COIN: Smart Soldiers (and Diplomats)

Posted By Grim

The Economist is thinking about COIN today (hat tip to our friend COL Maxwell).  It's a reasonable introductory piece, although most readers of this page will have dealt with the concepts at a higher level.  Still, if you are new to the subject -- or if you work for the State Department, and you don't understand why your bosses want you to go to Iraq -- you could do worse than to spend a few minutes with this piece.

A growing body of opinion, both in the Pentagon and outside, has concluded that insurrections are best fought indirectly, through local allies. “It is extremely difficult for Western powers to defeat insurgencies in foreign countries in modern times,” says Max Boot, author of “War Made New” (2006). “At the same time, there are very few instances of insurgencies overthrowing a local government. The problem is that Western armies lose the will to maintain imperial domination.” Western forces always have the option of going home; for local governments, though, fighting insurgents is a matter of survival.

A better model than Malaya, argues Mr Boot, is the end of the Marxist insurrection in El Salvador in 1992. American forces did not lead the fighting. Instead, a small contingent of under 100 advisers from America's special forces helped the democratising government reorganise its army and avoid the fate of nearby Nicaragua, which fell to the Sandinistas in 1979.

This is the "by, through and with" model, which is a model that has a lot of success to report for it.  It's the one that the Special Forces are designed to handle, but it's not a SF model only.  To work properly, you need at least three components:

1)  SF or other military forces, to turn social networks like tribes or families away from the insurgents, and then train them toward compatibility with government forces.

2)  PRTs, MiTTs, and USAID to apply benefits to "green" areas and deny them to red/yellow ones.  The yellow ones see the benefits the green areas are getting, and want them.  When they approach the government to ask for them, the government answers, "Yes, of course we'd love to do those things for you, because we care about helping people.  But first, we need you to commit to the following things:  controlling your youth, helping us find insurgents, and taking a public oath to stand with us." 

Then, when you get those things, you start to expand the "green" zone.  This is the so-called oilspot method of Counterinsurgency.

3)  State Department support at the highest levels, from the Ambassador down, who understand the mission and answer for it.  This is listed in spot #3, but it's ultimately just as important as getting it right on the ground.  State needs to be shepherding the local government in ways that will help defuse the insurgencies, and encourange stable settlements.

None of this is easy, to be sure.  There are serious challenges in terms of training, for example.  SF is designed for this; conventional forces aren't.  You can see in Iraq, though, that conventional forces can do it -- look at the so-called "Concerned Local Citizen" programs that have been stood up from Anbar to Wasit.  Mostly these have been developed by conventional fighting forces, Marines or Soldiers.

I've written here quite a bit about the PRTs and the role they are playing in Iraq.  That element is getting stronger all the time, and I'm proud of what they're doing.

State is still in transit at its upper levels.  This week's stories show that they aren't really there yet.  The stories also show, though, that they are starting to move in that direction.  We need them to get to where they are "doing" counterinsurgency as one of their main duties -- in places like Iraq, it is their main duty.

This is one of those places where the nation and its government continue to learn on foot.  Rumsfeld was right about one thing:  you go to war with the army you have, and the State department you have.  We've got to keep up the momentum, especially with State, because they do have a serious and important role to play in all this.  Perhaps Ambassador Kenney can do some "subject matter expert exchanges" with her colleagues at State.  She has done a great job down south, and we'd do well to have more like her.

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Comments

[Rykehaven]

The worst thing that could happen right now is a State Department opportunistically injecting itself into COIN operations just because it sees the political winds shifting from Washington. From my reading (and I might be mistaken), you think that’s reason for optimism.

I’ve dealt with this subject when Condi heralded the idea of State asserting more authority over USAID last year. There’s no cause for celebration, ESPECIALLY for guys in the military, on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and a host of AORs:

http://www.dprkstudies.org/2006/01/27/condi-challenges-old-diplomacy/

I’m a little old on the subject, but in talking to Marines, my feeling is that State marginalized itself after 2003-2004 (much of which had to do with our election, a BIG turning point in this war). They basically retreated to the green zones and buried their heads in the sand by hob-knobbing with the Iraqi chattering classes (or clerical class, it’s hard to know the difference).

THIS WAS A GOOD THING.

Unless you want to see more cities like Fallujah being handed back to the terrorists: the more State retreats, the more leeway we have to run our own operations (naval, air, COIN, vis-à-vis Iran, you name it), the more feeble State’s ability to mount concerted interference, obstructionism and treachery in conjunction with the bureaucracy’s media and cultural allies in Congress, in foreign countries, and even in our own hometowns.

[Rykehaven]

Grim said: ” We've got to keep up the momentum, especially with State, because they do have a serious and important role to play in all this.”

We’ve gotten this far without them, in fact, IN SPITE of them. Why do you want to change things NOW? Why are you advocating for their “help” and “input”, when you have to know who these people represent and how they operate.

This is what you do:

If you ever find a State puke telling you that you have to “consult” or “inform” him of specific operational details and procedures or your “read” on the local situation, BLOW HIM OFF (politely). This is what most of us do.

