COIN: On "The War as We Saw It"

Posted By Grim

This Sunday, the New York Times published a piece called "The War as We Saw It" by Specialist Buddhika Jayamaha, Sergeants Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, and Staff Sergeants Yance T. Gray and Jeremy A. Murphy.  These gentlemen are assigned to the 82nd Airborne, which needs no introduction here.

I wish to begin by conveying our respectful appreciation of their service, and our hopes that their Staff Sergeant Murphy will recover quickly and fully from his injury.  It will surprise no one that I am going to argue against some of the conclusions they offer, but I do not wish disagreement to be read as disrespect.  Their service honors our nation, as does the fact that they feel they can provide a frank assessment of their observations to the public.

The piece they have published offers a despairing look at the situation in Baghdad, where elements of the 82nd have been operating for fifteen months.  I do not intend to challenge their understanding of the facts on the ground, as they are based on direct observation.  I assume the truth of every fact they report.  What I wish to challenge is their conclusions about how events will, they seem to say "must," develop. 

Let us begin by comparing their language with the language of another such report, written last year by another highly qualified military observer:  the chief of intelligence for the United States Marine Corps.

The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there, said several military officers and intelligence officials familiar with its contents.

The officials described Col. Pete Devlin's classified assessment of the dire state of Anbar as the first time that a senior U.S. military officer has filed so negative a report from Iraq.

One Army officer summarized it as arguing that in Anbar province, "We haven't been defeated militarily but we have been defeated politically -- and that's where wars are won and lost."

I have no reason to believe that the Colonel was not an expert both on the situation he was analyzing, and also in the business of analysis.  He was flatly wrong, not because of a failure to understand or observe the situation before him, but because he did not see how the forces in play would work against each other.  Almost at the moment he published his findings, the darkness began to flee before the dawn.

Please continue to the extended entry.

The gentlemen begin with the problem of militia infiltration of the Shi'ite elements of the Iraqi police and some army units:

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

That isn't the whole picture, though:  if the Iraqi Army and Police units were loyal to "Shi'ite militias" only, why would they attack the Americans who were training and supplying them?  If the ISF units were puppets of the militias, it would not be necessary to use them against the Americans:  the Americans would be natural allies who were training, equipping, and propping up the militia's military wing.  The way forward would be to help America "win the peace," build the ISF, and then withdraw -- leaving the militia-puppetmasters in control.

What the anecdote suggests is suggested also by the recent killings in Najaf, aimed at factions loyal to al-Sistani.  These killings, in turn, have been part of a series of murders of Shi'ite religious and political leaders that broke out almost directly after the 2003 invasion, including the murders of Abdul Majid al-Khoei (allegedly by Sadr factions) and Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim.  It is not that there is a "Shi'ite faction," but that there are several of them in competition for control.  The infiltration by militias of some ISF units is matched by the infiltration by competing militias of ISF units, with differing loyalties and thoughts on the way forward. 

A COIN strategy of disaggregation relies on fragmenting opposition movements, to make each of them easier to defeat in detail.  Here, the fragmentation is already accomplished.  There is not a Shi'ite front to -- in the words of the article -- "realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal."  The Shi'ites are more concerned about each other than about us, or even the Sunnis.  The article suggests that the Shi'ites are trying to 'consolidate their hold over Iraq,' but what they really seem to be doing is competing for the right to consolidate the Shi'ite majority.

That, then, is the first point:  this particular enemy is divided against itself. 

The "lethal armor-piercing explosive" sounds like the gentlemen from the 82nd were describing an EFP in language civilians would understand.  I spoke with General Lynch, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, in a recent Blogger's Roundtable.  (Full disclosure:  I don't think the general realizes he has the honor, since I conduct professional relations under my real name, but as I am working a short term contract to 3ID, he is my current employer.  The contract has nothing to do with OSD's Blogger Roundtables, in which I participate simply as an interested citizen.) 

GRIM:  I want to ask you about Operation Copperhead Road, which is targeting EFP cell operations, as you obviously know. In the past, there's been some concern that EFP technology was coming out of Iran. Without going into anything that's on the classified side, can you give us a sense of whether your operation, first, is being successful, and secondly if it's turning up evidence of Iranian involvement?

GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, I can -- I don't know about Copperhead Road but I have had 42 attacks in my battlespace that are EFP attacks. I'm coming across munitions in my battlespace and weapons caches that are clearly marked as Iranian munitions. I've got a large forward operating base east of Baghdad; I've got an entire brigade combat team there -- headquarters and subordinate unit. We had 50 rockets lined up against that forward operating base. A great young soldier operating one of our unmanned aerial vehicles saw these rockets. We vectored ground forces out there, and ground forces disconnected all the firing mechanisms and rockets, but every one of those rockets came out of Iran. So we do indeed have marked Iranian influence in our area -- EFPs, munitions and also training -- you know, marked ideas of extremists from our area going into Iran, conducting training and coming back.

The EFPs, the murders of Shi'ite holy men who are not aligned with Iran, these are not the mark of an ungovernable local situation.  They are the mark of intentional troublemaking -- proxy warfighting -- by Iran against the United States.  The planting of EFPs against American targets becomes, then, not an expression of native anti-American hatred -- a show of disgust for an occupier -- but part of a war fought by Iran to control the Iraqi state by winning control of the Shi'ites.

I don't bring this up to start a separate argument about what it should mean that Iran is waging this particular war.  We have reason to believe that every nation in the area, including our ally Turkey, is involved in meddling with Iraq's internal politics to a greater or lesser degree.  It is a matter of great national interest to them, so of course they would be. 

Rather than engage the political question of what to do about Iran, I want to point to the military reality that their involvement creates.  What we are seeing here is not a national liberation movement by Shi'ites against Americans come to be viewed as occupiers.  What we are seeing is a divided Shi'ite Iraq, engaged in deadly infighting; with Iran backing some of the groups in a bid to control Iraq, and meanwhile also using them to wage proxy attacks against the United States.  A national liberation movement directed against us would be a cause for despair indeed; less so the situation as it is.  We can debate separately how we deal with Iran, but when we have dealt with them, a large part of this issue will resolve itself.

So, the first point was that we have a divided Shi'ite faction.  The second is that Iran is backing some of the groups, the ones causing us these particular problems.  That implies a COIN solution from the principle of disaggregation:  the others are natural allies of ours, because we have a common enemy in Iran.  Rather than having the Shi'ites turning against us, and having to fight the majority of the populace (or withdraw), we have a much simpler problem:  we need to balance the situation on the ground in the favor of the faction that will find us to be allies, and help them win the control of the Shi'ite faction that Iran seeks for its proxies.

Let us move on with the original article.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

I have a strong conceptual disagreement here.  I agree that creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency -- or an insurgency, if you are fighting it as a proxy war, as Iran is doing.  I agree that armed Sunnis have become effective surrogates.  What I disagree with is the degree to which they need to be loyal "to the center" -- I do not think it needs to be either their primary loyalty, or even very important to them.

To explain what I mean, I need to collect another piece from the article.  This is something that I agree with strongly.  For that matter, it is something they appear to think is strongly important:  they say it twice at different points in their short article.  I will combine them here.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.... Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers.

That is absolutely correct.  A political solution cannot preceed the military solution.  Political solutions only arise when the losing party no longer feels that it can benefit more by continuing the struggle.  In other words, you have to win the war first.

Politics in Iraq, at this point, have to be viewed not as part of a "peace process," which is a foolish dream.  They have to be viewed as a part of the war effort.  They should not be designed to offer concessions in return for negotiations; they should offer concessions only in return for alliance, and should punish those who remain outlaws, who wage war against the central government.  It is necessary that reconciliation be able and willing to forgive and offer amnesty to those who are willing to come in from the cold; if the COIN is being fought successfully, there will always be more such persons arriving.  As long as you remain opposed, however, you must be fought hard and offered no political relief.  There must be consequences:  this is a basic part of my understanding of COIN strategy.

The Sunnis in Anbar, and increasingly in Baghdad, are effective surrogates.  They did not get here by learning to love America.  They got here by being put in a position where they had to choose between alliance with us and alliance with AQI -- and then watching those cities who allied with AQI fall one by one to the United States Marines.  They got here by watching a chain of fortresses cut them off from their allies in Syria.  They got here, in other words, by watching bad choices be punished, while those who allied with America found themselves supported and defended by America, their interests protected even against our other allies.  Reconciliation is for them.  As they are now persuaded to fight alongside our forces, we will see they are treated fairly and properly.  That is the way we turned Anbar around.

The same can be done with the Shi'ite factions.  We must understand the proper role of reconciliation:  it is the role of forgiveness for old enemies who are now ready to be allies.  It is not a way to win allies with bribes.  It is an offer made to those who will now fight with you, in pursuit of a political order they agree in advance to defend.  In return, reconciliation.

