well, indeed, our own systems for doing that seem to be failing. As I noted above, I'm not sure our own State/Federal model is sustainable even at home -- and, as you rightly note, our system is unique. Men who have sworn an oath to defend the Constitution, as we have done, are sworn to doing what we can to uphold that system -- but I don't know that it will survive, in spite of us, though I have faith that we shall find a way.

As for exporting it, I don't think that's a thoughtful model. Your own concerns are correct. As "The Black Mail" noted, in the early days of the Iraq war, we should make tribalism work for us -- not work against it.

You mention Iran at the end. I have no workable scenario for Iran that doesn't lead to war. In terms of what we can affect by policy, I think we're looking at timing, not result.

-Grim.

The Major says he hopes to respond tomorrow.  I will keep you posted, but I thought you would be interested by the discussion.