Counter-In SURGE ncy- What exactly are we doing?

Posted By Uncle Jimbo

Media note: I will be on St. Louis 97.1 TALK with Jamie Allman who has an excellently smart-assed blog called BullMooseAmerica. You can listen live at 0830 am Monday morning at the 97.1 link and I'm pretty sure I have a scoop for Allman about the pro-blogger world.

Counter-inSURGEncy

One of the many problems the Bush administration has made for itself is the inability to control the narrative about the war. A perfect example is that the current effort is known as The Surge, which gives the impression of simply more of the same. The problem is that this has been a completely new and different effort and having it branded as throwing more troops at the problem is unhelpful.

There has been some success in having Gen. Petraeus as the brainiac in charge of the effort, as that makes it difficult to attack "Bush's" strategy. But the fact that we waited more than two years to fight an insurgency with a counter-insurgency (COIN) falls on W's shoulders for not firing Rumsfeld, and those like me who supported him far too long. But now we have a the proper doctrine under leadership committed to fighting it, but do we have the time necessary to make it happen?

It has seemed like Gen. Petraeus and this whole wacky COIN idea just landed fresh on the scene last Fall. He finishes up the new book on COIN doctrine and goes up on Capitol Hill to explain his cunning plan to the dim bulbs in the Senate who overwhelmingly approve this and send him off to Iraq in Jan. and then before the last troops to conduct this new effort have left the US, the disloyal Democrats begin calling the whole thing a failure. Well COIN is hardly new and even before Petraeus, we had the basics down, just ask the Marines, who had a perfectly functional manual that would have been a much better guide than Rumsfeld's plan of Iraqification, even if it is a bit weak on hearts and minds.

So what is Counter-inSURGEncy?

An insurgency can be fighting a sitting government or can oppose an occupying power. Our current situation is a mixture although it leans toward the latter as the Iraqi Government has shown little ability to actually govern. The Shia rebellion at the end of the first Gulf War was an example of fighting a sitting government. Sadaam also showed the most effective method for stopping an insurgency, completely brutal and savage violence to kill all or most of the opposition and their families and immediately break their will to resist. We had that option early in the war when we found heavy opposition in Fallujah and instead of crushing that resistance we pulled back. I am not saying we should have acted like Sadaam and just killed them all for Allah to sort out, I am saying we should have gone in and pummeled any and all who opposed us. We should have done so using the precision fire weapons and rules of engagement to limit civilian casualties that we always use

In addition, let's consider who is an insurgent and who is an innocent civilian. Casualty numbers are often tossed around in the media as if anyone not found with an AK and a couple of RPGs isn't an insurgent. I disconcur, and in many cases civilian casualties are members of the insurgents family and support group. If Akhnard heads out in the street next to his house and lobs a couple of mortar rounds at us, then jogs back inside, well the 2,000 bomb that flattens that building kills no civilians. Anyone in there is actively or passively assisting Akhnard and while it is sad that some of these are actually innocent kids, if he puts his whole family in his fighting position then their blood is on his hands.

Another early COIN test that we failed was when Mookie Sadr's thugs poked their nasty heads up. The whole point of an insurgency is to oppose the formal powers of the state or occupier and show that you are equally able to project force. Sadr's thugs started running around acting like the religious jagoffs that they are, and showing that they were the power. Then they started fighting and killing US troops and there was one good answer to that, Mookie's head on a pike, yet once again we appeased. Throw in the early decision to disband the Iraqi Army and you have three strikes that put us in our current position behind the eight ball.

How do you win a Counter-inSURGEncy?

Mao had the answer to winning an insurgency "The people are like water and the army is like fish,". An insurgency requires that the populace either actively assist or at least not oppose it. This has obviously been the case for us in Iraq as Sunni insurgents, AQI and Shia extremists have been shielded by the rest of the people and we stayed in our bases, venturing out to clear some area of bad guys and then hand security off to Iraq military and police forces either incapable of handling the job, or hopelessly infiltrated by sectarian agents. We would move on to the next target and the area we just cleared would see death squad retaliations by Shia militia members of the security forces, or we would see Sunni and AQI attack and defeat the "Iraqi" forces then retake control of the area.

