An interesting OpEd in the New York Times that asks some very cogent questions as we ponder the threats we face, an uncertain fiscal situation, and a populace weary of the in-fighting.
After seven years on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am convinced that we are well along the road to repeating the French mistake. It has been more than 30 years since the last clear-cut American victory, the brilliant and audacious landing at Inchon. Vietnam, the Pyrrhic victory in the Mayaguez affair and the failed Iranian rescue attempt all attest to some deep-seated problems in our armed services. Yet our national defense debate, in Congress and in the press, continues to revolve largely around how much to spend. New ideas, from inside or outside the services, are seldom heard and less often welcomed.
A growing number of my Congressional colleagues have come to feel that there is something profoundly wrong. We have joined in what amounts to a military reform movement, an alliance of (mostly younger) military officers, civilian defense analysts and members of Congress. The reformers' goal is to bring our defense priorities back into line with what history tells us is important in winning - and, therefore, deterring - wars.
In seeking to determine where we have gone wrong, we must start by looking at the basic building blocks of any military - (1) personnel, (2) tactics and strategy and (3) hardware.
Personnel questions are usually discussed in terms of pay, service entrance tests, and so on. But these issues miss many of the most critical aspects of military personnel policy.
What's truly remarkable about it is that it was written in 1982.
Read the whole piece at the link here: What's Wrong With The Military
Hat tip to "Doctrineman"