Some Thoughts On Intelligence: Mores

Posted By Laughing_Wolf

Before life handed me enough to make a fortune in Nashville could I but set it to music, I had started a post on intelligence gathering and analysis. A precursor post is here. At the risk of getting ahead of myself, some of the comments to this post provide a timely point for discussing what is perhaps the largest problem with, and most difficult aspect of, intelligence analysis: mores.

Mores often are defined as some variation of the customs and conventions that make up a society and allow a person to function within them. To my mind, the best definition I have heard is that they are the blinders we wear as a result of living in a particular culture.

It is a very complex and fascinating subject, for it is something most seldom stop to consider. Each of us is shaped by the country in which we grow up, for each has its own unique history and social makeup. Each of us is shaped by the region, city, or other location as well as the unique social mix that is the family or group in which we are raised. As we grow up, we tend to take certain things as "gospel" in that certain assumptions, outlooks, stories, and more are such a part of our life that we accept them without question.

Such core beliefs shape our lives and our methods of thought in ways much more subtle than mere bias. These beliefs shape the way we process and interpret the data that comes at us in life on a level well below conscious thought. It is part and parcel of the entirely unreasonable, yet natural, human assumption that everyone thinks as we do.

Yet, not everyone does think as we do. Even within the United States, there is a large variance in the mores of people raised in different areas or ethnic and cultural groups. Someone raised on a farm who is used to dealing with animals, butchering them, helping raise them, etc. is going to have a different set of mores from someone born and raised in downtown Chicago. They are going to have very different frames of reference, and one of the early purposes of education/mass education was to provide a common frame of reference so that people from different backgrounds could communicate effectively. This also served to add a new layer into the mores that shaped the people.

From an intelligence standpoint (and political as well), is the fact that we all tend to assume on that deep level that everyone thinks and believes as do we. Some of the worst analysis of events comes from those who insist on presenting analysis based on this assumption, particularly if their mores are extreme even for their culture.

When a majority of people involved with doing some form of analysis all have similar backgrounds and beliefs, be it called corporate culture or sheer institutional inbreeding, the result is that any analysis and interpretation will be shaped by the common mores no matter the internal checks and balances designed to prevent such. It doesn't matter if it is an intelligence agency or a newsroom: when all have very similar or same mores (beliefs, training, instillation of corporate culture), there literally is no way to avoid skewing the results because the underlying unconscious assumptions are so similar.

An obvious solution is, of course, to bring people who don't share that tradition. Be it outsiders coming into an institution, or bringing in people from the culture/region/etc. being studied, it is a great way to get a different set of ideas and interpretations. The problem with intelligence can be, however, that such people have an axe or three to grind. They may be people who detest the current regime in the area, which will skew their analysis. They may be reluctant, the people who left on a matter of principle but still love their country, people, and friends -- a thing that will also skew thier perceptions. They may also fall prey to the very human trap of not providing complete translation or context because of the fear that doing so may not measure up to the mores and social conventions of the country/organization doing the research. They may be plants put in place to deliberately skew things through false information and deliberately wrong analysis. Finally, they too are constrained by their mores in their analysis.

Another obvious solution is to have a mixture of sources for doing translation, analysis, and interpretation, so that each effectively checks the other. The problem lies in the fact that any such mixture then has to go through the institutional process. For this reason, more than one administration has made use of what Tom Clancy referred to as a "Backstop" program to get an outside/independent source of information and analysis. Of course, that does no good if any or all analysis and recommendations are rejected because it conflicts with the institutional mores of an administration. A study of events/history of the challenges inherent in the collapse of the Soviet Union and rise of the Russian Federation, particularly looking at the time of the tanks and Yeltsin's stand, is a prime example of this.

A staple of Hollywood and of literary potboilers is the individual who has not only gotten the data, but analyzed what it really means, yet is thwarted in efforts to head off disaster by evil types who reject the data and/or analysis out of hand. From the civilian/military analyst who detects the impending attack to the researcher who detects the next major natural disaster but is ignored or actively suppressed, it is a staple of entertainment. So prevalent is this meme that it has become a part of our culture and even shapes our mores. This has reached the point that there is a collective tendency to try to force people and events to fit it, rather than to simply accept that events are much different and more complex (Plame being a good example). This is not just an American problem, but affects countries and institutions worldwide, and is the root cause of many serious diplomatic and military miscalculations.

One of the hardest things for any analyst to do is to make a conscious effort to set aside their mores. It means studying the situation, the data, and the societal context in which they reside. The short version is to think like the enemy, which can have its own perils. There are those who have done so, and ended up converting to the other side. There are those who have done so and in so doing damaged their ability to work within the mores of their own culture. Yet, to truly analyze and understand any event in the world, be it domestic politics or enemy actions and intentions, we must at least attempt to make the leap to think outside ourselves and our mores. For if we do not, any analysis, interpretation, and action we take will be tragically and fatally flawed.