To defeat the insurgency, you must be in the water swimming with and catching the fishes and that is the simple fact about COIN. It is less about combat power, than cup of tea power. Currently in Iraq many of the insurgent strongholds were maintained through intimidation not allegiance and once we have come in and then put down stakes the locals see that they will not be left to the tender mercies of the insurgents or sectarian security forces. They get to know and trust the US forces who now have skin in the game just like the locals. Now they can point out that there are a couple of terrorists trying to lay low in a house over there. Oh and there are IEDs on that route, and the guys who planted them went that way in a white Toyota pickup. We have heard all along that only the Iraqis can give themselves security, and that is true. But they need us to keep the savages trying to maintain their claw hold at bay while they do this. Once initial security has been established then local security/police forces must be empowered to share and then take over day to day security.

That is COIN pure and simple. You go among the people and share their sacrifices, build rapport and protect them from the barbarians at the gates. Once you have marginalized the insurgents by denying them safe haven to rest, refit, and plan they are much less capable of creating havoc as they are constantly looking out for that Predator drone. This creates a snowball effect as more areas are pacified and the insurgents are driven like salmon to the shallows to be scarfed up easily.

Then and only then can true political reconciliation occur. It is ridiculous to expect Sunni and Shia to make a political deal when every day each side's worst elements compete in a spectacle of savagery trying to win the atrocity of the day award. COIN is designed to first eliminate the insurgent's ability to operate in safety and then to build the people's confidence that our forces are on their side. That sets up the political reconciliation which is the only way to get to an end game.

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Comments

[Allan]

Uncle J,

This is a good concept. I hope it works.

But, it might be too little, too late. This should have been the policy in March 2003 and should have been supported by many more troops.

Had the war and its aftermath gone as Rumsfeld hoped, it would not have been needed. But, the failure to implement it was a catastrophe. It allowed the insurgency to grow and it may have grown too big for COIN to succeed.

This endevour may have been lost on the day that Rumsfeld said there was no looting in Baghdad.

I hope this works. If it doesn't the blame is not on the troops. It is squarely on the shoulders of Rumsfeld and Bush.

One question: If this fails, will you be supporting another strategy or will you decide enough is enough, as I did in early 2004? After all, it seems that we have had three our four changes of course since then, and up until now, none has worked too well.

[ajacksonian]

One of the problems I've had with typical COIN work is that folks will quickly bring up the 'oil drop', and then not address the underlying conceptual basis for it. That analysis of what it takes to even 'get' to an 'oil drop' has not been done, and for that reason it was not a founding concept for the work in Iraq. So, I dropped the dime on it, and call it for the misapplication without underlying foundation in Iraq, and question its overall utility seeing as how it has not worked in Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia.

As a Nation, the tools of government, INTEL and even MSM reporting have left us without the tools to properly examine Iraq, COIN, and the shifting changes that person-to-person network analysis is having in this realm. We are moving from the era of 'one fish masked by a school of fishes' to one of individuals in a P2P organization masking activities amongst daily life, but having high communication and interaction needs within their own network that separate them out via those activities. The fundamentals of police anti-gang work are critical in that, and in Iraq that moved in because of the large number of police officers that realized the tools they had for network analysis as work were needed in this realm.

I disagree on the concept that the 'surge' is more than long-term change in emphasis in the overall in-theater strategy. It does utilize the network analysis tools and U/CAV persistent surveillance, and is now seeking to utilize the hard and fast on the ground knowledge of local communities to ferret out the individuals involved in the P2P terrorism, gang warfare, organized crime and 'insurgent' areas. As they all have similar outlooks, methods of operation and use terrorizing of civilians as their overarching outlook, they do get swept up together. Getting rid of corruption requires something different and a strong internal affairs capability that is only slowly standing up in Iraq.

With the lack of understanding of the culture of Iraq going in, there was no way to actually have *any* post-war scenario succeed. US Foreign Policy had failed in that, along with the INTEL components so that no matter which part of the US government one truned to (DoD, State, CIA, DIA, NSA) none of them interoperated to be able to figure out that multiple sources were conflicting and resultant analysis was thus biased. It took on the ground HUMINT shifting through multiple layers of in-theater INTEL work along with the P2P network outlook to go after Saddam, first, and now applied more broadly to start giving us the overview of *what* can be done there. The CIA, famously, did not have *any* HUMINT resources in Iraq until three weeks before the invasion... that should tell us something about the reliability of their assessments there.