That does not mean that their primarly loyalty is "to the center."  They may, in fact, despise the center.  Their primary loyalty will not be to the center at all, but to the tribe or local government with which they identify.  The center will have to defend and support its interests, in return for the defense and support of its own by the locals in Iraq's many tribes and localities.  This is what Gen. Bergner was talking about in his description of how local political movements were now starting to be important in Iraqi politics:

[O]n one level, [Iraq] has been a centrally governed country, without question, but in this country the tribe, the family have always been the most powerful bond that the Iraqi people have felt. And so you have kind of a duality of centrally directed but, if you ask the people who they trust and who they want to work with, it's at the family, tribal and community level. So both of those exist and both of them are very real parts of the nature of Iraqi society.

The general had just finished describing an array of progress around Iraq by local governments and movements, who had declared loyalty to the common peace, and were now seeking support from the central government.  More than anything else, I find that array of grassroots movements to be encouraging, a mark of a COIN strategy that is making progress toward a final goal.  It shows that the people of Iraq feel as the gentlemen of the 82nd say they should:  they want security above all, and are ready to start standing up for it.  But they are not doing so in a way that sees America as the enemy; they are doing so in a way that accepts responsibility for creating it themselves, locally.

In this, their enemy is obviously not the United States of America, which has done more than any other to help bring about that security.  The enemy is those elements, whether AQI or Iran, that seeks to create instability and destruction in order to pursue its political ends within Iraq.  Far from the grassroots movement the authors of the NYT piece say they fear, a movement by Iraqis to recover their dignity by standing up to America, I see a grassroots movement by Iraqis to recover their dignity by standing up for Iraq.

A federal system is the right choice for Iraq, one that bases its legitimacy primarily on the support of the tribes.  The tribes' leadership is accepted as authentic by their members, because it is a natural blood loyalty.  Tribes must be brought into fellowship with the government by fighting the war to its end, that point at which they are ready to pledge themselves to the defense of Iraq's common peace.  At that point, a generous reconciliation backed by American guarantees should be offered to prevent future splits. 

Iran must be dealt with, one way or the other.  The political process should be understood as following rather than leading the warfighting process.  It is critical to make clear to the people of Iraq that the enemies of an independent Iraqi government cannot hope to establish peace, but can only prolong the war -- even should they force out America, it would only deepen and worsen the conflict that troubles them.  As AQI was shown to be incapable of establishing independent strongholds in Anbar, that could resist the central government or the Coalition, so too Iran must be shown to be incapable.  That may require changes in the ROE, as the gentlemen of the 82nd suggest; it may require occasional changes in global and regional strategy, as dealing with the issue of Iran is of increasing importance.

Yet in this way, the longing for security among the Iraqis of Baghdad will have a clear and obvious outlet.  Like in Anbar, they will find that the American-backed central government is the only outlet that offers a real solution to the problem of war.  In this way, we can win the people of Baghdad as we won the people in Anbar. 

I have a sense that our military leadership understands all of this.  I hope that our political leadership will come to do so.  My respects again to the gentlemen of the 82nd; and my prayers for their comrade.

UPDATE:  I am reminded by email that I did not discuss their concerns about the economics.  These are serious matters.  Let me reply by inserting part of an email I exchanged with a fellow blogger on the topic, in a backchannel discussion in which he was taking a similar position to theirs:

You're right that there are a number of measures that are trending in the wrong direction, and have been... You mention power generation, which is symptomatic of several of them.  I spoke to one of the top leaders of the Army Corps of Engineers in Iraq, BGen. Walsh, whom I asked about the issue of power generation.  He reported that the original problem had been one of a degraded power grid inherited from Saddam; but that we have replaced huge sections of it with new turbines brought in from the United States.  The current problem, as you know, is twofold:  insurgent attacks have targeted power generation, and local places are dropping off the grid in order to keep their generated power at home, rather than allowing it to flow to Baghdad.

That's two separate problems, obviously, one military and one political.  Of the military problem, there's this to say about it:  attacks on civilian power generation are a war crime by the insurgent forces, as civilian infrastructure is not normally a legitimate target.  The insurgents fight primarily by killing civilians, of course, and so they have almost managed to empty the category of "war crimes" as applied to themselves; almost everything they do is a worse war crime than this. 

It is mirrored in a number of similar problems:  the water treatment plants have been bombed, compounding the drinking water problems.  Spirit of America, the charity, collected donations to buy sewing machines and set up stations in Iraq where women could come and work on those machines for free.  The idea was to build small pools of capital in Iraqi society, to help speed the rebuilding, and to empower the women, who had little access to capital otherwise; but those sewing stations became a target as well, and were destroyed.

Given that we want to improve the state of Iraqi society for humanitarian reasons, and also to increase the stability that will improve our chances of achieving strategic goals, it doesn't matter "whose fault" the sorry conditions are in a certain practical sense.  We have to find a way to improve those conditions despite the worst the insurgent or terrorist can do.

On the other hand, I think their brutality ought to be motivating to a certain degree.  We ought not to want to say, "America and her allies can be defeated if you are prepared to be cruel enough to the weak."  I would add to your list of things we wish to accomplish a second humanitarian goal, one that applies not only to Iraq but to many places in the world:  we, the Coalition countries, need to make a stand for civilization.  We need to reassert that the things we have defined as war crimes will not be allowed to prevail as strategies, nor to return to prominence. 

This is one reason I am glad to see the UN willing to try again, and the State Department redoubling its efforts as well.  I think we have a common stake in this.  Unfortunately, the issue was clouded badly at the start of the war, so that we splintered in a debate over how best to uphold the Geneva Conventions -- whether with the International Criminal Court, say, or through national methods such as the US prefers -- and what precisely the Conventions require with regard to terrorist organizations and insurgents.  That division has been very harmful to all of us, and it has clouded the fact that we are debating different interpretations of common principles, while fighting a foe that prefers to fight by blowing up children playing hopscotch (as, alas, we saw this weekend).

All of that was to establish what I see as the fourth, and possibly most important goal.  This is not quite the neoconservative goal of altering the region with democracy, as it is not transformational but defensive.  I think we have an interest in defending the ideals of our civilizations, in terms of how wars may be fought, against those who believe they can prevail through brutality.  We have a common interest in not seeing brutality prosper:  for, as any economist knows, what prospers will also multiply.

Comments

[Ymarsakar]

When I read Sherman's letter to Atlanta, I realized that the American version of Total War philosophy was not the conventional war people thought it was. There was something intensely flexible, sensible, and unconventional with what Sherman and MacArthur did. Even as technologies changed, ideologies morphed and died out, and the times passed them by, the principles by which they based their actions still ring true.

People will do what they are rewarded for doing and avoid what they are punished for doing. But the behavioral model isn't enough. People also do what they believe to be beneficial, even if it is not, and people avoid doing what they believe to be risky, even if it is guaranteed with their aid.

The more people understand, the less their choices become. Hopefully we can shrink their choices down to the right choice, for us as well as them. For everyone that is, except our enemies. A constriction based upon the use of power, applied not to buildings or war machines but to the human psyche.

This is a good explanation, Grim.

[Allan]

This debate is now turning interesting. We have competing assessments of the engagement on Iraq from people on the ground who give diametrically opposed assessments.

One thing to note: it is less likely that the grunts will succumb to political pressure or the pressure to please their commanders when giving a report. Thus, their assessment may be more forthright.

Second thing to note: these soldiers are at a non-strategic level, most likely assigned to units at the brigade level or below, so they may not have the complete picture.

But, there is no doubt, these are boots on the ground. Their last line is crucial: "We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through." They question the mission. They question the politics. They question the strategy. But they do their jobs.

These are true citizen soldiers.

Grim,

I do not disagree with your assessment about Iran. I do not agree. I just don't know. I trust an Arab (at least one born and raised in the middle east) as far as I can throw him (which for me is not far). My experience is that they are not loyal to anyone but their tribal leaders. I would not doubt that those we believe are our friends are also the ones coordinating the attacks. They have a different

The Iraqis are just using us as an ends for their means. (This would likely be true for any indigenous force that wants power). To them standing for Iraq means nothing, unless their tribe controls Iraq.

I, too, believe that the individual Iraqi wants security for Iraq. But that means security for the individual, not for people outside of their clan.

In my belief, the only way to get Iraq going in the way you want it to go is to get the people to shift their loyalties from the clan to the state. This goes against centuries, if not millenia, of tradition, and may be impossible. The clan is, after all, just an extended family.

Perhaps it can be done. I don't think it can be done the way that we are doing it now.

I think that, if nothing changes, we will be having the same debate in five years that we are having now. Unless, somehow, we can get visionary leadership at the top (POTUS, SECDEF, and CJCS), it will not happen.

Of the Democratic candidates, perhaps only Biden has a chance of doing it (the others will simply declare victory and leave - which, in itself is not a totally bad thing).

