BLACKFIVE: The John Hillen Commentary on Fallujah

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The John Hillen Commentary on Fallujah

Posted By Blackfive

Many of you have sent me the Commentary from John Hillen (via the NRO). BTW, John Hillen was a Paratrooper and Special Operations Officer before advising and writing on defense issues.

It's great, but I think that you should hear another part of the story from a Brigadier General who was there, too. First, here's Hillen's observations:

Our Best and Bravest
A young Marine officer talks about Fallujah.

By John Hillen

I went to a presentation by a young Marine infantry lieutenant last week about the platoon he led in the assault on the insurgents in Fallujah a few months ago. It was fascinating stuff for us military types — acronyms were being slung with abandon. Some points were particularly worth noting and sharing:

The intensity of combat in Fallujah: Of the 46 Marines in this lieutenant's platoon, 20 were evacuated for wounds during the three days of fighting and only four emerged completely unscathed.

Some 20-odd insurgents were captured by his company during the battle, but there was not a single Iraqi amongst them. Muslims from all over the world, they were aspiring jihadists who had found easy recruiting networks through their local Mosques in their home countries, which plugged them right into the insurgency.

Most chose not to be captured. When surrounded in buildings and repeatedly told to surrender, they chose to fight on and become martyrs.

Many of the insurgents were injecting themselves with stimulants, bringing to mind the Moro guerillas in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century.

Intel was sparse to nonexistent at his level — a figure-it-out picture. His intelligence preparation of the battlefield amounted to urban-combat drills. When the operation kicked off, he took his men into their assigned sector of town, found what insurgents were there (usually by taking their fire), and then used fire and maneuver to destroy them or compel their surrender.

Iraqi forces fighting with them were a mixed bag, ranging from very courageous and dependable to downright sympatico with the insurgents.

The "gloves off" rules of engagement in Fallujah had a profound effect in other trouble areas, where the populace became remarkably more cooperative and engaged with the Marines after word leaked of the Americans' tough approach with the jihadists in Fallujah.

Incidentally, some sophisticate tried to prompt the young officer into musings on how he and his Marines felt about the mission in Iraq and our purpose there. The lieutenant gave a gold-plated answer, noting that his focus was on his Marines and his Marines' focus was on each other, which provided the platform for any purpose. As in all wars, ultimately the men fight for each other — perhaps one could even say firstly they fight for each other. He also noted, though, that among the things they stumbled on in Fallujah was a torture house (he showed pictures) with hooks hanging from the ceiling, black masks, knives, al Qaeda-like jihadist literature, and other more gruesome evidence of what went on there. "Nobody had a problem focusing on why we were there," he said, with Gary Cooper-like understatement.

Twenty-four years old, a Tufts graduate from a well-to-do family, he chose to go into Marine infantry and along with that rigorous training he attended the Army airborne school and even the special-warfare scuba school, one of the most physically demanding courses the American military has. This is the caliber of the young officers leading our combat troops on a confused and complex battlefield. This generation of young combat leaders is going to be a great resource for America for a number of years to come, whether they stay in the military or pursue other ventures.

And, via Seamus, here's the comments from the Brigadier:

...the “sophisticate” in the audience asked the young lieutenant how he, or his Marines, felt about attacking into Fallujah following this sequence of events:

1. Ambassador Bremer initially, last spring, wants to attack Falluijah following the contractor deaths – against the advice of virtually every Marine commander there.

2. Then Bremer, after being warned that the Marines would wreak great devastation, orders the Marines to attack. Surprise, surprise, the Marines do exactly what they predicted – great success with huge enemy casualties. Bremer can’t handle it and orders the Marines OUT of Fallujah - when the attack was only partially complete.

3. THEN, after many months, the “administration” reverses itself and orders the Marines – and Army – BACK in to Fallujah to do the job they wouldn’t let them do in the first place, now having given the insurgents the better part of a year to stockpile weapons and reinforce.

The young lieutenant answered that his Lance Corporals, who had been following not only the tactical situation but the political situation back in the U.S., predicted an attack in early November. They were, of course, right.

Had the administration listened to Marine commanders in the first place, the entire thing might have been avoided. Then they didn’t listen the second time either, and compounded their first mistake. They then finally come to their senses and order the most recent attack, but at great cost to our Marines and soldiers. Too bad they didn’t listen to the Marine leadership in the first place……and by the way, that Lieutenant was a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the “sophisticate” who posed the question was a retired Marine general...

