Blogger Roundtable on Iraqi Kurdistan

Posted By Grim

I was on this week's DOD Blogger Roundtable with General Cichowski and UK Brigadier Neil Baverstock (who, I mention purely as a point of interest, is also a judge for the UK Romantic Novelists' Association.  "Glamorous, or what?").

These two gentlemen had been asked to talk to us about the transition ceremony, by which the three provinces of Kurdistan passed to formal Iraqi control.  From now on, Coalition operations in the provinces will have to be approved by the local authorities.  The ceremony was apparently very flashy and inspiring, as befits such things.  It didn't get much coverage in America, as Red State (also on the call) noted.

As they had come to talk to relatively friendly bloggers about a happy and inspiring event, the generals were probably shocked to find themselves in a hot LZ.  They were there to talk about the ceremony; the bloggers wanted to talk about the war.

In fairness to the generals, who took time out of the crucial business of warfighting to talk to us, I want to start by telling you what they wanted you to know about all this.  USAF General Cichowski said (this is the link to the official transcript):

[I]t was very nice yesterday -- and it's important for the readers to in your -- those on the Net to understand that yesterday we went up in an Iraqi C-130, the -- part of the brand new Iraqi air force -- into the Kurdish region. And so as their capability grows it's growing in all areas, and it was very nice to be able to step off with a very, very professional aircrew, speaking as an airman, to take part in the ceremony.

That is an important point, and one the general is right to mention.  Heavy airlift capacity is always at a premium in modern military operations -- even several NATO partners are lacking in that regard.  One of the key early contributions to OEF came when Norway devoted C-130s to the effort.  The development of an Iraqi air force that is capable of such transport, insofar as is it is linked to the development of an Iraqi state that is an ally, is a useful long-term advantage.

Now, here's what Danger Room's David Axe wanted to talk about:

Iraqi Kurdistan is a full partner in the federal Iraqi state. The armed standoff between Kurdistan and Turkey is Iraq's problem and Baghdad is sure to handle it just fine. Kurdistan will share its oil. And let Iraqi Arabs into the region. And everything is just great.

These are some of the half-truths I was fed during today's blogger teleconference with U.S. Army Major General Kurt Cichowski, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategy, Plans and Assessment for coalition forces. We were talking about Iraqi Kurdistan, that autonomous region in the north bordering Turkey. Since 2003 Kurdistan has been functionally independent, with its own parliament, army, police and courts and its own oil fields. And as Kurdistan has risen, so have the aspirations of Kurdish nationalist terrorists ... and so has Turkey's alarm. In recent weeks the Turks have massed troops on the border, threatening to take action to suppress the nationalists if Kurdistan doesn't.

When I challenged Cichowski about his rosy presentation, his best evidence that things are going great up in Kurdistan, between Kurds and Turks and between Kurds and Arabs, was the conduct of yesterday's official ceremony handing over security in Kurdistan from the tiny local body of coalition forces to the Kurdish regional government.

Danger Room got a response from Jack Holt at OASD, which said that the questions were "best asked of the government of Iraq."  That's perfectly true, especially now that they are fully in control of Kurdistan -- high order diplomatic concerns make it hard for the Coalition to speak about these concerns.

On the other hand, this exchange was troubling:

Q Yes, good morning, gentlemen. Andrew Lubin from ON Point. Just kind of following with David's questions a little bit -- with the violence in the last two weeks up in Kurdistan, which is really the first time this has happened, you know, for the past few years, doesn't this make the Kurds want to close the border even tighter? My friends -- sources up there tell me they're shutting down the border to all Arabs. So how does this square with them being oil members of the government of Iraq when they don't want to let their alleged Sunni and Shi'a brothers up into the country or up into the region?