Of the Republican candidates, I believe only McCain has the background to do it. Guliani, Romney, and Thompson have no foriegn policy or military experience to speak of. And Guliani seems to think that Bush is on the right course, and has been since 9/11 (which is a roadmap for defeat if there every was one). Romney might offer interesting insights, though, as his formative years were spent in business, not in politics or in the courtroom.

I continue in my belief that we began losing right after Baghdad fell, and have not turned the tide since. No Republican candidate offers any substantive thoughts for changing the situation. And no Democrat would be willing to spend the political capital to do so.

[john Ryan]

All of the insightful analysis is always from the American point of view/perspective. We are not dealing with people who have the same mind set that we do. One of the biggest mistakes that we have made in Iraq is assuming that the people of Iraq would behave/react the way that Americans would in similiar circumstances. At this point we are arming both sides of a (potential) civil war. Our new best friends the Sunnis of Anbar have walked out of Maliki's government and show no signs of coming back.

[Tom W.]

The revision of history marches on...

Even before Rumsfeld resigned and Abizaid was replaced, Iraq was by no stretch of the imagination a defeat in progress.

It was difficult, but compared to the all-out carnage of the Algerian War of Independence, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the Russo-Chechen Wars-- other major protracted counterinsurgencies against Muslim fighters--Iraq was and is a shining example of how to avoid destroying a nation while confronting highly motivated irregulars.

As for the NYT article...

Didn't read it. Not interested in defeatism, especially when it comes from our own troops. Every war has the guys who insist that everything is SNAFU, right up until the moment of victory. This article is another attempt to help lose the war by chipping away at the morale of the home front, so I won't spend any time on it.

Had enough defeatism to last me a lifetime.

[Grim]

Allan,

Your core concern seems to be that we need to transfer loyalty from tribe to central state. I don't agree, either that we can, or that we need to do so. The tribe is a natural system of authority, and unless it breaks down naturally, it is tremendously strong.

That said, we can build a central state on the foundation of support from Iraqi tribes. Such a support would be a strong foundation indeed. See the link toward Gen. Begner's comments, and also this:

http://www.grimbeorn.blogspot.com/2003_09_01_archive.html#106364137140899538

John,

I hadn't realized you were an American; I thought you were Australian, for some reason. In any event, my response to Allan is a response to you also. I have never thought of the Iraqis as being fundamentally like 21st-century Americans. The piece I just cited was from 2003, and works from the fundamental assumption that the tribes are indispensable.

[jordan]

For a multi-authored piece, the Op-Ed is remarkably coherant, and actually reads like a single-authored work. It certainly stakes out a view from the strategic, bird's eye level, which the MSM normally dismisses when it comes from the sergeant-level grunt. It's good that they now publish such a piece, despite their previous view of soldiers' opinions as valueless, having been obtained through the "soda straw" of their limited AO and low rank.

This Op-Ed's authors clearly are acutely aware of the points advanced by politicians and media principles who argue against the war, and they support and reinforce most of them. I'd be interested in hearing more about the day to day experiences during these past fifteen months that led them to these conclusions. It would also be interesting to hear from other's in their unit about whether they hold the same views. Also, publishing this at this particular time, only weeks before Petraeus' testimony, makes it hard not to view it as another piece of the media-wide effort to discredit his testimony before it's made.

As you point out, Grim, we saw a similiar bleak assessment in the Marine Corps intel assessment on Anbar, which was closely followed by success in that province. It's interesting that the question of applying what worked there to other regions wasn't addressed by these authors. That would seem to be a pretty significant part of any assessment on the prospects for achieving our goals in Iraq, and the decision-making process on what to do next.

I'd be interested in seeing the Petraeus/Kilcullen take on this Op-Ed.

[Uncle Jimbo]

I think the biggest and really only mistake they made was taking their experiences in a small part of the war and extrapolating them out to the entire theater. As Grim points out the situation changes dramatically at times. We are nearing a tipping point and even if not all see it, progress is certainly being made.

Cordially,

Uncle J

[Ymarsakar]

We are not dealing with people who have the same mind set that we do.

I think that hits upon the truth. Since Allan's mindset concerning Arabs may or may not be their mindset or perhaps it is their mindset about us, that Americans only value Americans, that Americans only help Iraqis because Americans are using Iraqis as shock fodder, and so forth. What is unquestionable however, is that some people's mindsets are totally alien from the other. Dealing with this, whether concerning the domestic or foreign insurgency, in America or Iraq, is crucial to the completion of any "grand strategy".

I don't agree, either that we can, or that we need to do so.-Grim

Guerrilas, revolutionaries, and leaders of slave revolts have always known that you cannot trust states, politicians, or agreements on paper. You can only trust honorable men to do what their honor dictates. That is all.

What we see here in the West as unity and central government was built upon the blood of millions, and the sweat of even more. And even then, there will always be internal enemies. You can never get rid of them, unless you go Stalin's route and purge 50% of the population, civilian or military.

The best we can do is to isolate the two sides, Democrat or Republican, so they do not try to destroy the other, so that some function of peace and tranquility may reign. If Iraq cannot survive people being loyal to their family, friends, and blood brothers more than the government, then neither can we survive the Left and their allies' ultimate loyalty to themselves, rather than to the US Constitution.

Iraq's fate will seal ours, in time. Just as our fate will seal the world's fate, in time.

The tribe is a natural system of authority, and unless it breaks down naturally, it is tremendously strong.

Grm, what would you have said to the Russians that lost some 90% of one of their generation and the British that suffered from Fascist bombs, if they wanted Emperor Hirohito's head? What do we owe Hirohito and Japan, given their war crimes? It seems your answer to that would be the same answer to "what do we owe the Sunnis that once fought with Al Qaeda".

Just reaching into history and comparing arguments that I think are similar. Unfortunately, people may not listen this time. Has the shock of defending against psychological warfare waged by demoralization media campaigns been too much for people to regain their mental balance? There is plenty more coming in the decades that will soon pass.

We are nearing a tipping point and even if not all see it, progress is certainly being made.

You mean just because Omaha Beach's tanks sank, that this doesn't mean the entire Normandy invasion was in the same dire straits? Preposterous, Jimbo ; ) Can't be.

One last note to Grim. You may mean a different thing when you say "strength" than when others do. What is strength and where does it come? If a person disagrees on such, then there is no real ability to say that tribes are strong or good.

I continue in my belief that we began losing right after Baghdad fell, and have not turned the tide since.

The US started losing the moment it went for an armored strike rather than an insurgency as practiced by the SF in Afghanistan. Or perhaps it was when Bush went to the UN on the advice of Powell and on the loyalty ties to Blair.

There was no tide to turn. A decisive engagement requires the other side to fight, not melt away.

Besides, even if you had your own choice of political candidates, they would have been helpless without correct military advice. Which was not given, not from the Army at least.

[Grim]

Ymar:

Strength in social relationships comes from trust. Blood ties support trust in a natural way -- that is, humans' wiring is such that we tend to feel loyalty and trust towards closer relatives rather than strangers.

As a result, tribal relationships are relatively strong. Indeed, even in the advanced Western democracies, there are places where they have not broken down -- in the American nuclear family, for example, there are what amount to tribal bonds of authority that even the state will normally respect, because they know what it would cost to try and break those bonds.

[gray82]

I would like to comment on two of the previous comments above. First, when the above fella Tom W. stated that he did not read the article because he wasn't interested in anymore "defeatism, especially when it comes from our own troops," I have to disagree with him, and I read the article several times because my husband was one of the authors. I won't argue, especially since my husband is still deployed and isn't here to voice his own opinions on this page, but I will state that defeatism is the last thing on their minds, now more than ever considering what happened to our good friend SSG Murphy. Maybe this fella should have read the article. Second, I'd like to comment on Mister Jimbo's comment on "taking their experiences in a small part of the war." My husband is on his third tour of Iraq and has been to Afghanistan once. I'm not saying it is more or less than anyone more qualified in the area of expertise, but I just thought that statement minimized their time spent in the theater.

[Grim]

My respects, ma'am. I'll let Jimbo and others answer for themselves, but I wanted to welcome you. Military wives are a special breed.

[Ymarsakar]

Thanks for the elaboration, Grim.

As for Tom's comments, I can only say that many are tired of the New York Times. Not because of any enmity towards your husband, gray, but just because the motivation of the Times is like the motivation of Der Spiegel. Not to be trusted.

A person that wanted to do good, could have his purpose hijacked by others intent on warping it to other ends. I do not assume that this is what the Times did here concerning the composite article, but it has to be calculated in.

I don't think Jimbo or most of us are interested in attacking their qualifications, per say. Rather perspectives count for a lot. A person may see something that is true for him, but it may not be the part of the picture another sees. It doesn't mean they don't know what they are talking, but it does mean it is incomplete. At least by the judgment of Jimbo, as evidenced in the thread forward of this one.

Motivation has always mattered more to me than qualifications. A qualified person could be mistaken, it is no guarantee that it will end up as a solid reality, that which he proposes. However, if he is motivated, then he can correct any problems that can crop up. However, if they aren't motivated or motivated in say something else, then bad things can happen.