Do NOT act like his friend, keep it professional. Do NOT try and get him “involved”. He is not in the Chain of Command and is not entitled to information (I always got irate when some sailors told me they thought SOS Powell was in the Chain during ESWS boards).

Push Back.

Treat anybody connected to the State Department (even security and former military) as you would a journalist or a potential terrorist, because he is capable of doing just as much damage and perhaps moreso (he’s “inside”). If you’re not the CO, get his name and some ID and report it up the Chain of Command especially if the guy’s not using proper channels of inquiry. If he’s uncooperative or refuses, it’s a BIG red flag. Many CO’s know the score and they’re more politically adept at handling these characters. If he’s truly interested in building a constructive (and productive) relationship with your unit rather than demanding he be taken seriously, he’ll work at it over the course of a few months. Otherwise, he’s not to be trusted and your dissatisfaction should be respectfully communicated upwards or through the CO’s open-door policy.

This is an OPSEC issue. Do NOT “go-with-the-flow”. It’s not about “getting the State Department involved”. And the two basic principles of OPSEC and divulging information is (1) Clearance and (2) Need to know. Even if the State official is “cleared” by higher-ups, he does not necessarily have a “need-to-know” and it is incumbent on COs to make their OWN determinations (ask for clarification and documentation) before they tell their soldiers, sailors and airmen to “cooperate”. Information headed to the bureaucrats in DC can’t go too slowly, especially since they move so slowly to OUR requests for “cooperation”.

Know who you’re dealing with. This is the State Department; like the vast majority of journalists, they are not to be trusted.

[Rykehaven]

Grim said: “State Department support at the highest levels, from the Ambassador down, who understand the mission and answer for it”

NAÏVE!

You don’t need this. I don’t need it. And America (and Iraq) can’t afford it. What we need is a strong line to the Commander-in-Chief, our Congressional allies and the American people. By placing the emphasis on State, you give them the opportunity to undermine the military’s influence (and State would like nothing better).

Understand this: State Department professionals are NOT like military professionals in one KEY cultural respect (actually, one of many).

We have a goal to accomplish in security and reconstruction; ultimately to better the lives of our people by bettering the lives of the Iraqis. To ACHIEVE this, we must have “influence” to acquire resources and “authorization”. The politicians and diplomats @ State want “influence” too, but not for the purposes of building security or helping in reconstruction.

They want “influence” for its OWN sake!

This cannot be emphasized enough.

It’s the cultural difference between professional problem-solvers (engineers, doctors, soldiers, business managers) and professional politicians/protestors (lifelong bureucrats, lobbyists, lawyers, journalists, etc): The former get a “high” from ACHIEVEMENT. The latter get a “high” from ATTENTION.

Do you think we will get “support” from Washington DC (with THIS Congress) because State Department diplomats (many of whom don’t want to be in Iraq) will “cooperate” with military personnel (whose culture they can’t stand) and communicate our concerns (unvarnished?) to their own cultural brethren in the media and the Democratic Party?

IT WILL NOT happen that way.

These people don’t want to be our partners; they want to be our masters. The reason for that is because we don’t share the same goals.

By relying on State, you advocate for putting lifetime diplomats BETWEEN us and the Command Authority at innumerable levels. And that will give them the ability to twist us into knots in everything we do: our relationships with the local security forces, our ability to defend ourselves, our necessity to ask “permission” from a bureaucrat (ie the Democrats and so-called allies) before we conduct ANY operations. I’d be surprised if they didn’t ask for a political investigation (which is not the procedural inquiry) every time we used WARNING shots.

To these people, everything is a bargaining chip to be bartered away for MORE influence, NOT a problem to be solved. And I mean everything: our ROE’s, our boarding procedures and authority, our overflights, your COIN operations, how we are allowed to react or what we’re allowed to say when Iran kills our men – EVERYTHING.

Even our honor (ESPECIALLY our honor) is EXPENDABLE to these people.

Do you want their help?

Yeah, I’d like their help like I want the help of our so-called “allies”.

On second thought, No thank you.

[Rykehaven]

Grim said: "We need them to get to where they are "doing" counterinsurgency as one of their main duties -- in places like Iraq, it is their main duty."

Whatever victories we've attained thus far are considered BARGAINING CHIPS to State: to be traded away to our enemies and "allies" for incongruous promises and a higher profile for the State Department officials for being "movers and shakers" at cocktail parties in Paris, London and what-not(Iraqi security be damned).

OPEN YOUR EYES.

[Francis Marion]

Rykehaven,

Grim's eye's are open. He knows COIN like few out side Special Forces know COIN. Amb. Kenney also understands the roll of DoS in COIN. She supports the military's roll and enhances it with other civil support agencies and organizations. Grim's argument is that State needs to learn from Kenney and apply the lessons to Iraq.

Your experiences with DoS seem to be strictly with underlings who try to portray their importance by interjecting themselves into tactical situations. You are right that, on a tactical level, DoS employees should do nothing more than observe. However, DoS, from the Ambassador on down, need to understand their roll in COIN and that is to identify the organizations that can be of assistance and push them in the right direction and to help advise the local government in the best course to take.