GEN. CICHOWSKI: Gosh, Andrew, I've got to tell you I've not heard of that and that's one of the things that we were talking the other day with the border officials. Again, the control of the borders is a federal government thing and I've heard of no reports of any kind of shunning of any group whether it be on racial or ethnic or religious background.  [GRIM:  Note that at this point the General is talking about the external border, not the internal one that was asked about -- probably a misunderstanding.]

Q (But that's just ?) coming from the Kurdish side, not from the Baghdad side.

BRIG. BAVERSTOCK: Well, it's interesting you hear that because I mean, the -- and they've come back to -- (inaudible) -- to relations between the Kurdish region and Turkey as well because it is more complicated than just a security issue. There's a huge amount of trade actually goes on between the Kurdish region and Turkey, so closing borders is going to hurt both sides and it's not necessarily in their interest so we haven't heard about borders being closed --

(Cross talk.)

Q -- more if I could --

BRIG. BAVERSTOCK: -- patrol the borders, yes, but not necessarily closure.

Q No -- no, this was more on the Iraqi side -- on the southern side than the northern side because there's huge -- most of the construction in Kurdistan is with Turkish construction companies.

BRIG. BAVERSTOCK: That's exactly right.

Q Yeah. But no, I was referring -- I was --

BRIG. BAVERSTOCK: I don't know how they can actually close the border. There is no border between the Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq, and there are checkpoints but there are checkpoints in a lot of places, and those checkpoints are there for internal security reasons. They're perfectly legitimate, and we've heard no reports they're actually turning people away on the basis of their ethnicity.

Q Okay.

Q Sir, it's with all due respect -- this is David Axe -- I've been to Kurdistan twice and I think that's not true. The checkpoints do turn Arabs away.

Q [Lubin] Yeah. And that's what I was hearing -- they will, you know, this -- I heard it in the future tense -- that they will be turning people away from who are, you know, who are Shi'as. Sunnis maybe -- Shi'as definitely -- do not want them. They're the troublemakers.

GEN. CICHOWSKI: Well, gosh, that would be interesting because I have to tell you that's one of the issues that we have talked a lot about, and there are Kurds on our committee. There are Kurds that have come down and visited us and our going out there -- that's certainly an area that we will look into but I will tell you from the internal that we have not heard that.

This isn't an invocation of high order diplomatic concerns, but an assertion about the internal data.  I take the general at his word.  What I wonder about is whether (a) the military intel does show these rumors, but they're being discounted or disproven by analysts before the general sees it, or (b) if the military intel has not picked up the same information at all.  Case (a) is not troubling, if it's so; case (b) is troubling.

There was a second exchange of this type.  I think the first speaker was Lubin again:

Yeah, a general question if you don't mind. How do the Kurds -- what I was trying to say -- they have their own economy. It's like they're trying -- they have their own flag -- they got their own government. It's like they're trying not to be assimilated except on a superficial basis into Iraq. It strikes me they're giving Maliki some lip service. Beyond that, they're going their own way. How does that square with one, you know, unified and friendly Iraq? I don't see it.

GEN. CICHOWSKI: I think that's a little harsh. For example, they had both anthems played yesterday. There was more than the lip service of the talk between the indivisible whole. There's a tremendous amount of discussions that are going on for the federated state that is taking on the Kurdish bloc in the parliament is very active. The determination of the hydrocarbon and the revenue sharing is one that is of great interest throughout the entire country as a whole, and the determination of the military budget for that will be inclusive of the regional forces is something that both sides are talking to next. So there are a number of issues that they are taking on as an indivisible whole, not as two separate independent parties.

Q Okay. Appreciate that.

Q Hello, sir, this is David Axe again. I hate to keep disagreeing but the KRG has not expressed any interest in sharing its own oil revenues from the new fields up in Dohuk and elsewhere. So I mean, so far there is no -- at least not -- there's not going to be any oil revenue sharing from Kurdistan down to Baghdad.