It's hard to tell what the NYT article authors want. I mean, what do they really really want? What do they want, as Morden kept repeating in Babylon 5.

[Grim]

Well, let's not attack their motivations, either. There is no cause to assume they are anything other than what they appear to be -- NCOs in a storied unit, who are entitled to express both their understanding of the facts, as military men, and their opinions on what the best Iraq policy might be, as citizens.

Disagreement should not imply disrespect. Anyone who has served as they have has every right to his opinion and his say. I don't have to agree to be ready to defend that right.

[Lord Whorfin]

What about the claim of 2 million refugees in surrounding ME countries and 2 million living in slums??

[jordan]

gray82, thanks for your service. What does your husband think our next step in Iraq should be?

[Grim]

I don't know about the slums, but with an unemployment rate between 25 and 50 percent, it would hardly be surprising. The economic issues are serious, as I mentioned in the update above.

I think the 2 million refugee figure is from Syria alone. I don't know if Syria is reporting accurately; but I remember them mentioning it in a recent conference.

[Deltabravo]

I think Grim has a good point. This is a classic case of the men all standing around the elephant describing their particular section of the beast. And the NYT is always suspect in ITS motives. (That's my humble view.) The article may validly describe the section of the elephant that unit is standing under. (And the fact the NYT was so eager to print it, gives us a clear indication of just what part of the elephant the unit happened to be standing under...) But I think standing back and looking at the whole thing gives a better picture. I think we need to see what Petraeus has to say about that.

[Deltabravo]

Oops, sorry. I was actually referring to Ymarsakar's point. Not that Grim isn't also making good points...

[Jamison1]

gray82,

I would like to echo the sentiment that military wives have a special place in heaven reserved for them.

As to your note, surely your husband didn't see the same thing in all three deployments (with a year between them, I assume)? So now he is seeing what he is seeing in his AO. But what he is seeing in his AO would be different than what people are seeing in, say, Fallujah. Right? Or am I wrong here?

Again, thank you for your service.

[JE]

It has been my surmise in reading emails from someone likely to be a similarly located soldier in Baghdad that this misunderstanding and misinformation is prevalent. It was my impression because those emails spotlighted in a laser point fashion on the tiny part of the war they were experiencing, a "microcosim" which because it had not as yet caught up with the full force of the surge, did not reflect anything but the same old, same old. There was no mention of the improvements in Al Anbar, none more recently in Diyala, or on what is in its infancy, the region sounth of Baghdad.

While none of these men or the one I write to discusses morale, my interpretation of both writings is a lowering of morale. They will complete their missions but they are discouraged and see no progress whatsoever.

If I could suggest something as a lay person, though comitted to the military as I am from a military family, is that the NCOs - all of these, be included in weekly or biweekly briefings which discusses all the various things that are happening and the correct reasoning behind them. I think they do not have that full picture and they deserve and need it, particularly when there is a lag time in implementation of the surge to begin or to have success rear its head. As well as the two groups mentions as not entirely understanding the ramifications and implications of the things going on, I read a milblog post in which they had been assigned to guard a large wedding party. They did not understand the degree to which these events had been targetted and in classic COIN, it was important to see that this large event go forward without violence. Turns out the wedding did not occur there - a bait and switch, but the principle remains the same. Instead of a massive waste of troop resources, it was one of their best applications. They should have been made aware of that.

I would see that these smart men and women who are called on to be the backbone of much that goes on, know and understand the entire process by which we are seeking to win this war. And most important of all, they should be kept abreast of the phenominal changes for the better occuring in other areas. Not knowing has to effect not just morale, but the efficiency with which they go about the mission. If they feel it all flawed and sinking fast, the degree to which any human can give the very best is diminished despite the desire to do precisely that - give their best. There should be time allowed for Q&A's so that all questions are asked and all answers given. In the end this is a matter of respect and they deserve it. Their best performance demands that they be in the loop.

[MICHAEL in MI]

"In my belief, the only way to get Iraq going in the way you want it to go is to get the people to shift their loyalties from the clan to the state. This goes against centuries, if not millenia, of tradition, and may be impossible. . . ."

This comment from Allan baffles me. On one hand, there is an understanding that what we are trying to accomplish in the Middle East is change "centuries, if not millenia, of tradition". On the other hand, there is the tone that this is expected to be accomplished within 4-5 years, or just give up, because it is "impossible".

I continue to be amazed at how people seem to think that taking on the monumental task of transforming the Middle East somehow should be accomplished within 4-5 years, and, if we don't get it done in that amount of time, then it just can't be done. What that tells me is that it is not the Middle East mindset that is warped, but the mindset of we Westerners that is warped... Since we seem to think that everything should be accomplished on a nice, short timeframe, wrapped up in a nice, tidy package.

As far as these soldiers go, as someone mentioned already, why did they not speak to the progress and success made in Anbar and Diyala? And are they of the small-picture, instant-gratification mindset that if we haven't gotten all of our objectives done within 4-5 years, then it is hopeless? That is what seems to come across to me.

It is pretty obvious now that we are no longer in the against-the-war/support-the-war camps. Now we have fractured into "the war effort is too hard, let's give up"/"we have obstacles and problems, but let's find a way to solve them and get this done, because it is a necessary endeavor" camps. I sense these soldiers, along with many other Americans and military members, are in the former camp. Which is fine, that is human nature. However, that mentality never accomplished anything worthwhile.

I have worked with a lot of negative, pessimistic, defeatist and fatalistic people in my line of work. They complain and bitch and moan about everything under the sun. This problem, that problem, this obstacle, that obstacle. Most of the time, they are correct in their assessments of the problems and obstacles. However, their big problem is that they are not putting forth the problems and obstacles in order for others to be aware of them and then find a way to solve them. No, they are making note of the problems and obstacles as proof and reason to give up on the particular project. This is obvious when I have gone to them and suggested some solutions to their problems/obstacles and their response was "yeah, maybe that would work, but probably not, and it's too hard and would take too much time, so it's not worth it, so let's not bother..."

I sense this same attitude from people now.

It is very important to bring problems and obstacles to the attention of those who can figure out a way to solve them/get around them. But it is defeatist to bring problems and obstacles to light ONLY for the purpose of saying "this is too hard, we have to give up".

While I respect the service of these soldiers and I respect them for bringing to light the problems and obstacles we face in succeeding, I do not respect the defeatist and fatalistic attitude. And I damn well don't respect them going to the NYT (or any other mass media outlet) to voice their defeatist and fatalistic attitude. I would have hoped that along with COIN strategy and any other training needed pre-deployment, that the military would also give the soldiers some training about the agenda of the media. A key understanding of the FACT that the media is NOT on their side, and will use anything and everything they say to undermine their mission to the point of putting their fellow troops in danger, is absolutely necessary.

All that said, I was so glad to read this analysis by you, GRIM. I first read about this article at HotAir and AllahPundit was in his usual negative/pessimistic/defeatist/fatalistic/see-here's-more-proof-all-is-lost-in-Iraq tone. But thankfully, many commenters started posting the links back here to your analysis and that of Uncle Jimbo and AllahPundit put up an update link to this post. I have been griping there about them not linking enough to you gentlemen here at Blackfive as well as Greyhawk at Mudville, Mrs. Greyhawk's DAWN PATROLs, etc, in order to put all their military posts in proper perspective. Hopefully they will start doing it more often.

[Grim]

Well, don't be too hard on AllahPundit. He's a clever fellow, with a bright sense of humor.

He also has a nasty job -- spending all day trekking through the media, especially cable news? Good Lord. How could he not be afflicted with occasional bouts of despair? The last time I saw CNN, it made me despair for the future of the whole American nation -- and it wasn't even talking about Iraq, but just a couple of minor crimes that happened to be on the front page for a day. Still, the misconceptions and bad thinking on display, and consumed by CNN's viewers, were distressing.

Poor Allah looks at that stuff every day, all day. Give him a beer or something; he's earned it.

[Soldier's Dad]

"We are not dealing with people who have the same mind set that we do."

People are people. What changes when one moves around the world is 'negotiating style'. Every culture has a different style.

I once agreed full price for some jewelry in a Saudi shop and was unceremoniously shown the door. I had offended the owner by not 'negotiating'.

In the US negotiations tend to address the 'easy to agree' items first, then the difficult items last.

In Europe, the hard items come first, the easy items come last. If one makes significant concessions on the hard items, it is proper form for the other side to simply concede on the easy items as a gesture of good will.

If one wants to see how a central government functions in a tribal society one merely needs to follow congressional debate over the Transportation Budget. Roadwork creates local jobs and and all 435 Tribal Sheiks in Congress do whatever they can to insure roads get built in their districts...even if it means building roads to nowhere.

