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Impressions of Iraq
The following Memorandum was produced by Ed McCarthy who visited Iraq just a few days ago. Mr. McCarthy is a DOD exec in charge of training units to get ready for war - specifically at JRTC, CMTC or NTC. He is known for some great successes with training for troops headed for the Balkans.
I apologize for all of the military abbreviations in the memo, but I didn't want to alter it.
Blackfive
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
Subject: Impressions – IRAQ – 19-23 October 3003
This memo contains my impressions developed during a 19-23 October 2003 visit to Iraq. I am indebted to the commanders who opened their thoughts and units to me. This is not meant to be a critical piece, as I have not walked in their moccasins. I have not written letters to families as have these great leaders. This is intended to be a forward looking, nor a rearward pointing, think piece.
1. An infantry battalion commander told me, “You can’t assume kindness will win their hearts. You’ve got to get in sync with the Arab male mentality – then they will respect you – tough but fair.
2. From point 1 comes the need to balance “Dignity and Respect” with operating within the cultural norms. Do we compromise our values to operate within their value set as did Laurence of Arabia? At what point on the toughness scale does the new unit enter the fray? This is a really tough decision for the leadership of the new unit – and I do not think it should be left to subordinate leaders to make this determination.
3. Units have got to have their game face on before they leave the operating base. Standards have got be impeccable. This means looking correct enough that no one who wants to live would dare attack you. Units that do not demonstrate this degree of professionalism will invite attacks. I went on an early morning raid with a mechanized unit. We looked as tough as tough could be. The operation went off without incident – every soldier looked ready for action all the time. As we returned, after daylight, we passed a logistics convoy. Soldiers were not postured with the same alertness as ours; some were out of uniform. Later on, we observed a lone vehicle drive by – the policy is three, two of which must have crew served weapons. Both the convoy and the lone vehicle were inviting attacks. In the train up for this mission, I would inflict kills every time on ill disciplined convoys and lone vehicles to make the “Game Face” point.
4. Before Units enter theater, everyone must understand the capabilities of CA, PSYOPS, CI, THT. I also hear this point consistently from rotations in the Balkans.
5. Units training for this mission need to practice drills from vehicles in all environments for ambushes, raids, and manning Ops.
6. Translators should be treated as a pacing item. The battalion that I joined for the raid only had three translators – one was a CAT II, the other two were hired locally by the battalion. I am told not every battalion has a CAT II. We have forgotten what we learned in the Balkans. How do we manage perceptions, win hearts and minds, or just operate safely if we cannot communicate with the population? Soldiers detain people, search homes, and order people around without being able to explain to them what is happening. This is a recipe for disaster.
7. I spoke to a CPA representative who routinely speaks with a local Imam. In a recent conversation the Imam stated that three months ago, he used to get one request a week for a Fatwa (sp) to kill an American soldier. These requests have increased to three a day. The two main reasons for the requests are:
a. The way we treat their woman
b. The retention of their men
Now think back to the shortage of translators – This could be a second or third order effect of poor communications – we can’t reach the people.
8. There is always the feeling that “platoon headquarters” does not know what is going on. Most useful intelligence seems to be self generated by units. Scott St-Cyr has the key. Some days ago he expressed his philosophy to me. He said, “I work for the king. The king can be the squad leader who needs the information.” That is really healthy – but tough.
9. Relationships are more important here than they are for units operating in the Balkans -- build them fast; but watch who you build them with. A commander can give stature to a thug just by paying attention to him in a group.
10. All operations should be preceded with a risk assessment. The next step is to rigorously seek ways to mitigate risk. Absent this, force protection can be a crap shoot.
11. Each time units mount an operation, we will, by nature, upset a portion of the population. We should use Information Ops to mitigate this much the same as we identify actions to mitigate risk after doing a risk assessment. Actions might be as simple as the production of a flyer explaining what we are doing and why; a phone number for an IRAQI OFFICE that family can contact to get information on detained family members; cold be a MEDCAP etc.
12. Instincts are important. Leaders and troops must know what right looks like. Then, instinctively, they must know something is out of the ordinary.
13. We’ve got to get out front of the enemy’s IO. I heard over and over again, “Sheiks are the internet of IRAQ” – figure out how to leverage them!
14. Don’t write checks you can’t cash. Don’t write checks your boss can’t cash. Don’t promise anything till you’ve checked and double checked, and have the resources under your control. The first time you promise something and don’t deliver, you have no credibility with an Arab.
15. As the National Governing Council and field offices mature, operations and cooperation in the field will become more difficult. The Council in Baghdad is driving to centralization. The CPA and the Coalition is driving, bottom up, to decentralization. They are on a collision course. One of the implications is provincial governments, put in place by the Coalition, are not being paid -- by the government in Baghdad. They seem to be on a collision course.
16. Right seat left seat rides are significantly more important here than they are in the Balkans. Incoming commanders must gain a complete understanding of players and history of previous unit’s operations in the AO. The implications can be tremendous.
17. Troops I interviewed from previous rotations commented about conditions changing so much that ROE change or supplemental instructions were required, but not forthcoming. It might be prudent to review ROE regularly against METT-T-C. It might also be prudent to regularly review how ROE are being operationalized by subordinate units. In the extreme, frustration can be one heck of an enemy; it got my generation My Lai.
Ed McCarthy
29 OCTOBER 2003
November 06, 2003 • Permalink
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