GEN. CICHOWSKI: David, it must be important that you understand the legislation that is currently going through the process. There is one particular law in the hydrocarbon implementation that talks to new fields versus old fields, and I believe you're referring to the one version of it where new fields do not have to be shared but that could be not just in the region -- in the Kurdish region, but it could be in the potential for the new fields out west as well as some new undeveloped fields down in the south.

Now we're at the overarching issue.  Is Kurdistan paying lip service to a diplomatic vision of Iraq, while secretly setting itself up for independence?  Let's look at an earlier question:

So Streiff, do you want to kick it off?

Q Sure.

The first thing I'd like to ask is on the security forces in Iraqi-Kurdistan, or these three provinces, is the Iraqi army there drawn from throughout Iraq or are the army units in Kurdistan primarily based on the old pesh merga?

GEN. CICHOWSKI: That's a question that's going to take a little while, so hang with me.

There are three parts of three divisions in that area: the Iraqi army divisions from the second, third and fourth divisions. The even numbered divisions were built on the National Guard. So the predominate forces in the second and fourth are Kurdish individuals; however, we have worked very hard to have a balance of all nationalities and ethnic backgrounds in not only the odds, but in the future development of the even number of the Iraqi divisions.

In addition, the constitution allows the formation of regional guards, or guards of the region. This particular force in the Kurdish region is made of the leftovers of the -- what we call the CPA-91 Militia, which in this particular case is a pesh merga, or what is left of the pesh merga, but they are now the Kurdish Regional Guards. Both the PDK as well as the KUP have formed together into one and they are now the Kurdish Regional Guards.

So, the units that now have the lead in securing Kurdistan are three divisions of the Iraqi Army, two of which are locally recruited; and a separate, special unit composed entirely of pesh merga.  That's pretty enviable.

What can we reasonably infer from all this?

I think we can reasonably infer that the Kurds are creating what is at least a fallback position of separatism.  They've arranged themselves so that they have a reliable guard composed of their countrymen -- the pesh merga were the first fighting units from Iraq that were functionally capable of interacting with the Coalition.  They are also not indebted for existing oil revenues to the rest of the country.  Should they separate from Iraq proper, then, they have the means to secure their liberty v. the rest of the nation, and no outstanding debt that could be used as a casus belli against them.

If I were a Coalition military officer in Kurdistan, I would be taking a hard look at my intelligence to see whether we were getting the rumors about Kurds turning back Arabs and discounting them -- and if so, how solid our reasons for discounting those rumors were --  or if we are not tracking that data at all.  It may not be true, but true or not, we should have some data about it, if only for IO reasons.  If it's a false rumor, we ought to know who is putting it out and why, to combat it; if it's a true fact that's somehow been kept out of Coalition intelligence, that's a problem.

There is no special reason to be concerned about the data otherwise; the Kurds would be fools not to be setting up a fallback position, given the real possibility that the US Congress may yet force an end to stability operations in Iraq.  I would be surprised, in point of fact, if no one at DOD has written a very similar fallback plan -- something that would create bases in Kurdistan from which we could conduct continuing operations against any mini-states al Qaeda attempted to erect in fallen Iraq, as well as support operations v. Iran, whether diplomatic or military.

For now, of course, the plan remains victory.  The proposed new US Embassy is really a fortress.  The Bush statement that he expects a fifty year deployment points to what is probably a very wise policy of creating a permanent presence to counterbalance Iran and shepherd the spread of democracy in the region.   The Surge is showing some positive signs, and the recent turn against al Qaeda among Sunnis around Baghdad is the best news in a while.

That said, every good fighting man has a backup plan just in case.  The Kurds are very good; we shouldn't be surprised if they have one too.  In fact, we ought to get in on it, if we haven't already.

Michael Goldfarb of the Weekly Standard was also on the call; he asked a very good question about whether there were official Turkish military contacts in Kurdistan (the answer, encouragingly, was yes).  I asked about Coalition force levels in Kurdistan, which will be remaining constant -- a reasonable policy, given that we want to be sure the new order works before we ship people out to fight elsewhere; and likewise a wise policy, if we were considering Kurdistan as a backup stronghold.