[Grim]

Haggling is a big deal in China, too. When we lived there, for a long time I would never haggle over anything. The exchange rate in those days was such that everything, even at the full price being asked, was quite cheap; and while I understood that they were asking more than they really expected to get, I also felt like I had more than they could readily understand; was paying less than I would at home anyway; and was pleased to help improve the lives of the merchants I dealt with by paying a little more, as they lived in conditions that could be greatly helped by a little extra.

Besides, raised as I was in the South, I took bargaining on price for something a gentleman did not do -- you either bought, or if you could not afford a thing, did without it with no complaints. You did not say, "Could you lower your price?" So I didn't.

After a while, the one guy at the market where we got our vegetables just started stuffing extra groceries in the sack after I'd paid him. He was happy to take my money for a while, but he obviously got to feeling bad about it.

From that point on, I learned to do some cursory haggling, just for form's sake. It was not my object to be discourteous; just the opposite. There was just a real cultural difference there that had to be learned.

[Ymarsakar]

Anyone who has served as they have has every right to his opinion and his say.

Opinions are okay, Grim, but I was refering to individual views. Because the article is a composite, written based upon the views of many, it is not easy to recognize the individual views of the author. That is an important facet to know, and one that would facilitate greater means of communication.

It is unlikely that their motivations are corrupt in nature, but if they are speaking their mind then it would be better if they spoke their heart's desire as well. Even 5 sergeants cannot create a monolithic creature of intent or purpose.

The Coalition has often let the Shia sections slide because of a number of factors. Americans are actually creating closer and stronger bonds with Sunnis. Petraeus' pattern seems to be expansionary in nature. Meaning he once started training Iraqi police and what not, then he branched out into the Al Anbar tribes, and so forth. In Al Anbar, Americans could derive loyalty and respect from protecting the citizens from their government, Al Qaeda. And also promises of aid against other enemies, Shia or Iranian perhaps. In the Shia sections, Americans could acquire some grassroots support by protecting the Shia from their government. Corrupt bureacrats do not need more prey for their mills. Sadr doesn't need more people to execute, either.

None of this could be accomplished by giving the Iraqis more local say such as obeying the Iraqi government more, because the only people that will have a say will be those already in power and those already in power needs a purging. The only way the people at the bottom of the pyramid will have a say is if they have backing. Now it can be either from us or the Sadr militias funded by Iran, the choice is left to us since those without power have little choice in the matter. They choose what is offered to them.

In the Shia section, however, we're dealing with more than just local tribes and politics. The one that holds the battlespace of their minds isn't Al Qaeda, per say, so therefore cannot be attacked as we attack Al Qaeda. That's been one of the problems in the Shia south. Having given Iraq autonomy, you cannot now take it away if some corrupt Iraqi government bureacrat says No. And yet what he is saying no to is helping those that most need the help in the Shia sections. Sadr says yes, we will help the downtrodden, and thus his power networking grows amongst the poor and downtrodden.

The fake pride that results from refusing American help in order to pull yourself up via Al Qaeda, Iranian, Sadr like, bootstraps just isn't likely. And if it is not likely, why would we expect the Iraqis to choose it when they can have better options? This is like women choosing abusive boyfriends constantly. Should we leave every individual woman to such selections based upon the choices of a few?

Which brings me back to my point provided to Grim. How can you argue with a person's position if you can't tell the difference between his position and his co-authors? Asking for what they want is very valid in my view.

He also has a nasty job -- spending all day trekking through the media, especially cable news?

I agree. Psychological warfare attacks are no joke, especially if you purposefully go out and receive them.

[Ymarsakar]

Even though I respect their service, I don't like the term because it sounds too trite for me to write it. I'd rather respect their desire to see a better world for the Iraqis they see and the Iraqis they do not see in or around Baghdad. However, I can't say that because I don't know what they really want.

Do they want Sadr's head on a pike, but believe that we can't do it so we must craft a temporary dyke? Or do only some of the authors want to attack Sadr, while others are convinced that Sadr isn't the problem? Do some really want the Iraqi government to be less Shia? More Shia?

You, as an individual, have your views, Grim. But your vies are not carbon copies of other people. I believe I can better understand you if I understand the totality of your views, rather than simply the reflections it brings off in the statements of others that might agree partially with you. This is not about service or even whether they are right or wrong, complete or incomplete.

I can't do anything about their situation, but I can at least grasp the completeness of their situation as best as I can.

[Ymarsakar]

Dike, I mean.

[Grim]

"Asking for what they want is very valid in my view."

Perhaps the problem is the Babylon 5 metaphor. I don't object to science fiction, of course; I suppose I've watched a bit of it in my time. Nevertheless, I don't think it's helpful to drag Sci-Fi metaphors into policy debates. I didn't care for the "watch Star Trek to learn about the true nature of war" concept we had being put forward a few weeks ago; and if anyone is an "agent of chaos" in Iraq, it's not the 82nd Airborne.

So, if you've got a question for them, fine; but let's not run them in with 'the Shadows.'

[David M]

Trackbacked by The Thunder Run - Web Reconnaissance for 08/20/2007
A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention, updated throughout the day...so check back often.

[Allan]

Michael,

Not sure why my comment baffles you.

On the one hand, I agree that changing Iraq will take many years. And I think it is a good cause. And I think we should do it.

On the other hand, the politicians supporting the war seem Pollyannaish. Bush said that the surge would change everything. His minions said the war would be quick. His supporters say "fight the war because it is the most important thing since the crucifixion," but do not join the military because they have more important things to do.

I have said all along that, if this is as important of a battle as Bush claims, we should dedicate more resources. If not, get out. Bush is taking the middle road, which cannot work.

[Grim]

I see nothing wrong with devoting more resources to Iraq. Which ones are you thinking we should apply?

[Ymarsakar]

So, if you've got a question for them, fine; but let's not run them in with 'the Shadows.'

Posted by: Grim | August 20, 2007 at 09:39 AM

That was not my position nor is it. I am asking the question of what they want, Grim. And if you know the episode of which I speak, the one that asked the question was Morden. There is no comparison other than that I am asking the same question he asked.

If metaphor it is, Grim, then why is the metaphor one that says they are the Shadows? I did not mention that. It would be pointless to. If I knew their motivations, I would not ask it. If I knew what they wanted as individuals, I would not seek out what they wanted. Why do you think I would seek out that which I already know?
--------------
On the other hand, the politicians supporting the war seem Pollyannaish.-Allan

Then why do you prefer McCain if you believe him Pollyannaish?

but do not join the military because they have more important things to do.-Allan

Then you believe the military could be run more effectively without KBR contracting and the various other jobs the military pays civilians to do for the war effort?

Many people are known to accept danger pay and go on contracts for military or other purposes in Iraq, from the US, and other countries as well. Are they doing less because of the very high amounts they are paid or are they doing more? Maybe that is not the right question at all.

I have said all along that, if this is as important of a battle as Bush claims, we should dedicate more resources.

More resources to do what? Is this one of those pork bridge projects, that resources must be invested in? To whom will you invest the resource into for? What purpose will such resources be used for? You know Petraeus' and Bush' plan, in general. If you want to give them more resources, they would be hard pressed to say no. But if you want to divert their resources to your purposes, then that's not the same thing is it. If you believe a change of leadership (political or otherwise) would allow a re-direction of critical resources to the correct fronts, then you are not just talking about more or less resources being used.

So what are you talking about, in essence, Allan?

[Grim]

Ymar,

Let's not get into the weeds on this point. If you've got a question to ask, that's fine; ask it plainly. Just try to do so without invoking evil characters from Sci-Fi shows. Or good characters from Sci-Fi shows. I don't want to hear from Jim Kirk or Mr. Morden when we're talking about a real war in which our people are sometimes dying, and our nation's interests are deeply concerned.

That's all I'm asking; it doesn't seem too much to ask.

[Allan]

Ymaskar,

McCain supports the goals of the war. He does not support the strategy or tactics for accomplishing those goals.

Resources. If this is the most important thing going, we should treat it as such. Expand the military (specifically, the Army and Marines). Institute a draft. At the very least, POTUS should be encouraging people to join the military out of patriotic duty.

Joining the war effort. While I am not enamoured with the fact that KBR is an integral part of our warfighting machine and that contractors are playing an ever increasing role, I do recognize that is what is happening. If young people decide to join the war effort by working for one of the contractors, that is supporting the war. Indeed, if memory serves, in WWII, our military industrial complex was key and working for it was one of the ways to avoid being drafted. Writing an opinion column or working on your father's campaign does little for the war effort. But, if someone were to become this war's Ernie Pyle, I think that would be supporting the war effort also.

[Grim]

I don't want that to be received too harshly. Please remember, though, that one of the soldiers' wives is present. One of their comrades was shot just days ago.

This is a debate, therefore, that calls for some formality to avoid giving offense without cause. They deserve to be received seriously and courteously, and not to have their opinions compared to fantasies, however insightful or provocative those fantasies may be. Especially because we disagree, we should take care to show special courtesy.

