"...I was honored to fight for freedom, and I’d do it again.”

Posted By Mr Wolf

THIS is a story.

The NYT has a great (!) story up in their obits about COL Lewis Millett, who just passed away.  A Medal of Honor recipient, his story is one of the most unusual you will ever read about.

BLUF: He went from the US to the Canadian army in WWII, back to the US, convicted of desertion (and fined 52 dollars) and then fought in Korea and Vietnam.  Honored for the famed Bayonet Hill charge, his legacy will long live on.

Captain Millett was wounded by grenade fragments, but his men took the hill. President Harry S. Truman presented him with the Medal of Honor in July 1951. As the citation put it, “His dauntless leadership and personal courage so inspired his men that they stormed into the hostile position and used their bayonets with such lethal effect that the enemy fled in wild disorder.”

Then, there is this one (WaPo):

As an antitank gunner in Tunisia, he earned the Silver Star after he jumped into a burning ammunition-filled halftrack, drove it away from allied soldiers and leapt to safety just before the vehicle exploded. Not long after, he shot down a German Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter that was strafing Allied troops. Col. Millett, who was firing from machine guns mounted on a halftrack, hit the pilot through the windshield.

God Speed, Colonel.  There are so few like you anymore...

Wolf

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The Coming Afghan Decision - How Much Is Driven By Politics?

Posted By McQ

Richard Fernandez of the Belmont Club writes a very well done essay on the present Afghanistan decision making process. He compares Andrew Sullivan's apologia with David Kilcullen's concerns about the time involved in reaching a decision. You can disregard the Sullivan part except to understand that he thinks it is just marvelous that Obama is taking so much time considering all the options and doing his homework before making a decision to change the strategy there.

Fernandez reminds us of a very important point that seems to have escaped many as they await the decision. The strategy President Obama is planning on changing is his own. In March of this year he said:

Good morning. Today, I am announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This marks the conclusion of a careful policy review that I ordered as soon as I took office. My Administration has heard from our military commanders and diplomats. We have consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments; with our partners and NATO allies; and with other donors and international organizations. And we have also worked closely with members of Congress here at home. Now, I'd like to speak clearly and candidly to the American people. … So let me be clear …

This is surely something the administration would like you to forget. And thus you hear all the nonsense that's been coming out lately (and has gotten pushback from former VP Dick Cheney) that Afghanistan was just left adrift by the former administration. It is nonsense because the basis of the March "careful policy review" was that which the former Bush administration had done.

However that's not really the point – the point is that a "comprehensive, new strategy" for both Afghanistan and Pakistan were announced by this administration. A new general, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was named to implement that strategy. Now, suddenly, they're involved in reviewing that strategy.

What, if anything, has changed?

The event that has been blamed is the national election in Afghanistan. And, as mentioned, it has been coupled with the baseless claim that the Afghan war was left adrift by the Bush administration. The former problem, while serious, isn't a show stopper (see Iraq). The latter problem is simply untrue. What has changed is the politics surrounding Afghanistan. The polls show a deeply divided United States with the majority not favoring an escalation and many favoring we leave altogether. Given his domestic political problems trying to ram an unpopular agenda through Congress - which has succeeded in splitting his base as well as firing up the political opposition - he needs something with which to bring his base back in line. Afghanistan may be that issue.

Consider too who he has involved in his review: VP Joe Biden who is pushing a minimalist "super ninja" strategy. He wants to use special operators and drones to kill al Qaeda. Let Pakistan and Afghanistan sort themselves out politically. Obviously if that means the Taliban takes over Afghanistan again, well, so be it. The fact that Biden was wrong about every aspect of Iraq as he suggested strategy then doesn't seem to matter. Also included is Sen. John Kerry. He's considered such a lightweight when it comes to military matters that he's usually ignored outright when he pontificates on matters about which he obviously hasn't a clue. He thinks Gen. McChrystal's plan goes "too far, too fast". The fact that Kerry has somehow managed to include himself and is apparently being taken seriously by Obama tells you how little Obama knows about any of this and how out of his depth he is on the issue.