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Comments

[Jeffrey]

Grim, you wrote the following in your opening paragraph:

"These two gentlemen had been asked to talk to us about the transition ceremony, by which the three provinces of Kurdistan passed to formal Iraqi control."

Correct me if I'm wrong, but shouldn't the distinction be made that security for these provinces is now formally in the hands of the KRG and the Pershmerga, rather than under the control of the central government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces?

A Colonel in the KRG has been quoted by a French news organization as saying: "It's a sort of independence." In other words, the Kurds are celebrating because they now have regional security authority over their own territories. They clearly don't view it as "Iraqi" control at all.

I think this increased level of confidence will eventually embolden the KRG to reclaim Kirkuk, provoking the hell out of Turkey. If Barzani is successful in taking and keeping Kirkuk, I believe that it's going to splinter Iraq into regional power centers instead of a unified state, and that, to me, seems like the only chance the U.S. has in pulling a victory out of this mess.

[Grim]

That's really the question, isn't it? I think the Kurds are willing to play along, as long as the US keeps its hands in. If Iraq splinters, though, I think they've laid their plans and made ready. As well they should -- as well should we. Contingency plans are usual in war.

[liontooth]

Thanks Grim for the update and all your effort.

but shouldn't the distinction be made that security for these provinces is now formally in the hands of the KRG and the Pershmerga, rather than under the control of the central government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces?

from the transcript:
----
Well, our initial goal was to develop a set of conditions to assess the readiness of
each province for transfer of the security responsibility.

These areas include the security of the region, as well as
the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces involved -- primarily the police -- the
governance and the status of the Multi-National Forces -- that means the relationship
between them as well as the local governance capability itself.
Well, it's important to note that when we talk about security we're really talking
about domestic security and, in other words, what is happening in the provinces and can a
local government take care of it, primarily with domestic police? Additionally, we
assessed the Iraqi security forces, the army that is in the area. The training, manning and
equipping are continually monitored to ensure the province is ready to succeed once the
transfer of security has occurred. And the assessments that we are conducting are done at
the provincial level both with the governor of the province, as well as the Multi-National
division commander in the area. Together they do an assessment that is forwarded to this
committee that I talked about.
...once the committee has assessed that it's ready and the recommendation has
been made, we send that decision to the ministerial committee on national security who
makes the final recommendation for the transfer to the prime minister of the federal government of Iraq.
----

This seems to be like the US, where the implementation is with the Governor.

there was this additional reference:
----
as well as a parade of the Kurdish Regional Government military forces.
----

The General did mention that the National Guard up there was incorporated into the regular army divisions. I think their system allows for a National Guard that can be used throughout the country and a separate Guard that would stay in the Province/Region. Are these Province/Region 'military forces' simply a specialized police force like a SWAT team?

increased level of confidence will eventually embolden the KRG to reclaim Kirkuk, provoking the hell out of Turkey

At this point, I think your fear is unfounded. The 'Kurdish' army at this point can't go toe to toe with the Turks, and from the conference, the General said there are non-Kurdish soldiers in the area. Before the Kurds could really do anything, it would be a couple of years away, and they would still need to challenge the Iraqi Army. At that point, either the country will have gotten it's security under control and be somewhat unified (making it unlikely to challenge)or be fragmented as it is now. If it is still fragmented, then it may be in the US best interests for the Kurds to start to expand.

When I challenged Cichowski about his rosy presentation, his best evidence...

Good job Grim on reporting on BOTH SIDES of the story.

What this challenge DIDN'T consist of:
-any evidence the Kurdish authorities are aiding the rebels.

-any evidence that refuted the oil sharing claim. If the Kurds are going out and developing NEW areas NOW with their resources, we should expect them to simply share it? (Hello Hillary's village.)