[MICHAEL in MI]

"His supporters say "fight the war because it is the most important thing since the crucifixion," but do not join the military because they have more important things to do."

Care to provide a link for that direct quote you provided, Allan. Or are you vying to become the next Scott Thomas Beauchamp with your ridiculous overexaggeration.

Also, the "chickenhawk" argument again? Yawn. I could just as easily ask why all the Leftists whining about Darfur have not joined the Peace Corps and why all the Leftists who support Afghanistan have not joined the military to fight there. But I won't. Because that is not an argument. That is a petty ploy to attack the person instead of the person's points.

I will say one thing that most military members with whom I have talked agree... one does not have to enlist in the military to contribute to this war effort. There is a major propaganda war that has been waged by the Democrat Party, their propaganda arm in the American and International media and by the Leftist blogs. People are needed to fight that aspect of the war. Many of us are doing that every single day. Also, many people are needed to support the troops with care packages, letters of support, etc. Many of us are doing that every single day. So spare us your tired old "chickenhawk" squawking.

As far as the "surge"-offensive, it is a whole 2+ months old (it started 16 June 2007, if I am not mistaken). I didn't know a complete transformation of the Middle East was supposed to be accomplished in 2 months. And yes, I know we have been at this since 2003. But it has taken 4 years simply to gain the trust of the locals. They now trust us - well our soldiers and Marines anyway - and are working with them to root out al Qaeda and get their country back together. Everything has been happening slowly, but surely.

[MICHAEL in MI]

Posted by: Grim | August 20, 2007 at 11:56 AM

GRIM - That courtesy only goes so far. John Kerry served and saw his friends die. Should we have given him courtesy when he reported to Congress? John Murtha served and saw his friends die. Should I give him courtesy when he smears the war effort and the U.S. Marines?

NO. Period.

I said before that I respect their service and I respect them for bringing forth the obstacle and problems that we face. But I do NOT respect defeatism, fatalism, negativity and, on top of that, going to the worst propaganda arm for the enemy outside of CNN to broadcast that defeatism, fatalism and negativity.

Some of us civilians are doing are best here to support this war effort, get out the news of the military members' success and progress, send care package and letters, support the Victory Caucus and 10 Weeks to Testimony, get out the news from Michael Yon and Bill Roggio and Michael Fumento, etc etc etc. And I come online Sunday to see all that thrown to sh*t, because 7 soldiers are pessimistic, negative, defeatist and fatalistic. All the success and progress obtained over the past few months and the positive progress all over Iraq means jack sh*t now, because the only thing anyone will pay attention to now is the fatalistic griping of these 7 soldiers.

I'm sorry, but this crap really pisses me off.

As I said before, I see this debate going from anti-war/support-the-war to "it's a lost cause, too many problems, it's too hard, let's just effin give up"/"there are problems and obstacles, but the war effort is necessary and worth it, so let's find a way to solve these problems and work hard to git er done". I find these soldiers in the former group. And I am not going to just bite my tongue and be "courteous" when I believe their Op-Ed in the Treasonous Times is undermining the war effort and completely destroying the progress we have been making for the last two+ months.

[Allan]

Michael,

Simply put: If you are between the ages of 18 and 42, are qualify to enlist, and have never been in the military AND you believe that the war in Iraq is the most important thing going, by not enlisting or directly supporting the war effort because you have more important things to do, you are being a hypocrite.

And, yes, there are some very good reasons for not joining the military. But I challenge you to find one that is more important than the war, if, indeed, this is the most important thing our country needs to do.

Hell, in 2005, I didn't think that this is the most important thing for our country and I was not healthy enough to enlist, but I chose to stay in until I had been mobilized. I did it because it was MY patriotic duty. And there are thousands out there that did the same, despite not supporting the war. Because my country needed my small contribution.

So, I say: "you know you are a hypocritical supporter of the war if you CAN enlist but you CHOOSE not to do so."

Or, perhaps, you do not think your country needs your contribution to the war effort. We have a bunch of people unable to enlist that can do the work you seem to think so important, i.e., counter propaganda.

[Grim]

Michael,

There's a great big difference between attending secret negotiations with your country's enemies and then lobbying for their preferred settlement before Congress, as Kerry himself says he did; and publishing a frank but negative opinion of your experience in your AO, as a citizen, which these soldiers are entitled to do. There's not only nothing wrong with doing so, it's good for our country that we can hear the frank opinions of our NCOs directly from them.

There's a great deal of difference between condemning fellow Marines who are on trial for their lives, as Murtha did, and simply speaking what you see as the unvarnished truth. We ought to be able to disagree without hating each other -- these men and we particularly so. We've taken the same oath. Our loyalty is to the same place. We can disagree; we can see things differently. We can try to understand why they feel the way they do, for that matter: having seen a particularly bad AO up close for a long time, their frustration with the slow pace of progress ought to be understandable.

You're welcome to be annoyed that the NYT, for example, seeks out negative opinions and wouldn't dream of publishing a piece by six or seven NCOs who wanted to talk about how great their AO is compared to their last deployment (which, by the way, I have heard repeatedly from Marine NCOs in Anbar). It's fair to be irritated about that.

Still, what did I say to Ken Silverstein a few days ago? Anytime a serviceman wants to talk to the American people directly, he should be able to do so. We need to hear what he has to say.

We need also to think it through, to compare it with other data, not just to accept it. That was the point of this post. But their speech is not unwelcome, nor should it be. They've earned it, and we're better off for hearing it, whether we like what they have to say or not.

[Ymarsakar]

That's all I'm asking; it doesn't seem too much to ask.

Resources. If this is the most important thing going, we should treat it as such. Expand the military (specifically, the Army and Marines). Institute a draft. At the very least, POTUS should be encouraging people to join the military out of patriotic duty.

Since it is what you two want, I'll accept that. It is fair enough.

[MICHAEL in MI]

"We need also to think it through, to compare it with other data, not just to accept it. That was the point of this post. But their speech is not unwelcome, nor should it be. They've earned it, and we're better off for hearing it, whether we like what they have to say or not."

GRIM - I don't know how many times I need to say this. I have no problem with them stating the problems and obstacles that we face. I have a BIG problem with them going to the propaganda arm of the enemy and stating these things in a negative, defeatist, pessimistic and fatalistic manner. It is not only the message, but the way the message is presented that is important.

I learned the hard way in my line of work about being too alarmist and freaking out many higher ups on a project, when it was not necessary. I sent an e-mail saying how I felt a certain solution to a big problem we had (which affected millions of dollars of investment from our company in this project) was not feasible, from my opinion and from what I saw. I should have just sent it to my direct supervisors and then discussed it with them to get some different perspectives, because, upon doing that, someone noticed something that I had missed and we solved the problem. However, prior to that, I sent out the e-mail to everyone involved in the project and freaked out not only some higher ups in my area of the company, but some higher ups in our European offices. This put a lot of people in a panic for an entire day until my direct supervisors could put out the fire. A fire that did not need to be set, had I simply worked within my small group to address the issue.

Now, back to these soldiers. What they have to say is important, but the way they put out their message has started a huge fire. And I question anyone's motives who go to the NYT, who, as I said, are #2 on the enemy propaganda list behind CNN. Anyone who has not lived under a rock since 2003 knows the NYT will distort everything coming from the military into a negative anti-war effort agenda. I have to assume these soldiers have not been living under a rock and so they knew darn well how their message would be presented to the American public and what it would do the war effort.

That is my beef. NOT that they expressed themselves. NOT that they had some problems and obstacles to report. But that they went to the propaganda arm of the media knowing what they said would be used to undermine the war effort. I don't respect that. I can only assume that they meant to undermine the war effort, not urge people to find solutions which lead to success. Especially since their message was to just give up, since it's too hard.

[Grim]

First of all, just what has it done to the war effort? I was talking to John Cole about this over at his place. I thought this was going to be a huge story; but by 11 o'clock on the same day the story came out, it was spammed off the Memeorandum board. The Left is talking about Karl Rove and the Foreign Policy community this week; most of the Right is still talking about Beauchamp.

The only people who actually care about what these NCOs had to say are you, me, and a fistful of others around the country who take COIN theory seriously. We're the only ones who are listening to them and thinking about what they had to say. What they saw and thought and have to say is important to me. It's important to me for two reasons: first, because I want to live in a country where NCOs can talk directly to the people; and second, because I rely on that same free flow of information to do the analysis I do. I have sources in Iraq, but most of my data comes from open sources.

Greyhawk was talking about this a few months back, when the Army was on about OPSEC on military blogs. He just laughed, and pointed to how low the traffic is on most of them. We're the only ones who read them. These guys who are running "the national conversation," the CNNs and NYTs and so forth, and for that matter most of the political bloggers, they don't care one whit what some NCO from the 82nd Airborne thinks. We're the only ones who really care what they think, and what they saw.