Lastly, there's David Axelrod, who claims he "doesn't have a seat at the table" when these policy reviews take place, but attends every one of them anyway. While he may not have an official seat at the policy review table, he owns the table of chief political advisor and Obama sits at that table daily. Axelrod's job is to divine the political winds and keep Obama sailing in the fair ones.

Thus the strategy review. When Gen. McChrystal accepted the job to implement the Obama administration's new March '09 comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he began what all new commanders do – a commander's review. In that review he takes the strategy and mission and he games them out. He attempts to ascertain, to the best of his ability, what it will take in terms of resources to accomplish the mission the strategy outlines. Once he has ascertained that, he submits his plan to his commander – in this case, directly to the President.

It isn't a complicated process – the boss gives you a mission. You analyze the mission, determine what it takes to accomplish the mission and you go back to the boss with a plan and a request for resources. That's precisely what happened.

However, in the interim, politics began to rear its head. In July, right in the middle of the assessment process, Obama's National Security Advisor and former Marine General Jim Jones showed up in Afghanistan and made it very clear that requests for more troops would not be a welcome event. Speaking to Marine commanders there he was quite clear:

Now suppose you're the president, Jones told them, and the requests come into the White House for yet more force. How do you think Obama might look at this? Jones asked, casting his eyes around the colonels. How do you think he might feel?

Jones let the question hang in the air-conditioned, fluorescent-lighted room. Nicholson and the colonels said nothing.

Well, Jones went on, after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, if there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have "a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment." Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to WTF — which in the military and elsewhere means "What the [expletive]?"

Nicholson and his colonels — all or nearly all veterans of Iraq — seemed to blanch at the unambiguous message that this might be all the troops they were going to get.

The "17,000 plus 4,000 more" troops were a part of that March '09 "new" strategy based on the former administration's plans. Jones made it very clear that regardless of what these commanders thought they needed to do the mission they'd been given, they'd better plan on doing it with what they had. And later, in another interview, Jones dismissed any additional troops requests or their need by claiming that all commanders in the field ask for more troops, whether they really need them or not.

Apparently, however, Gen. McChrystal decided, Jones admonishment notwithstanding, that he couldn't with clear conscience, heed that advice and accomplish the mission given (although rumor has it he cut his initial estimate of troops needed from 60,000 to 40,000). He went ahead and submitted his plan at the end of August asking for more resources and troops.

Back to that fairly simple process I outlined above. Once you submit your plan to your boss with the request for resources necessary to accomplish that mission you normally then sit down with him and explain and defend your plan. That, of course, has never happened. And that 20 minutes on the tarmac in Airforce One while in Copenhagen did not give McChrystal the opportunity to do that. That meeting was driven by bad press and politics, not a desire to meet with and discuss the plan McChrystal had submitted. The required meeting, to date, still hasn't happened. But numerous "war council" meetings continue to happen. And as word leaks out, it appears politics – not a mission to succeed in Afghanistan – is taking center stage.

On October 31^st, in their Washington Post article, Anne Kornblut and Greg Jaffe made it clear that Obama was seeking a political decision vs. a military one:

The military chiefs have been largely supportive of a resource request by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, that would by one Pentagon estimate require the deployment of 44,000 additional troops. But opinion among members of Obama's national security team is divided, and he now appears to be seeking a compromise solution that would satisfy both his military and civilian advisers.

A worse scenario cannot be imagined. But it is in perfect keeping with how a politician would work vs. a Commander in Chief. Compromise is the bread-and-butter of politics. It is about keeping constituencies satisfied, if not happy. Contentment means votes. But compromise in terms of military strategy usually means disaster. Attempting to satisfy "both his military and civilian advisers" means he's looking for the best political solution, not the best military solution.