Without the basic work done by Rumsfeld to ensure that more conceptual flexibility on how to operate was initiated and integrated, then utilizing what *worked* you would not have gotten Gen. Petraeus re-writing the COIN manuals and changing the outlook of such organizations such as TRADOC. That was a huge change away from traditional modes of thought, and the hammer of Gen. Petraeus to move TRADOC into the 21st century could not have happened without Rumsfeld there to have TRADOC and others suck it up and do it. That was already happening on the logistics protection end of things, but it needed to shifted out of the DIY area and into 'this is how the new world works' concept. To do that the highly conservative organizations that oversee such things they needed to change.

Using only what we had in 2004 there was no basis for understanding the actual problems of Iraq, why the basis for a new army there was going to be difficult and yet extremely necessary, because the army 'fights as it trains' and is a reflection of its culture. We are trying to break the cultural patterns that lead to Arab Armies that Lose Wars.

That is a *ton* of stuff to do, as well as try to stand up some basis for Iraq to have National input and see if it wants to BE a Nation. It does, they had three elections in which, in any one of them, other ideas could have been put forth for the Nation. Now we are in the very, very grim time of having to help them through the massive change from immediate post-war government and protect the basis for new civil government on a 'bottom-up' basis starting in Anbar and now Diyala via the Iraq Awakening. There are a few major things that still need to get done, like a Provincial voting system, but the change to support *that* is already happening and shifting the power in Baghdad to a new coalition: Sunni Arabs, Kurds and technocratic Shia, along with just folks tired of the 'same old, same old'.

The US took 7 long years of fighting, and mostly *losing* in the Revolution to finally win. Then for 5 more years the Confederation was heading for disaster and was one successful Shays Rebellion away from fracturing completely. Yes, the US is built on immediate failure, but aiming for long-term success. It is not inevitable that the US ever succeed or survive, and if the Nation gives up in the face of a few thousand barbarian terrorist, we will deserve the pain we will get in fleeing from a People we have lifted out from under the boot of tyranny and despotic rule. If we run from these People because we have this strange idea that failure of the Nation is an option, then we must confront that we no longer believe in the basis of our Nation. That poison has been dripping into our bloodstream, as a Nation, for decades... and we must realize that if we actually believe why we have this Nation, together, is *right* then we must, as Washington, never stop fighting, even if it is just to survive defeats so as to fight another day. But the fight does not end due to: traitors, spies, ruthless enemies, lack of supplies. Washington had all of that in *spades* and still found the right men to make one mistake fewer than his enemies.

And win.

'Americans are not a perfect People, but We are called to a perfect mission.'

[Grimmy]

"One of the many problems the Bush administration has made for itself is the inability to control the narrative about the war."

There's a mechanism in our society for the distribution of information during times of war and peace. It aint the office of the POTUS, nor the US Military, it's the news media.

When each and every utterance of this POTUS is destined to be pulled apart, ridiculed, over analyzed, commented on by endless ranks of talking heads and finally declaired to be either lies or distortions, then what possible process is there to work the problem?

Weekly radio addresses? Daily? Hourly? How many speeches does a man need to hear during a time of war to understand that we're at war? One was enough for me.

If the media refuses to honor its obligation while it abuses its privaliges in order to further the progress of the enemy, who's fault is it for the inability to manage the narrative?

We've seen how many announcements provided by various commands of important developments go totally unreported by the media? It would be the fault of someone outside the media if our media was state controlled, but it's not. What mechanism exists to force compliance? Other than, of course, having journalists and their editors that abuse their privileges or betray their trust and honor to be hauled into court and treated as the criminals they are?

Who's fault is it?

TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PART I--CRIMES

CHAPTER 115--TREASON, SEDITION, AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2388. Activities affecting armed forces during war

(a) Whoever, when the United States is at war, willfully makes or
conveys false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with
the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United
States or to promote the success of its enemies; or
Whoever, when the United States is at war, willfully causes or
attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of
duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or willfully
obstructs the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to
the injury of the service or the United States, or attempts to do so--
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) If two or more persons conspire to violate subsection (a) of
this section and one or more such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall
be punished as provided in said subsection (a).
(c) Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or has
reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed, or is about to
commit, an offense under this section, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(d) This section shall apply within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States, and on the high seas, as well as
within the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 811; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII,
Sec. 330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

How many cases of willful misreporting have we witnessed? Those are crimes and punishable by law.
I ask again, who's fault is it?

[exhelodrvr]

Grimmy,
I agree with your point about the media bearing most of the blame. However, the Pentagon seems to go out of it's way making things tough on the "good" media (for want of a better term) to get the word out. The stories the Michael Yons/Bill Roggios have about having to fight through the red tape/bureaucracy, when they have limited time and limited funding, is mind-boggling. And the limitations that are put on military members blogging are (I believe) excessive. I understand the security concerns, but those are tiny in comparison to the importance of public relations in this war.