When a soldier wants to say something about the war he's just fought, I want to hear it. Not just because I respect his right to say it, but because I need to hear it. We all need to hear it, all of us who are serious about understanding what is going on. All of us who take military science and history seriously. It's not just that it's their right -- though that it is, and we ought to fight for their rights, since they fought for ours. It's that we need them, even the ones we disagree with, to be free to speak their minds. We need that.

[MICHAEL in MI]

GRIM - For the last time, I am not saying they should not speak their minds. I don't know how many times I have explained my position already, but you still seem to be missing my point and accusing me of somehow wanting these soldiers to shut up and not have a right to speak. That is not my position.

Second, my other point was tone of the message. There is a difference between reporting on Abu Graib as an isolated incident which the military is taking care of and turning that into a worldwide scandal, smearing the entire military with the label of torturer, accusing the leaders of America of authorizing toture and using the non-scandal to undermine the entire war effort. There was a way for these soldiers to express the problems and obstacles and then provide some solutions to them to win the overall war effort.

Also, with regards to your "no one is talking about this anyway"... well, that's good and bad, but not the point. And you are wrong that no one cares what the NCOs think. You know darn well the media cares a great deal what any soldier thinks who is against the war effort and against President Bush. However, you are right if you said no one cares what NCOs think if they are in support of the mission and in support of the President.

Lastly, the saying goes "loose lips sink ships". Speaking one's mind is great, but defeatism, pessimism, negativity and fatalism lead to sinking this ship (war effort). You know as well as I that this war effort is as much propaganda and psyops as it is military. We are right where we were in Vietnam where the enemy is defeated and cannot even touch the best military in the world, yet remains only because they achieve "victories" in the propaganda war, helped along by the American media and International media as well as the propagandists in the Middle East and in the American Congress.

I simply do not agree, in this day and age of propaganda winning wars more than military operations, that it is a good idea for any GI Joe to write an op-ed in the Propaganda Times saying that the war is lost and our military, the best in the world, does not have what it takes to defeat the Islamic enemy. If that is truly the case, then we may as well give up. Seriously. That is the message I take from these 7 soldiers. Just give up America. We don't have what it takes. Bring us home and let's give in to our Islamic masters.

Is that what you want average Americans to think?

It is one thing for me to b!tch to my coworkers about the state of the company for which I work. It is quite another for me to go write an op-ed in the WallStreetJournal, coauthored by 6 of my coworkers, stating that the company is in shambles, it's a lost cause, we're never going to recover, all stockholders should sell immediately. Especially when none of the latter is true, it just seems like it from time to time when I get in a negative, pessimistic, cynical mindset.

[Grim]

Mike,

The reason I may not be understanding your position is that I'm not clear on just what you're suggesting. Are you merely saying that you feel the soldiers used bad judgment in choosing the NYT instead of some other national newspaper? They wanted to talk to all Americans, after all, so a national outlet of some kind would have been their choice.

If that's all you mean to say -- "I wish these NCOs had chosen the Wall Street Journal for their letter" or something similar, fine. I don't really like the Times either.

But you seem to be saying something stronger than that; you are, in fact, using terms like "enemy" to refer to the NYT, and suggesting that publishing there is an act of infamy similar to Kerry's meetings, while an officer, with the enemy in Paris and his subsequent testimony to advocate their preferred settlement of the war to Congress. Yet you say you don't wish to silence the NCOs; you just want what?

Not, I gather, that they should be formally punished -- since that would be a form of silencing them. Do you feel they deserve social scorned for doing this? That we treat them roughly, in front of their wives? That seems to be what you were suggesting in your comment beginning 'that courtesy goes only so far.' Am I wrong?

"There was a way for these soldiers to express the problems and obstacles and then provide some solutions to them to win the overall war effort."

OK. What way is that? You are not trying to prevent their exercise of their first amendment rights; and they wanted to use those rights to speak to their fellow Americans. What method upholds those rights, and meets your criteria also? I don't think I understand.

[MICHAEL in MI]

"OK. What way is that? You are not trying to prevent their exercise of their first amendment rights; and they wanted to use those rights to speak to their fellow Americans. What method upholds those rights, and meets your criteria also? I don't think I understand."

GRIM - My main gripe is with their "all is lost, we can't win, let's give up" message. And that is their message. Period. That is the one-liner that AllahPundit used at HotAir. And that is what the soundbite American public would take away from this article as well. They won't care about the details of why or what for, they just see "7 NCOs Say War is Lost, We Can't Win, We Need to Give Up".

The American public doesn't care about the overall war effort, the progress that has been made, the assessment from last year that Anbar was lost and now we have turned it around, they don't care about COIN operations and how they take time, they don't care about military science or military strategy or military history. No, the American public likes soundbites and headlines and then goes back to playing X-Box and listening to their iPods and watching trash on TV. Or being at the mall. And so this article fed right into the propaganda of the enemy. Especially so since it was published in the NYT.

And these NCOs are either completely stupid ignoramuses or they knew exactly what they were doing when writing up this assessment in the NYT: 'our words will be used to undermine the war effort and get us and America out of here'.

Unless they are living under a rock, they know there is an assessment coming up in a few weeks by GEN Petraeus. But they didn't want to wait for that. They wanted to completely undermine the message about the big picture with their "all is lost, we need to give up" message. That is irresponsible in a time of war which is fought mostly with propaganda designed to demoralize the citizenry.

And that is what this assessment does. It demoralizes the American public and the Iraqi public. This is an Op-Ed in the most widely read and most "respected" news media outlets in the world. And this message is coming from NCOs, who, for all any of civilians know, are pretty important and knowledgable people in the war effort. So, if I didn't know any better, and only read the NYT, I would have woken up Sunday morning to read that the leaders in my military just declared the war unwinnable. And I would go on with my Sunday feeling demoralized, hopeless, defeated and depressed. Because the best military in the world just admitted that it cannot defeat an enemy. And now, as a civilian, I have lost all faith and hope in my military to succeed. And now, since I know my military feels it cannot succeed and needs to come home, I, a civilian who supports the military, will now stop supporting the war effort and work to make sure we just get our men and women out of there. Because these respected, experienced, knowledgable NCOs said our military cannot succeed and there is no hope.

That is the message I, an ignorant, ill-informed, non-military blog reading American, take from this Op-Ed. But, by all means, let's give all our griping soldiers free reign to go write op-eds undermining the war effort and demoralizing the support back home and encouraging the enemy abroad.

Rambling aside, my gripe is with their message to the American people that we should stop supporting the war, because it is a lost cause, its too hard and we need to quit. These NCOs know they speak from a level of authority and their words will be used as undermining-the-war propaganda. Are they John Kerry or John Murtha? No. Do their words have the same effect on the American public? Yes.

From my perspective, there is no other reason to write this article than to demoralize the American public. Were I not reading tens of military blogs each and every day for the past 2+ years to keep up with the ups and downs and obstacles and successes and progress with the war effort, this article would have completely demoralized me. Because I put a lot of stock in what the military men and women have to say. If all of a sudden Matt Burden, Uncle Jimbo, Greyhawk, Michael Yon, Michael Fumento and Bill Roggio all came out and stated the war is too tough, we can't win, we must work towards withdrawl, then, because I have built up such great respect for these gentlemen and their analysis, I would have no choice but to agree with them and work within my support the war effort groups to start getting them to stop supporting the war effort and turn their efforts towards getting our politicians to get us to withdraw.

Plain and simple, GRIM, I don't like "I can't" people. I don't care if they are military, politicians, media types, academics or family. And I will berate anyone who has nothing but "I can't... and I can't... and we can't... and I can't..." etc etc etc. What this war effort comes down to is we are either AmeriCANs or AmeriCANTs. The message that comes through to me from these NCOs is that we are now AmeriCANT. If that is the case, fine. I will stop supporting the mission and will just become a cynical, pessimistic, negative, fatalistic "I can't" person too.

When asked why I haven't enlisted yet, I will say "I can't... because it's too hard." When asked why I stopped spreading the good news about Iraq and Afghanistan, I will say "I can't... because it's too hard." When asked why I don't participate in politics anymore, I will say "I can't... because it's too hard." When asked why I don't care about the military or America or voting anymore, I will just say "I can't.. because it's too hard."

That is the message that articles like this relay to me.

My "criteria" is that we focus on the big picture and assess the problems, issues and obstacles and find ways to solve them to succeed. Period. Anything less does not help the mission. No matter what it is, no matter where it is. What does the Army do to those in boot camp who say "...but, I can't..."? I imagine they kick them in the ass and tell them to figure out a way.

Maybe my problem is that I am wired like an engineer, since that is my area of education (BSME Purdue 1999). I am tasked by my senior engineers with problems to solve each and every day. Problems that MUST be solved. I cannot just go back to them and say "we can't do this". The problem MUST be solved. It is my responsibility to find a way. Part of the way of going about that is to find each and every way that will NOT work before finding the way that WILL work. But I don't get paid to come back after being tasked with solving a problem with the answer: "none of these solutions work, I can't do it". No, I get paid to find a solution. If I can't, then I get fired. Plain and simple.

