Rules of Engagement in Counter-Insurgency

Posted By Uncle Jimbo

General rebukes Special Operations forces

By Sharon Behn

A crusading three-star general has sparked outrage within the Army Special Forces and Marine Special Operations Command by publicly condemning and twice bringing legal actions against members of their forces.

None of Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney's actions has resulted in a conviction, but they have roiled the military community, led to the resignations of several top-trained Marines, and sparked accusations of improper command influence.

I spoke with Ms. Behn yeaterday about this topic. It was an interesting conversation and in addition to these cases we talked about the tension between relations with host nations and their effect on setting Rules of Engagement (ROE) and interpreting them in the aftermath of a violent incident. She quoted me several times in her follow up article today. She quotes me as Sgt. Hanson, which looked strange but I guess she figures the title follows you like Senator, heh.

Also yesterday, a retired Special Forces weapons sergeant provided The Washington Times with a copy of an e-mail from Gen. Kearney, in which the general acknowledged that soldiers have to make instant, life-and-death decisions based on rules of engagement that are open to interpretation.

"A lot is in the relationships and agreements with the sovereign nations we work in, and a lot of it falls into interpretation of [rules of engagement]," the general wrote in a Sept. 30 e-mail to Sgt. Jim Hanson.

"This is the most difficult challenge our young leaders are presented almost daily, and in an instant, they must choose. It is as you say a relevant topic. We and I in particular are silent on this till some legal proceedings finish."

Sgt. Hanson, who knows one member of the Special Forces sniper team, said the fact that charges were brought against the two men after they were exonerated was sending a chill through the military.

"If they were that scrupulous in following the rules of engagement and get second-guessed from Tampa, that makes it a lot harder for that person who has to make a split-second decision," he said, referring to the headquarters of the Florida-based Special Operations Command.

At the core of the discussion, Sgt. Hanson said, was how the rules of engagement affect U.S. military interaction with both Afghans and Iraqis.

The two topics diverge in my opinion as in the case of MSG Anderson's shooting of a known terrorist in Afghanistan . In that casethere were clear ROE and he followed them. The issue in that case is whether LTG Kearney used improper command authority to bring charges against the men. I believe that bears looking into as the charges were thrown out quickly and unequivocally and this incident has certainly put a chill down the spine of anyone in the field looking through a scope. Ask yourself this, if you have bin Laden in the crosshairs, but he's not carrying a gun, do you drop the hammer?

This point bears a good looking at as it forms the basis of our biggest challenges in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The incident at Haditha stretched the ROE and our relations with many Iraqis, and the recent Blackwater convoy  in Iraq, which killed a number of civilians, caused the same type of repercussions as the Marine Special Operations (MARSOC) convoy in Afghanistan reminding us that the additional consideration of private contractors must be addressed. Both the possibility of civilian casualties as well as when we can kill known combatants are vital concerns in the conflicts we are now involved in.

Counter-Insurgency (COIN) is a balancing act where the use of violence is often required but used in full knowledge that anything beyond a surgical strike with zero collateral damage is counter-productive. Even a perfect op leaves a psychic scar on the populace, and they cannot be alienated if we are to win. The bad guys must know that any acts against good order will be opposed and punished, but even better than that is when the people turn them in before they hurt or kill anyone That is the key to COIN and that is why we have seen success in some of the worst areas of Iraq. The people decided that Al Qaeda's depravity was beyond the pale and joined with us to oppose them. Shared enemies is a fragile basis for an alliance and consequently actions by our troops that hurt or kill civilians are very dangerous.

Collateral damage is impossible to avoid in kinetic combat operations, and all ROE take into account the desire to cause as little harm as is necessary to accomplish the mission. ROE are constantly evaluated and adapted based on the situation and mission. The ROE for the assault on Fallujah in 2004 were considerably less restrictive than those the Marines operated under this year during Operation Alljah , and rightly so. In the first case we were battling large groups of armed fanatics for control of a city, in the second we were battling dispersed packs of the same fanatics for the allegiance and loyalty of the local people by setting up and staying among them. As the mission transitioned from combat to COIN, so did the ROE and so any incidents of harm to civilians become amplified in that environment.

The uproar in Iraq over the Blackwater incident is a perfect example of the effect this can have on the political process and the hearts and minds work being done. The same factors were in play back when the MARSOC convoy killed a number of civilians in Afghanistan and in an email to me LTG Kearney states exactly that in his response to this email I sent

Dear LTG Kearney,

I write to request an interview regarding the current state of SOCOM doctrine regarding the use of deadly force. There have been several incidents recently that have brought into focus the tactics our troops may use in the application of deadly force on targets that do not present a clear and immediate threat. I believe it would be instructive to clear up some misconceptions about tactics such as baiting and vetted targets. These topics have been much discussed in the press, and within the bounds of operational security it would be helpful for the facts to be cleared up.