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March 04, 2005 • Permalink
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Many of you have sent me the Commentary from John Hillen (via the NRO). BTW, John Hillen was a Paratrooper and Special Operations Officer before advising and writing on defense issues.

It's great, but I think that you should hear another part of the story from a Brigadier General who was there, too. First, here's Hillen's observations:

Our Best and Bravest
A young Marine officer talks about Fallujah.

By John Hillen

I went to a presentation by a young Marine infantry lieutenant last week about the platoon he led in the assault on the insurgents in Fallujah a few months ago. It was fascinating stuff for us military types — acronyms were being slung with abandon. Some points were particularly worth noting and sharing:

The intensity of combat in Fallujah: Of the 46 Marines in this lieutenant's platoon, 20 were evacuated for wounds during the three days of fighting and only four emerged completely unscathed.

Some 20-odd insurgents were captured by his company during the battle, but there was not a single Iraqi amongst them. Muslims from all over the world, they were aspiring jihadists who had found easy recruiting networks through their local Mosques in their home countries, which plugged them right into the insurgency.

Most chose not to be captured. When surrounded in buildings and repeatedly told to surrender, they chose to fight on and become martyrs.

Many of the insurgents were injecting themselves with stimulants, bringing to mind the Moro guerillas in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century.

Intel was sparse to nonexistent at his level — a figure-it-out picture. His intelligence preparation of the battlefield amounted to urban-combat drills. When the operation kicked off, he took his men into their assigned sector of town, found what insurgents were there (usually by taking their fire), and then used fire and maneuver to destroy them or compel their surrender.

Iraqi forces fighting with them were a mixed bag, ranging from very courageous and dependable to downright sympatico with the insurgents.

The "gloves off" rules of engagement in Fallujah had a profound effect in other trouble areas, where the populace became remarkably more cooperative and engaged with the Marines after word leaked of the Americans' tough approach with the jihadists in Fallujah.

Incidentally, some sophisticate tried to prompt the young officer into musings on how he and his Marines felt about the mission in Iraq and our purpose there. The lieutenant gave a gold-plated answer, noting that his focus was on his Marines and his Marines' focus was on each other, which provided the platform for any purpose. As in all wars, ultimately the men fight for each other — perhaps one could even say firstly they fight for each other. He also noted, though, that among the things they stumbled on in Fallujah was a torture house (he showed pictures) with hooks hanging from the ceiling, black masks, knives, al Qaeda-like jihadist literature, and other more gruesome evidence of what went on there. "Nobody had a problem focusing on why we were there," he said, with Gary Cooper-like understatement.

Twenty-four years old, a Tufts graduate from a well-to-do family, he chose to go into Marine infantry and along with that rigorous training he attended the Army airborne school and even the special-warfare scuba school, one of the most physically demanding courses the American military has. This is the caliber of the young officers leading our combat troops on a confused and complex battlefield. This generation of young combat leaders is going to be a great resource for America for a number of years to come, whether they stay in the military or pursue other ventures.

And, via Seamus, here's the comments from the Brigadier:

...the “sophisticate” in the audience asked the young lieutenant how he, or his Marines, felt about attacking into Fallujah following this sequence of events:

1. Ambassador Bremer initially, last spring, wants to attack Falluijah following the contractor deaths – against the advice of virtually every Marine commander there.

2. Then Bremer, after being warned that the Marines would wreak great devastation, orders the Marines to attack. Surprise, surprise, the Marines do exactly what they predicted – great success with huge enemy casualties. Bremer can’t handle it and orders the Marines OUT of Fallujah - when the attack was only partially complete.

3. THEN, after many months, the “administration” reverses itself and orders the Marines – and Army – BACK in to Fallujah to do the job they wouldn’t let them do in the first place, now having given the insurgents the better part of a year to stockpile weapons and reinforce.

The young lieutenant answered that his Lance Corporals, who had been following not only the tactical situation but the political situation back in the U.S., predicted an attack in early November. They were, of course, right.

Had the administration listened to Marine commanders in the first place, the entire thing might have been avoided. Then they didn’t listen the second time either, and compounded their first mistake. They then finally come to their senses and order the most recent attack, but at great cost to our Marines and soldiers. Too bad they didn’t listen to the Marine leadership in the first place……and by the way, that Lieutenant was a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the “sophisticate” who posed the question was a retired Marine general...

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