The information age and the blogosphere offer a strong ray of hope in this area. Take a look at these comments again. In my opinion, some have that tragic flaw, but it is not my opinion of such that matters. What matters is that several informed opinions are there, differing opinions. These have been placed into the marketplace of ideas, and in so doing, a huge step has been taken. While there will be much dreck out there, a lot of good and differing analysis and interpretation is now available for consideration and evaluation. The import of that for critical issues of the day can't be overstated.

So, a question for you is: can you make a reasonable effort to set aside your cultural blinders and look at the world as unfettered as possible? Or, are you a prisoner of your conscious and unconscious biases? Can you look past these to take a reasoned measure of what is being said and respond in an equally reasoned manner? Or, are you such a prisoner of yourself that you must attack, obfuscate, and avoid reason and facts as ground upon which you dare not tread?

Just some food for thought...

LW

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Comments

[BloodSpite]

He Lives!!!!! Good to see you back, and a good splash to make in that come back as well!

[Laughing Wolf]

LOL! Thanks, and it is good to be back to more than just commenting. Things are still hectic, just got a professional complement that will take up most of the weekend and a bit more, but it is getting better. Hope to have my own blog redone and back up soon.

[Grim]

Good post.

[Tom Dalzell]

Trust those that seek the truth, but never those who have found it.

[piercello]

Anyone interested in the topic of intelligence and its structure should really check out this fascinating book--

"On Intelligence" (Jeff Hawkins, 2004)

--which essentially argues that the process by which we think IS identical, but that its structure allows us to reach entirely different conclusions. It has significant bearing on this post. I have attempted (for my own purposes) to summarize the structural description it articulates here:

http://cellosophist.blogspot.com/2006/11/structure-of-intelligence.html

but I really recommend reading the book, as it will add immensely to this sort of discussion. I have to go to work (away from computers), but I am looking forward to seeing the direction this comment thread takes! As Grim said, good post.

[Grumpy]

Laughing Wolf, This is a GREAT POST! Especially in these times, this is a balanced meal. This is one of those things you take and put it into the "crockpot of your mind". Let it stay there and slow cook for a while, it'll be even better. Thank you, sir! "Grumpy"

[Rich Casebolt]

Here's another question, to go with your last paragraph, LW.

Are you confident enough in your ability to evaluate -- through the use of reason, in the context of objective fact and available history -- the validity of your own ideas, and the ideas of others, for yourself?

Or, do you lack the confidence to undertake such an evaluation ... and therefore, persistently defer to the experts and authority figures you recognize -- be they prominent people, professors, politicians, pundits, or pollsters -- to validate what you believe?

The former, is the foundation of wisdom ... while the latter, substitutes mere knowledge for that foundation ... and too often, leads to the wisdom-deficient groupthink you describe in the post.

Also, the "knowledgable" in our generation persistently confuse complexity for validity. IMHO, heeding the words of Pvt. Murphy comes right after fearing God as "the beginning of wisdom" ...

The important things are always simple.
The simple things are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.

[Ymarsakar]

I've been learning how to play chess all over again. With what I learned given my study of military history and military science, the game seems a lot more deep and interesting than it once was to me.

There is a lot of critical thinking, planning, and being dead wrong in chess. Everything from accepting the offer of battle from the opponent, to being unable to see the enemy's plan of attack and thinking, to simply messing up your own defense with one bad move.

When you get the basics down, it then comes to choices. Do you attack here, defend there, or retreat now? Take the left flank or right? Which flank or piece do you offer to trade for strategic and time value?

There is also the aspect of attempting to divine your enemy's strategy, based upon past history or current game observations. You try to predict where he is going to move. While you can do the calculations via brute force and just calculate every move that is available to him, and then try to sift through them for what you think is the best move, it is easier and faster to simply try to emulate the enemy's thinking. Assuming the enemy is going to make the best move, is simply good policy. But you can't get diverted by that into not defending yourself from all the other "worse" moves. A lot of generals have thought that they had planned for the worst and have taken contingencies, but it is the plan that you never planned for that really makes problems for you.

If you know what the enemy wants from you, then you can cut off a piece of the board and try to fortify it against all avenues of attack. This is much faster than calculating every action that might be taken against you.

Of course, at this level in the game, the mind starts going into endless loops, akin to staring into a mirror facing another mirror. Just how deep is this rabbit hole, you might ask yourself. Hard to get an answer. Lucky enough just to get an echo from the bottomless well.