And since such a solution is hardly obvious, he dithers. Sullivan mistakes that for slow, considered and methodical decision making. But in reality, it is a method of stalling as old man himself. Ask for more information, reject the options presented, send your minions back to the drawing board – all the while making the argument or implication that it is the fault of those presenting the options for not getting it right, not the CiC. Of course, anyone with any military experience knows that's nonsense since it is the "commander's guidance" from which any options are derived.

That brings us back to David Kilcullen. If you're not familiar with Kilcullen, he's considered to be one of the gurus when it comes to counter-insurgency warfare. And Kilcullen gets to the very nut of the problem with this "process" that Sullivan mistakenly praises:

David Kilcullen, one of the world's leading authorities on counter-insurgency and an adviser to the British government as well as the US state department, said Obama's delay in reaching a decision over extra troops had been "messy". He said it not only worried US allies but created uncertainty the Taliban could exploit.

Speaking in an interview with the Guardian, he compared the president to someone "pontificating" over whether to send enough firefighters into a burning building to put a fire out. …

Kilcullen expressed concern that Obama might deny McChrystal the 40,000 extra troops and split the difference between the four options, the kind of fudge common in domestic politics.

"Time is running out for us to make a decision. We can either put in enough troops to control the environment or we can credibly communicate our intention to leave. Either could work. Splitting the difference is not the way to go," Kilcullen said.

"It feels to me that all these options are dangerously close to the middle ground and we have to consider whether the middle ground is a good place to be. The middle ground is a good place on domestic issues, but not on strategy. You either commit to D-Day and invade the continent or you get Suez. Half-measures end up with Suez. Do it or not do it."

There is no "third way". At least not a credible one. In this sort of warfare, to use a poker analogy, you either fold or you're "all in". Domestic political considerations should have absolutely no place in these sorts of deliberations and decisions. But it is clear they do.

That is also clearly a disservice (to put it mildly) to every man and woman in uniform serving our nation today. It is also something which may easily get many of them killed.

So let's remember President Obama's words at NAS Jacksonville when he told those gathered there:

And while I will never hesitate to use force to protect the American people or our vital interests, I also promise you this-and this is very important as we consider our next steps in Afghanistan:

I will never rush the solemn decision of sending you into harm's way. I won't risk your lives unless it is absolutely necessary. And if it is necessary, we will back you up. Because you deserve the strategy, the clear mission, the defined goals and the equipment and support you need to get the job done. That's the promise I make to you.

Gen. McChrystal, based on the commander's guidance issued by the president in his March '09 strategy for Afghanistan, has done his review and submitted his plan to accomplish the mission outlined in that strategy. Now the commander wants to change the strategy.

Is it any wonder that many doubt Obama's commitment to success in Afghanistan, military or otherwise? Is it any wonder that many are concluding that he's looking for "off ramps" well before talking about "on ramps". And is it any wonder then, that those considering how this process is progressing have come to the conclusion that it's not about the military or winning in Afghanistan – it's about the politics of getting re-elected before pulling the plug.

If that's the case, President Obama will be seen as spending the lives of American soldiers in an attempt to protect his political viability. There is nothing most could think of which would be more despicable than that.

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Warrior Legacy Foundation adapts new 'Fight Song' -

Posted By Mr Wolf

Blackfive posted up a few weeks ago a song and video that is just too HOOAH! not to listen to.  You can find that post here for The Warrior Song.

Since then, the Warrior Legacy Foundation has worked with the song's creator, Sean, and his team to 'adopt' the song for the Warrior Legacy Foundation.  Now, the WLF and The Warrior Song are one and the same in promoting its use for our Warriors!  The WLF has 'adopted' the song as its 'fight song'.

It's such a perfect fit.  If you haven't seen it, take a look at it now.  Be sure to pick up a copy of it and spread it around! 

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A New Campaign for the Warrior Legacy Foundation

Posted By Mr Wolf

In honor of this very special Veterans Day, the Warrior Legacy Foundation is letting you all in on a little secret- they are letting out a sneak preview of a new fundraising and awareness campaign- all led by WLF Board Member and Country Singer Derek Sholl.