There is concern among many current and former members of the Special Operations community, myself included, that our people are not being supported as fully as they should be. I offer you the opportunity to put those concerns to rest..

    "Let me get back to you. While some of this falls in doctrine and TTP (Techniques, Tactics & Procedures). A lot is in         the relationships and agreements with the sovereign nations we work in and a lot of it falls into interpretation of     ROE.  This is the most difficult challenge our young leaders are presented almost daily and in an instant they must         choose.  It is as you say a relevant topic..... (My bold).
    LTG Kearney"

Managing the relations with the Afghans would be shared between then MG Kearney and the State Dept. In the case of the MARSOC convoy there was considerable pressure from the Afghans this was certainly a factor in their rapid departure from the country. There is pressure from the Iraqis for the same thing to happen to Blackwater and it will cause us difficulties as we try to get agreements made on very thorny issues. So there is definitely pressure on military commanders to write and interpret ROE as strictly as possible in order to avoid these situations. But a commander also has a responsibility to those putting their lives on the line as well and must ensure that no restrictions are emplaced that will cause our troops to be unable to prevail or defend themselves.

More important than making sure we have ROE that take into account danger to civilians as well as the lives of our troops, is supporting the troops who follow those rules.
I got the email from LTG Kearney over a weekend and by Monday his handlers had him back under control and  SOCOM COL Hans Bush called letting me know that LTG Kearney would not be doing interviews. I let him know about the concerns I had heard from those who would now be deployed and making these life and death decisions. He was genuinely concerned to hear of the effect this decision was having for those in the field and promised to open discussion of it.

It is perfectly proper and necessary for our military and diplomatic leaders to take host nation concerns into account when working out what levels of force are appropriate in what situations. We do this in every location worldwide where we have forces. We must ensure that the lives and safety of our troops are properly accounted for as these rules are formulated, and when our people act in good faith using them we must guarantee that we have their backs.

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Rules of Engagement in Counter-Insurgency

General rebukes Special Operations forces

By Sharon Behn

A crusading three-star general has sparked outrage within the Army Special Forces and Marine Special Operations Command by publicly condemning and twice bringing legal actions against members of their forces.

None of Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney's actions has resulted in a conviction, but they have roiled the military community, led to the resignations of several top-trained Marines, and sparked accusations of improper command influence.

I spoke with Ms. Behn yeaterday about this topic. It was an interesting conversation and in addition to these cases we talked about the tension between relations with host nations and their effect on setting Rules of Engagement (ROE) and interpreting them in the aftermath of a violent incident. She quoted me several times in her follow up article today. She quotes me as Sgt. Hanson, which looked strange but I guess she figures the title follows you like Senator, heh.

Also yesterday, a retired Special Forces weapons sergeant provided The Washington Times with a copy of an e-mail from Gen. Kearney, in which the general acknowledged that soldiers have to make instant, life-and-death decisions based on rules of engagement that are open to interpretation.

"A lot is in the relationships and agreements with the sovereign nations we work in, and a lot of it falls into interpretation of [rules of engagement]," the general wrote in a Sept. 30 e-mail to Sgt. Jim Hanson.

"This is the most difficult challenge our young leaders are presented almost daily, and in an instant, they must choose. It is as you say a relevant topic. We and I in particular are silent on this till some legal proceedings finish."

Sgt. Hanson, who knows one member of the Special Forces sniper team, said the fact that charges were brought against the two men after they were exonerated was sending a chill through the military.

"If they were that scrupulous in following the rules of engagement and get second-guessed from Tampa, that makes it a lot harder for that person who has to make a split-second decision," he said, referring to the headquarters of the Florida-based Special Operations Command.

At the core of the discussion, Sgt. Hanson said, was how the rules of engagement affect U.S. military interaction with both Afghans and Iraqis.

The two topics diverge in my opinion as in the case of MSG Anderson's shooting of a known terrorist in Afghanistan . In that casethere were clear ROE and he followed them. The issue in that case is whether LTG Kearney used improper command authority to bring charges against the men. I believe that bears looking into as the charges were thrown out quickly and unequivocally and this incident has certainly put a chill down the spine of anyone in the field looking through a scope. Ask yourself this, if you have bin Laden in the crosshairs, but he's not carrying a gun, do you drop the hammer?

This point bears a good looking at as it forms the basis of our biggest challenges in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The incident at Haditha stretched the ROE and our relations with many Iraqis, and the recent Blackwater convoy  in Iraq, which killed a number of civilians, caused the same type of repercussions as the Marine Special Operations (MARSOC) convoy in Afghanistan reminding us that the additional consideration of private contractors must be addressed. Both the possibility of civilian casualties as well as when we can kill known combatants are vital concerns in the conflicts we are now involved in.

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