Technology and information has indeed allowed us to become more cosmopolitan, giving us greater tools from which to think outside the box. Not everyone will make use of these magical tools of knowledge, but, enough will use them.

We all have our blindspots. As do our enemies. What any good analyst should be able to do is to learn from his mistakes and the mistakes of his enemies, in crafting a psychological and strategic profile. That way, you can make some tentative conclusions as to how you look, to the enemy, and how the enemy looks to you. But if we don't learn from our mistakes, or think our mistakes are that we didn't talk to Syria sooner, then well, the picture is going to get a bit skewed.

As you craft this picture profile of the enemy, you can further refine it by additional events in reality. Because this isn't a social science, after all, where you have to do "controlled" experiments to see what is true or not, which in the end results in flawed conclusions for psychology. There is no need to deal with choosing control variables and experimental conditions. Nature does all of it for us, under the hood. The world includes all the variables in play, even the ones you don't know even exist. The result, factual and final, that you get from a raid or an event in the world, is pretty concrete. If you misinterpret the causes, then that is your fault, not the fault of reality.

So, what this means for me, is that Syria, Iran, and Bush all have had many many years from which to generate a behavioral profile. Russia is a bit trickier in a way, because Russia is not a popular subject so finding good background info on Putin and what not, becomes just a little bit harder than it is with Bush and Amanie. Iran's actions from 1980s on, form a rather good impression. Wolf's mention of institutional bias, reminded me of CIA Chief Tenet with his slam dunk comment on Iraq. Everyone just "knew" Saddam had huge stockpiles of WMDs that could be easily found.

They were too busy slapping each other on the back for what they knew, that they forgot that intelligence changes as world events change. All that time the CIA and the UN was talking, Saddam wasn't sitting around doing nothing. So he might have had WMDs in 2001, but all of a sudden they "disappeared" in 2003. That's cause you started to treat it like an experiment thinking we knew all the variables. We don't. The more time that goes on, the more the intel conclusions become old and foggy.

Also represented when generals fight the last war, not the next one, and therefore get creamed. Maginot Line, the perfect defense, for WWI anyways. That is not even counting on the fact that the French withdraw funding and therefore left the Line incomplete. The only strategy that fails worse than a strategy to fight the last war, is a strategy to fight the last war that is underfunded.

As I see it, people can pretty much just look at Bush right now and know what he is thinking and how he will act. Same with Amanie. Yet the advantage of initiative is with Iran, but not because they hold any secrets from us, but rather because they are willing to act on the data that they have, when they have it. They don't wait around in the UN for 1 to 2 years broadcasting their intentions to the world. They move, they sabotage, they are on the ticket. They ain't going to wait around for the next President to replace Bush, because they know they can predict Bush's moves right now, but they are unsure about the next President.

I recall somewhat, that the Soviets, whenever there was a new President, would start some trouble to test that President's character and guts.

What has helped me see things more clearly, is a better understanding of multiple cultures. By that I mean, I take the basic principles of honor, duty, courage, and war and try to find similar aspects in other people's cultures. Therefore I understand others through my prism, yet I enlarge the size of my prism at the same time. By making more and more connections between my core tenets and between what I see from other cultures, peoples, and events, I am also able to double check with nature to see if my conclusions are right. If they are not contradicted by nature, then I can safely go on believing my premises are correct. If something weird happens, like 1 million Shia in Iran committs hara kiri instead of honor killing their daughters, then well, I'd have to readjust my views.

It is basically chess after 30 moves, and only 2 pieces have been captured. Your skills at calculation and positioning becomes... taxed. There are so many variables on the board, that it is a test of true skill and knowledge. You know when you get something right, by how it plays out. Unlike chess, reality plays out in one total game, where pawns get promoted and pawns get born, the game never ends. And the pieces that die or are captured, do not magically regenerate by replacing the board.

[Grumpy]

Laughing Wolf, This is a GREAT POST! Especially in these times, this is a balanced meal. This is one of those things you take and put it into the "crockpot of your mind". Let it stay there and slow cook for a while, it'll be even better. Thank you, sir! "Grumpy"

[Caleb]

In my opinion, be it ever so humble, we have in the past and still continue to get ourselves in deep s**t because we refuse to simply believe that opponents really mean exactly what they say? Why is it so unthinkable that old Amyjihad in Tehran means exactly what he has been saying? He says that we are soft. He says that we are corrupt. He says that we are highly beatable on the field of battle. Why is it so hard to simply agree that that is what he really thinks and acts upon? But no, we are always looking for hidden meanings, hidden messages, hidden agendas. He says that Israel has to be wiped off the map, and is proceeding to plot to make that happen.