This is a teaser of what is to come, and what they are working on with his team to accomplish.  Headlined under the banner ''For a moment, put yourself in their shoes..'' and have celebrities, entertainers, leaders and others be photographed in the boots of our Warriors.  Here are some sneak pictures of SOME of those who have already committed to getting photos done (and many more to come...)

Continue reading "A New Campaign for the Warrior Legacy Foundation"

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Five Student Veterans You Should Meet

Posted By Laughing_Wolf

I usually try to keep the day job separated from my work here, but sometimes it is a true pleasure to mix them.  It would be very much appreciated if you could take the time to go meet five student veterans at Purdue.  This is a good group, from a former Army medic working on a Ph.D. in special education (let the Army jokes begin!) to a SEAL who is a walk-on to the Purdue football team.  Please go check them out, and let me know what you think of what we did.  BTW, there should be an archive coming soon of the previous five-students profiles. 

LW 

getting an early start on Veteran's Day...

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CNN interviews PVT Joe Foster - Another Hero Emerges

Posted By Blackfive

Another reason to be proud of our troops.  Another Hero emerges from this incident.

Listen to his comments about the experience, being Irish, and heading to Afghanistan.

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JD Johannes - Saladin Province

Posted By Blackfive Head over to Outside the Wire to check out JD's latest photos of the trips he makes around Iraq.  Be sure to see the Iraqi army/police patches...and then read what JD thinks victory in Iraq will look like.

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Presidential Salute?

Posted By Mr Wolf

Our current CinC has taken a rash of crap on practically every issue imaginable, and deservedly so in most cases, but I've got to make note of something.

He's dramatically improved his salute.

My guess is, working around a bunch of Marines in the WH there is an example he's trying to follow.  I'd love to hear who has worked with him on rendering a proper salute.  His salute IS in a more Marine-style than Army ('official' Army salutes tilt the hand forward a tad, and slightly cup the palm) so that's why I'm guessing it's a Marine influence.

Recall some time ago when Blackfive himself wrote this article and posted this picture:

 

Now, compare it to THIS one, from his visit at Dover:

A SIGNIFICANT difference.  I've even noticed coming off of Marine One that his salutes are 'decently' rendered.  Which can be a trick for even lifers.  Heck, he even appears to have a Marine scowl going.  Could only be influenced by a senior enlisted type.

Now, to the question of whether or not the CinC should even render one- I completely side with the 'choice' crowd- he's the CinC, its up to him.  In fact, I feel its better that he DOES- whether or not he's ever served.  Now, if they want to make a distinction that only Presidents who've served in uniform should return salutes, ok, I get that.  But as in Reagan's day (and he's considered the first to do it) it's up to him.

Saluting is NOT political- its the military's version of a handshake and salutation.  Let's keep it that way...

Wolf

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Now What?

Posted By McQ

Following the politics of this decision making process concerning the "new" strategy in Afghanistan by the Obama administration has been maddening to say the least.  It hasn't at all been comforting, to me at least, that the general on the ground seems to have a very minor role in the process.  Or that suddenly Afghanistan's politics have taken center stage.

Let me be very frank here.  I've worried, since this administration took office, that despite all of the campaign rhetoric that there was little seriousness backed by even less experience in war fighting.  Instead the rhetoric was more useful for beating up the other side for political purposes.  

So I put together my own metric as to how I would judge whether or not the Obama administration was serious about prosecuting the war in Afghanistan.  If they were serious, an assessment would be made, a strategy agreed upon and, based on the recommendation of the general on the ground, assets would be allocated (to include those from the proper civilian agencies) to prosecute the war according to the agreed upon strategy.

If they weren't serious, we'd see a lengthy "assessment" process, dithering on strategy and troop strength, an unwillingness to commit to a strategy and any extraneous excuse the administration could find to delay a decision.  Then, when they did make one it would be short of the recommended one and just enough to keep Afghanistan afloat until the politics here were favorable (i.e. re-election secure) to pull the plug.