-any evidence of how many, how often, and in which area Arabs are being kept out of the Kurd areas. Are they even Iraqi Arabs?

Let's see, the rest of Iraq is in civil disorder, and the Kurds want to keep that 'stuff' from spreading to their region. Oh the horror those naughty ruffians!

[Ymarsakar]

How does that square with one, you know, unified and friendly Iraq?

About the same way it squares with Georgia having its own flag and borders, people. It's own national guard as well for some reason.

"Unified" doesn't mean what people think it means, which is "everyone agrees" or "everyone is the same way". Too Orwellian.

Ya well, he wouldn't see it, now would he.

Is Kurdistan paying lip service to a diplomatic vision of Iraq, while secretly setting itself up for independence?

Depends upon two core issues, I believe. What Kurdistan's leaders see as in their interest, meaning what have they prioritized as important. And it also depends upon what the Iraqis at Baghdad and the Turkish and what various other foreigners are going to do.

Action and reaction variables, should then be able to tell us which path Kurdistan will go, if we know what their priorities are that will be acted upon, and if we know what stimuli will be introduced to those priorities.

The Kurds are very good; we shouldn't be surprised if they have one too.

It would also be a good thing to rely upon the Kurds to be able to defend themselves, and not be spread out across where they can't be used effectively. The Kurds are stronger US allies than probably all the factions in the rest of Iran combined. Certainly stronger than Turkey. Whatever problems Turkey turns up, the Kurdish response will rely heavily on what the US decides to do in support or not support (Democrats) of Kurdish national security.

It is not envious for the Kurds to be trapped between Turkey and Baghdad. They did that before, and they knew what it was like. I think they prefer the status quo a lot better. There is also an inherent superiority complex, probably, because they were able to resist Saddam and setup local self-autonomy, while the Shias and Sunnis weren't able to. And still aren't able to because of the violence in the rest of Iraq that isn't in Kurdistan. And that sense of superiority is well earned, it is not fake bravado like you hear from Amanie in Iran. Bush did the no fly zones, but it was the Kurds that used it to their advantage in the North, whereas in the South the no fly zones didn't do much presumably because all the leaders had been purged or had fled.

The 'Kurdish' army at this point can't go toe to toe with the Turks

They can with American air support and logistics support. It is one of the issues that may be offered to the Kurds to craft a deal, a strategic deal, that allows the Kurds to secure their borders permanently while feeling more secure about integrating with the Iraqi government. If the Kurds know that the US will and has backed them against Turkey, they will be more eager to compromise on other things towards the south.

In essence, the US has to choose our allies, because those allies will be permanently ours for a long time to come.

Turkey wasn't there for us when we needed them, the Kurds were. Which do you think we should choose to throw under the bus?

The primary obstacle to a better Union is mistrust. Essentially, ultimate loyalty to Iraq as a whole develops through national sacrifice, national sacrifices made by everyone in that nation. It is the trust that people from the other side of the country will come to your aid if you are in trouble, and the certain knowledge that you will come to their aid if they get into trouble. Essentially, it is the level the United States is at right now.

Deals can be made, yes, agreements signed, but national unification will never truly be achieved until the Kurds can trust the loyalty and honesty of the national government. Enough to at least work inside the system to change it, rather than separating from the system entire.

So long as there won't come into power leaders like the ones that took the South into disastrous rebellion for nothing but personal pride and stubborness, Kurdistan should be okay. For as long as the US is there of course.

Which isn't certain now a days. If you want to create trust amongst your allies, you have to be there for them when they need you. And the Democrats, for all their vaunted talk of "multilateralism" and how Bush was pissing away our allies, have and probably will do the greatest damage to faith and trust in America. The foundation of any potential long term alliance.

America will truly be alone after a full retreat from Iraq, and some people prefer it that way.

[davod]

It is my understanding that even with the handover to the Kurds the US is still responsible for border security.

What will happen if the Turks cross into Iraq?