The same goes here in this war. There is no "there is no solution, I can't do it". We must succeed in this war effort and in this effort to transform the Middle East and push towards reforming Islam. We can NOT give up. If we do, the consequences down the road are a lot more dire than simply another 9/11-style attack leaving a mere 3,000 American civilians dead.

All the rambling aside, my main gripe was with the assessment put forth by these NCOs. You seem to suggest that every soldier in the military should be able to present their gripes about the war to the American public. I personally feel that is counterproductive to the war effort and would serve to undermine it.

Also, from what I understand, military members give up some Constitutional rights when going into the military. They are not allowed to criticize politicians or be active politically. That is a 1st Amendment right that is taken away. So me saying that they shouldn't speak negatively about the war effort in a manner that would completely undermine it is not exactly breaking new ground here with respect to their exercise of their first amendment rights.

[Davod]

Michael:

I have to agree with you. I have read through most of the commnents and come to the same conclusion. What gives these soldiers th right to write a letter to the NYT, which, if the NYT correctly reflects the views of the NCOs undermines the war effort. "Their first amendment rights" does not cut it with me.

My only caveat is the same with anything appearing in the NYT. Just what part of the NCOs views did the NYT leave out of the composite article?

As to the wife of the soldier. While defending the right of her husband to write what he wanted based upon his experience, she did not really confirm or deny the veracity of what he said. Does this mean he would write to the NYT before telling his wife his thoughts?

Additionally, the 82nd Airborne is an elte unit that is the tip of the spear of the regular army. It would not be unusual that such a force would be used continually in a war. I recall reading the same occurred during WWII with units of the airborne.

[Ymarsakar]

As for the questions, Grim, they are the same ones I asked of you and Allan. In which you answered with what you wanted.

[Ymarsakar]

You seem to suggest that every soldier in the military should be able to present their gripes about the war to the American public.

I think what Grim is describing is that analytical models require more data sources in order to become accurate. In this case, Grim is not against every soldier in the military saying his or her piece, because Grim needs those data sources for his analytical imperative.

Psychological operations takes a different view of data sources than intelligence analysis, however. Since the purposes of both are not the same.

In case it wasn't clear before, on another note, I took Allan's answer to mean the resources will be re-directed to based upon the strategy and tactics McCain, Allan, or both together agreed upon.

[Grim]

Mike,

I understood that you were angry about the defeatist message. What I don't understand is what exactly you are proposing as a solution. You seem to be saying something like, "I support their right to speak to the people, but they shouldn't use it to say things that hurt the war effort." Which is fine, but it's not enough. What I'm asking you is: if they do, are they still practicing legitimate rights in your view? Are they, instead, doing something that ought not to be allowed? Or are they doing something that is merely immoral, for which they should be shunned or scorned?

I asked you what method you think they should use to express their rights, and you offered a long explanation of why you don't approve of the message. Does that mean that there is no form of expression of this message that you think is acceptable? Finally, do you really mean it when you describe the NYT as an "enemy" publication?

This isn't something I'm asking about for no reason. I'm not asking because I like to hear "I can't" from people either. I'm asking because it's addresses a fundamental question that -- whatever happens in Iraq -- is going to have to be answered going forward, as the issue of terrorism continues to worsen.

I've told you why the data flow is critical, both negative and positive. There's no way I would be able to understand what is going on in Iraq if I didn't have good reports. You say you rely on us to help you understand and see past the media reports. I'm glad that you do, and we're doing our best to get the truth and the right information out there. That's one thing this post was about.

But look -- if instead of publishing to the NYT, they'd come on the Blogger Roundtables and said the same thing, we'd still have a negative impression of their AO to factor in. I'd rather have it than not. We need to know honestly what's going on in their AO, as citizens and as thinkers trying to decide how to address the challenges we face. We need an honest picture from those who have been there.

I have heard many people say, and I agree with the statement, that, "The bad news media is having a ruinous effect on the war, with their combination of ignorance of military science and defeatism and willingness to be manipulated by terrorists. We have to do something about that if we're going to succeed as a nation." I agree.

The question is what to do about it. My answer has been to work harder at seeing past what they produce, getting the truth from the guys in the field, and producing better analysis and making it available. In the short term, that's something we can do without putting the fundamental liberties of our nation under attack.

Another thing we can do is wait for market pressures to crush the big media who won't adapt to providing better data. The picture on newspaper revenues and readership, and even for cable news, is encouraging in that regard. More and more people are getting their news from internet sites like this one. It's a slow process, and I know we all would like it to go a lot faster, but it's a process we can let work without damaging the Constitution.

Almost all the other remedies for the problem I can think of involve some restriction of rights. Military men take their oath to the Constitution first, however. Protecting our rights is what the Constituion is for.

This is a tricky question, and one that I think deserves a great deal of careful thought.

In any event, all I'm asking you to do here is be decently respectful to the NCOs and their wives. I don't ask you to agree, or even not to be mad at them if you feel that's proper. They're soldiers, all the same, who've fought for us and hard. We may have to argue with them sometimes, but we should be able to do that like gentlemen.

[Grim]

"Psychological operations takes a different view of data sources than intelligence analysis, however. Since the purposes of both are not the same."

That is true. However, as you know, US Federal law forbids the use of domestic media for psychological operations, and the use of any media for PSYOPs targeting US citizens.

One of the things we as citizens need to do is get to be better at recognizing them, when enemies abroad target us. We can't, however, legally ask our government to set a standard that uses military-released information to affect domestic perceptions in an unrealistic way -- whether unrealistically positive or, if they should wish for whatever reason, negative. Government information formally released has to be true as far as the officer releasing it knows.

That's useful, although of course we still have to subject it to analysis, as they may be wrong (or, being human, misbehaving). Whether it's useful or not, though, it's still the law. We can't set standards that say "only positive information," both for 1st Amendment reasons, and for the reasons of lesser Federal laws and Executive Orders.

[jordan]

I would err on the side of more information, not less. The way to neutralize any psyop benefit for the enemy is to educate the public. That way, as Grim suggests, everyone can compare it to other sources and see how it fits in, or doesn't fit in.

We do have to be mindful of how words can be distorted and exploited, but I don't think that fear should keep us from offering up or receiving new information. I always want more data, not less. And I want ALL of it, good and bad, true and false. Even false data can tell you something.

But that said, Michael has a point. How do you protect democracy's free flow of information without playing into the enemy's media strategy? The only thing I can think of is public education so people understand what's going on and how their perceptions are being targeted and manipulated.

People will tend to do their own "analysis" of information anyway. The way to influence that process in a democracy is to educate them further with more information on what could be behind it. This article is carefully written to give the impression of insurmountable obstacles, but it never comes out and says anything truly defeatist.

I wouldn't stand in the way of letting any soldier speak (including Beauchamp), but do remember signing an agreement upon leaving government that any public writings would have to be approved while in my position, and five years thereafter. Maybe all this was considered by their chain, and they were given the green light.

[Deltabravo]

"That is true. However, as you know, US Federal law forbids the use of domestic media for psychological operations, and the use of any media for PSYOPs targeting US citizens."

So why haven't the managing editors and owners of the NYT been put in jail yet?

That aside, Grim, I can see that you want unfiltered data from both ends of the spectrum. I wonder, does it have to be publicly given? Could not these 7 NCOs have emailed their articles to think tanks or bloggers like yourself and done so privately and engaged in a private discussion?

Stuff like this is what the Tokyo Roses thrive on. Picture, for instance, if we had a situation of hundreds of our guys in POW camps in the middle east. This is the kind of article that would have been shoved under their noses to demoralize them. "See! Even your fellow soldiers don't agree with what you're doing." The pen IS mightier than the sword. Words have consequences. And I wish the NCOs had taken in a bigger picture of the end users of their article. (Not that one of the people here didn't bring up a great point. How do we know the NYT didn't skillfully edit the article and subtly change its focus?)

And I ask again... if y'all could be in charge of directing an "information campaign" over THERE... what would YOU say? What would you put in the foreign press, for instance?

"...why haven't the managing editors and owners of the NYT been put in jail yet?"

I'm sorry if that wasn't clear. I don't mean that it's illegal for the NYT to target the US audience with PSYOPs (although I do wonder why they aren't in jail for publishing things like diagrams of our troops' body armor -- that actually does seem to be illegal, but hasn't been prosecuted). I mean that the US government itself cannot do so. It cannot tailor its information release to the US public except to provide truthful information.

Now, as for the question of whether the NCOs article was edited by the NYT to change its focus/purpose/impact, that's a question blogs are good at answering. When they have finished their transfer home, perhaps they'll drop in to talk to us. One of their wives has done so already; I'd be glad to talk to any of them about what they saw and so forth.

"I wonder, does it have to be publicly given?"

You are prepared to trus