Initially, it looked like I was seeing a president who was serious about the war there.  In March President Obama announced a new strategy and he also appointed a new general.  He even committed more troops to the fight  As far as I was concerned that indicated a president that was now walking the walk.  He took all the steps necessary to take ownership of the war.

But when Gen. McChrystal did his commander's assessment and requested more troops he was essentially ignored.  Then the alternative strategies pushed by the likes of John Kerry and Joe Biden - suddenly experts in military strategies - came to the fore.  We also heard that the decision on what military strategy we were going to pursue depended heavily on the outcome of the disputed election in Afghanistan.  And then it depended on a run off.  Meanwhile, the Obama administration finally met with the JCS for the first time only a few days ago.  And what came out of that, apparently, was a request for more information - a province by province assessment.

But, back to the runoff election in Afghanistan.  It appears, at least at the moment, there won't be one.  Abdullah Abdullah has said he'll boycott it.

So now what?  Will we put together a military strategy, announce it and commit to it and begin the process of fulfilling it.  Or will this be used as yet another excuse to delay such a decision?

On Monday, in address to the personnel at NAS Jacksonville, President Obama said he would not be rushed into making a decision.  He said, "I won't risk your lives unless it is absolutely necessary".  He went on to say, 'because you deserve the strategy, the clear mission and the defined goals as well as the equipment and support you need to get the job done."

All true.  But missing from all of that is the fact that we presently have thousands of troops in Afghanistan whose lives are already at risk and remain at risk pending a decision.  We have everyone and their brother saying that the theater is undermanned - putting those there at further risk.

And they remain at this heightened risk as the interminable decision making process goes on.

His aides now tell us he'll announce something between Nov. 7th and 11th.  Will he?  If so, and if it is a well thought out and viable strategy, I'll withdraw my objections.  However, if he finds this latest electoral reversal in Afghanistan to be a reason for further delay and dithers some more, I'll be forced to conclude that this isn't about fighting a war, but instead about politics and protecting his electoral viability.  And if that turns out to be the case, I will be unsparing in both my condemnation and criticism.

President Obama was duly elected by the people of this country to fulfill the duties of the office of President.  Among the most important is that of Commander-in-Chief.  It's time he stepped up and assumed that position.  And Mr. President, that means you have to do two things that haven't been evident to this point - lead and make decisions.

Let's roll.

 

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Beyond COIN v. CT or COIN + CT: An Emerging Third Position

Posted By Grim

How many troops do we need in Afghanistan?

Yesterday's publishing of State Department officer's letter of resignation brought us a practical expression of a theory:  essentially, that the unified insurgency would collapse if we weren't there for it to fight.  The theory holds that tribal ethic of "me against my brother, the two of us against our cousins, the four of us against our neighbors, all of us against the tribe across the ridge, all those tribes together against strangers..." is allowing the Pashtun-based Taliban to hold up a coalition that they couldn't manage without us present.  If we pulled back, or pulled out, these natural tensions would reassert themselves and the insurgency would be ripped apart from the inside.

There are several names associated with this theory that give it credibility.  The first is Dr. David Kilcullen, who needs no introduction to readers of BLACKFIVE.  His book The Accidental Guerrilla holds that there are two factions to the insurgencies we fight:  the hard-core ideologues who came to fight us, and the "accidental guerrillas" who got swept up into a fight that happened in their backyard.  Dr. Kilcullen gives advice not so much aimed at abandoning the fight, but on swaying those who have 'accidentally' fallen in with the enemy toward our side. 

Another, who should be as well known but is not, is MAJ Jim Gant, a Special Forces officer who has a new paper out on the subject of tribal engagement.  The paper is only 45 pages long, yet offers some fairly specific suggestions on how to reform current practices to support the strategy he proposes. [BlackFive edit. note:  Major Gant was a SYSK two and a half years ago for his courage and honor in Iraq, and there's a follow up piece here.]