I have one other main problem with how the WOT is being. Once it was apparent that the initial strategies were not working, they should have started significantly increasing the size of the military.

[Grimmy]

exhelodrvr:

I can't disagree with you there. But like I was taught from day one in the USMC, there's no such thing as perfect, and, not having the perfect solution still means you have to do something.

The active military has its place in this fight. As humans do, sometimes it will be done amazingly, and sometimes not so amazingly. Also, as is true with any large organization, military or civilian, whenever people are involved, perfection is impossible.

We're not yet to the point of "falling on the triarii" but we are creeping toward that eventuality.

Our part is to help hold the line at the home front. Too much has been allowed to go fallow simply out of either fear of conflict with those who support our enemy or indoctrination into it being our duty to "go along to get along" in order to survive in close contact with the same.

Fix it where we find it broken and have the ability to reach.

Also, ask yourself, how much of your resentment toward past efforts in Iraq are born more out of constant bombardment from misinfo and dysinfo and the constant effort required to argue against that, and the fatigue that results from having to argue the same issue ad nausem with an endless list of new useful idiots?

Also, how much of this current surge and COIN success would there be if there hadn't been as much of a foundation set as the "Iraqification" effort made? How much of this effort is serial (one thing has to be completed before the next can be started) and how much parallel (operations and programs able to be conducted simultaneously)?

Would the COIN surge have as much success if the Iraqi players weren't already worn out? Already burned too often by AlQueda?

I don't know the answers but such questions tend to get overlooked in the hurry to simply be unsatisfied because issues aren't progressing as cleanly or pristinely or quickly as folk want.

Maybe we've done our 1st Battle of Kasserine Pass and the untried theories that build up like a plaque in peace time have been tried, some discarded and some improved?

No matter what though, this isn't over with Iraq. Not by a long shot. There's much more to come and it's time we started hardening up for those times that will be so harsh to bear.

[Ymarsakar]

Jimbo, can you say any details concerning the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, how effective it was, and whether we could apply any of the elements to Iraq now?

[exhelodrvr]

Grimmy,
"how much of your resentment toward past efforts in Iraq are born more out of constant bombardment from misinfo and dysinfo and the constant effort required to argue against that, and the fatigue that results from having to argue the same issue ad nausem with an endless list of new useful idiots?"

I don't have resentment against the past efforts in Iraq; I think that they were reasonable plans that weren't successful for one reason or another. But I think that the government has been slow to react to increasing the size of the military.

I completely agree that in general the media has made the task more difficult. Unfortunately, you go to war with the media you have, not the media you would like to have. And the government and the Pentagon have been slow in adjusting to that, and they still don't seem to have caught on.

[douglas]

"Would the COIN surge have as much success if the Iraqi players weren't already worn out? Already burned too often by AlQueda?"

GREAT point. AQ's misdeeds are a big part of our success, unfortunately for the poor Iraqis that thought they were the good guys...

"But I think that the government has been slow to react to increasing the size of the military."

Maybe, but how would that have played out in the media two or three years ago? Would that have been received well? What would all those troops have done for a couple years while we were still trying to work things out the Kiki Munshi way? Sounds like a good idea, abut who knows if it would have been a good idea earlier or not. That's why I think that it's generally navel gazing to get stuck on issues like that, and much more productive to focus on the current scenario, and about a year out.

[exhelodrvr]

Douglas,
If you don't acknowledge the mistakes that have been made, how are you going to do things better?

As far as what would the troops have done for a couple of years: are you serious? First of all, training. Secondly, there was plenty of work that could have been done in Iraq prior to this effort, securing borders, for instance. Third, it would allow for a rotation system that puts less wear on the troops.

[Ymarsakar]

Douglas,
If you don't acknowledge the mistakes that have been made, how are you going to do things better?

That depends on whether the critics actually want things to get better.

[Ymarsakar]

"But I think that the government has been slow to react to increasing the size of the military."

They got their own personal pork to spend first. The Military-Industrial Complex and lobby group got downsized after the cold war. And most folks don't want to see it back. Regardless of what effect it has on individuals.

All this is Presidential level. He has to get funding for the military, even if he has to wreck a few careers, lock some folks up, pardon some others, and veto 50 bills.