[Grim]

I am sure there are contingency plans for that too, though I don't know what they are (and wouldn't disclose them if I did -- that would rather obviously be destructive to our national security). However, I'd expect those contingency plans aren't likely to come into play as long as we remain in Iraq. If we leave, though, it's anybody's guess what could end up happening on the ground.

[Observers]

"They can with American air support and logistics support."

"Turkey wasn't there for us when we needed them, the Kurds were. Which do you think we should choose to throw under the bus?"

This is far-fetched. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. It has the second-largest army in NATO after the U.S. It has long been at the top of the list of U.S. arms importers. It is a major ally of Israel. It has over 200 F-16s, with 100 F-35As on order. While it isn't inconceivable that the military relationship between the U.S. and Turkey could change from alliance to enmity, elaboration on the details of how this could come about, what the implications might be, and why these implications would be considered acceptable, would add much credibility to this idea.

[Ymarsakar]

It's simple. Turkey's secular status is being corroded. Eventually they will make the choice for us, just as NATO will eventually pass the bar of "too useless to be worth the cost".

Future alliances are not made on what is going on now or went on in the past, but on the trends that will affect future. Future relations for example.

As we know with France, just cause you're part of NATO, doesn't mean your actions are going to be helping the team. That's sort of why France got out of certain NATO functions in the past.

[Observers]

Ymarsakar, I don't dispute the demographic shift within Turkey as much as I question its relative importance. Pakistan is much further down the road of Islamization, and yet predictions that the U.S. would turn on Pakistan have not come to any fruition.

NATO is a politically useful tool. The supposedly pragmatic concept of short-term alliances of convenience may play well in think tanks, but in the real world, where governments both democratic and otherwise are constrained by their domestic populaces' discontent, it doesn't yield success.

Again, with your point about France, I would suggest that the relative importance is minimal. You are describing a chill in relations, something not so infrequent in occurrence and something very different from the scenario liontooth envisioned of the U.S. overtly turning against Turkey.

[liontooth]

the scenario liontooth envisioned of the U.S. overtly turning against Turkey.

I didn't intend to mean the US would back the Kurds if they go against Turkey.

At the conference and in the comments, there were concerns that the Kurds NOW are in the process of asserting their independence and are ready to break away from Iraq. The Kurd/Turkey border was referenced as evidence of this.

My point was the unlikeliness of this happening NOW because the Kurds lack the strenght to take on Turkey.

Regarding my point of:
a couple of years away... ...At that point, either the country will have gotten it's security under control and be somewhat unified (making it unlikely to challenge)or be fragmented as it is now. If it is still fragmented, then it may be in the US best interests for the Kurds to start to expand.

I was refering to the Kurds expanding into fragmented Iraq after the US leaves. At that point Iraq would be like Afghanistan before the Taliban took over. Kurdish expansion/influence/expansion of power into Iraq would be in Turkey's security interest too.

[Ymarsakar]

Just to make some clarifications. I don't think the US will attack the Turks. I think the Turks will eventually decide what they are going to do about the Kurds and the region in general, which will spark a US reaction of one sort or another.

You are describing a chill in relations

Global repositioning. Any chilling is a side effect. Look at Putin. Is he chilling the relations with the US? Yes, but why? That's the important question.

It doesn't matter if this is infrequently, It will occur when it occurs. Of course it is different from liontooth's, I'm not talking about his scenario after all.

There's a difference between a nation's best interests and a nation's perceived interests. National security or otherwise. And therelin lies the problem. It would be best for Turkey to back the Kurds... but they won't probably. Just as it would be a good thing for Russia to become more free and ally with the US and Eastern European countries... but they aren't, now are they.

[Observers]

I have no interest in a wider debate or responding to non-sequiturs. My specific interest was the mention of American air support in the context of a Turkish-Kurdish flare-up. If anyone sees this as a remote possibility in the near-future, I'd be interested in testing that particular idea. If not, carry on.