BLACKFIVE: Blogger Roundtable with Marine Sgt. Major Morin

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Blogger Roundtable with Marine Sgt. Major Morin

Posted By Grim

USMC Sgt. Major Morin spoke with us yesterday, mostly about deployment issues. Why is the Army using the deployment scedule it is now? What are its advantages and problems? Why does the Marine Corps use a different schedule? The transcript is here.

I noticed from his biography that the military had once assigned him to serve at State. I asked him a question about whether interagency support to our efforts in Iraq was improving, versus how it had been at the start of the war.

There was a very long pause before he answered. That answer, and more, after the jump.

SGT MAJOR MORIN: I can let you know that I think in the beginning of the fight, we were kind of fragmented. There was kind of a reluctancy it seemed. There wasn't a huge influence or there wasn't a huge number of assistance from the other agencies coming in. It wasn't a coordinated effort for whatever reason. But what I can talk about now is that we do have a much more coordinated effort. The PRTs which are the provincial reconstruction teams that are on the deck now, and we have the EPRTs which is the embedded provincial reconstruction teams which actually are out at the brigade level, they're actually embedded with the brigade so the brigade can sort of infuse them at certain places where they're needed or where we've made great successes in an area.

And it's kind of a carrot and a stick, if you will, almost that we can push these people in there. You know, we promise you, you know, security and stability, and that's what we're trying to achieve. And when we get that and when the local populace is supporting or at least not fighting back -- you know, resisting, let's say -- then these teams can get in there and start making life better, you know, on the day-to-day basis for the Iraqi people. So having that there, those are all the other agency guys -- that's State Department guys, that's Department of Justice guys. I mean, those are the individuals that are in there that kind of solidify that effort we have. So the two of us partnered together as we are today is a vast improvement of the way it was before, you know, circa 2003-2004 era.

Q Can you talk just a little bit more about what the State and Justice guys are doing at the PRT-EPRT level?

SGT. MAJOR MORIN: Yes, sir. You know, working with the local governorates. Trying to get the rule of law down at the lowest level down there into, you know, the districts. So the Justice guys are in there, you know, trying to train judges and get, you know, our police folks in there working with law enforcement. They're trying to, you know, build investigators and, you know, a police force that's actually functional. On the side of aid, you know, there's so many buildings, there are so many just basic infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt whether it be schools, whether it be hospitals. You know, identifying that need and then going forth and either rehabbing or reestablishing, you know, just those human services, another big target that we have in there. And they're doing a magnificent job in the areas that we have secured and stabilized to where they can get in there and operate. They have more kids going to school now than we had before. There's court systems that are coming up and running that never existed before. So they are making some good strides in certain locations but not everywhere, because the situation on the ground does not allow that yet. But as we continue to secure and as we continue to move along with the military-type operations and continue to increase the successes we have right now, I'm sure that the PRT folks will be there right to follow along and just capitalize and further along that effort -- just kind of continue that momentum that we have.

I understand why the Sgt. Major took his time answering. Interagency questions are always potentially harmful because they are political minefields. A bad answer from a senior man can derail the cooperation he is trying to encourage.

That said, the most legitimate and damning criticism of the war is to do with the failure at the interagency level. Without rehashing all that has been documented, it is clear that the various agencies failed to get together on a plan that they would all wholeheartedly support; and it is clear that no one made them. We therefore went to war without all the power we should have been able to expect. It is encouraging to see that this is improving.

The PRTs have had success in Afghanistan, which is why the President's new plan for Iraq involved getting the concept into a working form there. The plan spoke of involving PRTs at the brigade combat level, which seems to be happening.

Embedded PRTs consist of a senior State Department officer as the team leader, a civil affairs officer as the deputy team leader, and up to nine other members with a variety of skill sets. The diversity allows each EPRT to work closely with not only the commanders and Soldiers on the ground, but also with the local community leaders in Baghdad.

Because they're linked up with a combat brigade, whatever assistance they have to bring can be pushed out into less-stable areas than before. Getting those agencies involved in the reconstruction efforts "out west" is a good step.