[Rykehaven]

Francis,

1) Perhaps I was too subtle. Let me put it this way: State Department personnel are ALREADY treated like journalists and potential terrorists. The reasons have already been mentioned. That, and my “suggestions” regarding OPSEC are, in fact, “old-hat” in the military. It’s not scandalous; not new; not a secret and your defense of State rings hollow in my profession. If, on the other hand, you’re trying to convince non-military personnel, be my guest.

2) Don’t talk to me from “on-high” about the lowly “tactical level” as if the tactical level didn’t make up the larger operational and strategic picture. In fact, if you can’t talk to me about the nitty-gritty details at the “tactical level”, forget about trying to lecture to me about the “big picture”.

If Grim is the professional you say he is, he knows better than to make general statements with no specifics. He’ll focus on explanations of what State is actually DOING (meaning “at the tactical level”). If there are no specifics, they aren’t doing much.

I’ve had others respond to me about allies involved in “heavy fighting” as if the claim itself made it true, as if they didn’t have to deal with specifics.

It is – to laugh.

I usually ignore them.

3) Don’t try to BS me about USAID being part of the State Dept. and its culture, because that is the organization (actually, “network”) you’re probably imagining/heralding as being such a credit to State’s involvement.

WRONG.

That’s like the UN claiming credit for USAID’s contributions in Indonesia.

Only recently has State attempted to claim authority over them [read the link]. Whatever. The UN has tried to claim authority over the US military too. Both might succeed but I don’t intend to scream for joy if it happens.

USAID has always been close to the US military just as the USMSC has been close to the US Navy; it is a relationship borne of operational/logistical necessity, some might consider it “outsourcing” relief efforts. I’ve had the honor of working with many of the employees and associated contractors. Few, if any, would claim lineage or association with the blow-hard bureaucrats at Foggy Bottom. USAID’s accomplishments in NO WAY reflects State Dept efforts because they’ve been politically and operationally independent entities for as long as I can remember.

If you want to securely ferry medical supplies and personnel to a non-permissive environment (because of insecurity or natural disaster), the last person you want to have to convince is a bureaucrat in the foreign nation’s capital (though you may have to) or Wash DC. Ultimately, you want to be able to talk to local security and the US military or military contractor who may be able to provide the support, information and security detail themselves or have enough pull with indigenous military personnel to provide transport. There is a diplomatic/military divide in some foreign countries too, BTW (apparently, that includes “Iraq”).

Bottom line: USAID employees want to get things DONE. That should have been your first clue as to whether or not they’re blood brothers with State.

And that’s another insignificant reality “at the tactical level”.

State’s attempt to gain authority over USAID, however, does concern me. I haven’t dealt with them since 2005, so my info is old. It’s a question of “consultation” versus “control”. If anyone has any specific updated information, I’d appreciate it.

[Francis Marion]

Rykehaven, From your tactical position you seem to be missing the big picture. I have been working COIN from the tactical and strategic levels for a long time. Grim never made any suggestion that State should take control of how tactical assets are implemented. He did state that State needs to get on board. Without them contributing in a positive way we are missing out on many good opportunities.

[Polaris]

I could be wrong, and I'm not trying to pick a fight, but after reading his comments in response to Rykehaven, I don't think Francis has actually "said" anything.

[Grim]

In fairness to Francis Marion, there really are only two things to be said:

1) The point is not that State, as it is currently constituted, should take over COIN operations. The point is only that COIN operations require a strong political as well as military element; and that State currently is not 'getting it done,' though they have been making movements in the right direction. I'm pleased with the PRT program. I view it as progress although, as Mr. Reeker admitted to us in the Blogger Roundtable discussion with him, DOD provides a great deal of the manpower for the PRTs, esp. our reserve corps. Having helped (in a very minor way) to set up new PRTs here in Iraq, I can attest that this is true.

The link to the Reeker discussion, and several discussions with PRT team leaders, can be found here: http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/09/roundtables-prt.html

2) Down below in the Trackback section, there's a link in from Small Wars Journal (SWJ Blog). Reading the piece they linked in with should provide a fuller refutation of the idea that State -shouldn't- be involved with COIN than I have time to construct; and it will offer that refutation in better names than mine, including Dr. Kilcullen's own.

[Consul-At-Arms]

I've quoted you and linked to you here: http://consul-at-arms.blogspot.com/2007/10/re-coin-smart-soldiers-and-diplomats.html

[v.v.]

I don't mean to derail this thread, but you guys seem to know your stuff about COIN, so do you know any good books that a dumb teenager like me could read to understand it?

[Grim]

As a primer, the new Army/Marine Corps manual COUNTERINSURGENCY is actually quite good.

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

Before that, you may want a simpler grounding for beginners. I have written two. Try this previous post:

http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/04/coin_the_gravit.html

Also this one:

http://www.blackfive.net/main/2007/01/a_strategy_for_.html

After you've read the new field manual, there is quite a lot to follow that. However, the annotated bibliography in the COIN manual (above) is excellent; it's even broken down into "the Classics," then overview pieces, and finally the most recent (as of last summer) expertise on the subject.

[v.v.]

Grim...thanks a LOT! Those posts really helped. The manual 's some pretty interesting reading so far, too.