We have a whole cadre of national intelligence agencies and individuals in both the legislative and executive branches, including the White House itself, that are operating on the belief that the Chi-Coms are bluffing, that they are not really building up their military to any great extent, and if they are, it is not meant to be a threat to us. The Navy has a strong cadre of flag officers and field grade officers that not only believe that meme, but also do everything possible to promote that view. It has led to stunning intel failures, but it goes on undaunted. Nobody dares believe that the more militant leaders of the Chi-Coms believe and mean exactly what they say about building up to take us down. Ah so, the inscrutable Orientals, always speaking in riddles, never saying what they mean. Oh yeah, are you sure? Oh, and what about Dear Leader, Kim, in NK? Surely he doesn't mean all the mean things he says about us and the threats that he makes. Oh yeah, prove it.

Maybe, just maybe it is time to take some of these folks at their word and believe what they are saying. Maybe, just maybe Bush didn't really see into Putin's soul when he looked into his eyes. Isn't it past time to quit listening to Baker, Scowcroft, and the band of globalist, conventional wisdom, thinkers that have messed up before? Didn't they do enough damage during the first Bush administration. Look at what worked so very well for Reagan. Reagan told our allies and our opponents exactly what he was going to do, and then went out and did it. In Iceland, he told the head Communist no and proposed complete nuclear disarmament, then walked out when the Russkys said no. Everyone that claimed to know anything, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, said that he didn't mean it, it was all bluff. If wasn't, was it. He let the whole world know that he intended to see the Soviet Union defeated, and he proceeded to guarantee that outcome before he left office, and it happened during the first two years of his successor. My how many times the foreign policy elite have tried to deny Reagan the credit for the fall of the USSR. Thank heaven Maggie Thatcher has been around to keep the record straight.

Sometimes people mean what they say, and we are trying to be so cleaver that we essentially beat ourselves, simply because we refuse to believe. Think about it.

[Andy]

What you call "mores" intelligence professionals call "cognitive bias." It's an enduring problem for intelligence analysis that can never be completely overcome because the root cause is human psychology.

As a long-time intelligence professional, I'm very worried about the future. This article sums up most of my concerns:

http://www.cyberneutics.com/publications/SurvivalFeb06.pdf

The problem of cognitive bias in intelligence analysis has been studied extensively by CIA academics, intelligence professionals and psychologists. Most of this groundbreaking work has been declassified and is now available here:

https://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/Default.htm

One notable monograph is titled, "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" and is available here:

https://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html

[Tammi]

While only placing my toes into the corporate world of analysis, I do know enough to say BRAVA LW. Excellent post. And the Mores you speak of are exactly why I am such a fan of brainstorming and checks. I never consider an analysis complete without branching out and gathering outside input. To make sure I'm not allowing my mores to bias my analysis.

But on the flip side, it is also those very mores that make me valuable in my role. The same is true, IMHO, in all venues of analysis. Each of us have obtained our values, views and basis via individual trials. IOW it allows us to look outside the box and see things in a different vein.

So we need the checks and balances to make it all work. We also need people that have history, experience, knowledge.

Sadly, it seems that many feel it's their way or no way. And, I think, that is the bottom line issue that often times bites us in the behind. We don't finish the process. We need both parts of the procedure.

Great Post!!!

[jordan]

Good points all, not just for the analyst, but for those up the chain who have to be persuaded by the results. The product has to get into the right hands, and for that to happen, that chain has to be persuaded, or it'll never get "out of the building", and is therefore useless. As these are the "culture" enforcers, its a tricky process.

Repeated, habitual self-checks as conclusions are being formed can also help (not from lack of confidence but as part of the process.) Are you going down a path that eventually will be useful to an operator or policymaker, or is it angels dancing on the head of a pin? Is it intellectual "masterbation" or potentially relevant in the real world? It's easy to get stuck in your own head, enamored of your pet ideas. Not many have the humility to avoid this, but maintaining a clinical detachment can help.

People who become analysts tend to be cerebral, enjoying the hunt with the brain as predator. The problem is sometimes you don't even know what animal you're hunting for. You've sometimes got large gaps in information, and that's where your biases and prejudices can get you in trouble. Some of the worst intelligence failures of late have been the acceptance of bedrock assumptions that went unchecked for a long time. When they've gone back, often they're chagrined to find those old assumptions were made necessary by the absence of data, i.e., unknowns.

The Stockholm Syndrome question is a good one for think tankers and area-studies experts to mull over. People like Robin Wright, now a WaPo writer, have spent decades in MidEast studies, and of course know alot about their subject. Walid Phares' last book, however, lays out how intellectuals and academics failed to raise the flag when throughout the seventies, it was apparent that MidEast extremism was a growing and serious threat. He accuses them of downplaying or being an apologist for disturbing trends that should instead have sounded alarms in government. You can see traces of that in her work.