In Iraq, tribal engagement is how the Awakening happened:  the tribal frictions began to pull some of the 'accidental' guerrillas away from AQI, and the Coalition was ready to do what it took to support their swing to our side of the conflict. 

How would that theory work in the absence of Coalition forces, which is what is being proposed in Afghanistan?  Presumably, one would wait for the tribal tensions to create open fissures between the hard core and the local tribals, and then make contact with those tribes and offer them support at a much-lower footprint:  perhaps with MAJ Gant's proposed SF advisors, or perhaps only with money and weapons.  In return for their support against terrorists, and tacit support for the government, they would be allowed to field forces and control their own territory (as the Sons of Iraq were so permitted).  This approach creates a whole new class of "warlords" in Afghanistan -- or reinforces existing ones -- but it could plausibly create a situation in which those warlords became clients of the Afghan government rather than foes of it. 

One of the hallmarks of COIN theory is that you shouldn't create local-national COIN forces that look like Western forces.  Rather, they should be organic to the local culture, so they will have credibility with the local culture instead of appearing to be a foreign imposition.  This approach suggests a modification of that basic hallmark:  you may need both.  At first, an organic tribal/militia force can actually win the fight on the ground.  The 'Westernized' security forces take longer to develop and purge of corruption, but are important to finalizing the peace and providing the central government with the ability to control the ground at the end of the day.

The Sons of Iraq are a good example of this, in just the way that the Iraqi Security Forces were not:  and it took the SOI to end the fight, so that the ISF could step in later and assume governance roles.  These roles may be in support of the tribes as much as they are in support of the central government:  the ISF becomes, as we have been, the negotiator between the central government they serve and the tribal leaders they work with every day.  In that way, they are the glue that holds the state together and allows for a final peace.

Another voice is Dr. Rory Stewart, who famously walked across Afghanistan in 2002.  He also holds that the US should back off substantially in Afghanistan in order to allow ethnic rivalries to work against the Taliban.  While they would capture some outlying areas, the Uzbek and Tajik rivalries should restrain them from overrunning the country.  A minimal Coalition presence in Kabul would keep the government from collapsing, and allow it to reach out to other Afghans with aid programs and economic support. 

Dr. Stewart isn't envisioning a high-level strategy of the type described above, but rather a sort of "muddling-through."  However, he sees the same basic tension at work:  the Taliban being constrained by rivalries that are suppressed because of our presence.

Dr. Tony Corn at SWJ proposed something similar recently, which he called "A Kilcullen-Biden plan."  His article is interesting because it looks at things from a higher level perspective as well:  can the US actually afford to fight this war?  He doesn't think we can.  Since the COIN model we are currently using requires substantial funding for a long time, if he is correct than a scaled-back model becomes inevitable. 

Can we make such a strategy work, and at a much lower cost in American lives and money?  It depends on whether the central theory is true.  The Taliban were able to overrun most of Afghanistan before, though what became the Northern Alliance did indeed stop them.  How far would we have to pull back, and for how long, before the tensions rising to the surface began to split the insurgency enough to reintroduce Tribal Engagement Teams, for example?

This approach would also mean consigning Afghan women and girls (and any remaining current allies!) in these remote areas to control by the Taliban.  That's a moral cost we'd have to decide that we were prepared to accept. 

Finally, it would create something akin to a safe-haven in those areas where the tribal/ethnic fissures were least.  Pakistan's decision to do this is what precipitated the strong, Taliban-based insurgency we are facing now.  We would be gambling that the new safe-haven would be contained by the fissures, so that the Taliban would have all it could do to deal with newly-opposed tribes and ethnic forces (who would have our support, of course, when they were prepared to accept it).

It's a strategy with some risk, then, and some known costs we'd have to elect to accept.  Nevertheless, it's not a foolish proposal:  some of our best and most experienced believe it can work, while saving American lives and fortunes.

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